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THE NEW REPUBLIC

WHY TOM DASCHLE IS RIGH
By Jonathan Chait

WHY THABO MBEKI IS WR
By Peter Beinart



WHAT WOULD JESUS HAVE DONE?

POPE PIUS XII, THE VATICA AND THE HOLOCAUST

By Daniel Jonah Goldhag

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THE ANTI-CHOICE FORCES ARE BUSY GETTING



The Supreme Court is only 1 vote away from overturning

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THEIR DUCKS IN A ROW...



Influential anti-choice forces are working to fill the next vacancy on the Supreme Court with a like-minded judge. The plan to overturn Roe v. Wade is well underway. We must save Roe.

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C O R R E S P O N D E N C E

Rex populi

TO THE EDITORS:

Theodore Roosevelt, in his inaugural address as president—not of the United States, but of the American Historical Association—complained: "Many learned people ... feel that the quality of readableness in a book is one which warrants suspicion. Indeed, not a few learned people seem to feel that the fact that a book is interesting is proof that it is shallow." Christine Stansell seems to be one of these "learned people," as shown in her review of *Theodore Rex*, by Edmund Morris ("Details, Details," December 10). She insultingly compares *Rex* to programs on PBS and to film scripts. Does she also consider NPR vulgar, or is it only visual images that seem anti-intellectual to her?

Stansell's review of *Rex* is confused and confusing. She does not like big books, which she regards as Victorian; but it seems that Morris's book is not long enough after all, because there is not enough material on historical context. She thinks Morris relies too much on Roosevelt's papers; but later she praises these same epistles for their perspicacity. Actually, over 70 collections of papers are listed in Morris's notes. Stansell complains that recent scholarship has been ignored, and yet Morris's notes at the back of the book cite many sources from the 1980s and 1990s. And let's be clear: One of the reasons Morris's book is so big is that 166 pages are notes. Stansell doesn't even like the title *Theodore Rex*. "America does not have kings," she says indignantly; the title is "lifted from the sensationalist press of Roosevelt's day." Apparently she didn't read page 370, on which we find that the title was from Henry James, hardly associated with the yellow press. Stansell even complains that *Rex* is too attractive and inexpensive! But most people will probably continue to watch PBS, go to movies, and read Edmund Morris.

JOHN A. GABLE
Executive Director
Theodore Roosevelt Association
Oyster Bay, New York

CHRISTINE STANSELL REPLIES:

The problem with *Theodore Rex* isn't that it is too long or too "visual." Nor that it is "too attractive and inexpensive." The problem is that it is pretentious, boring, and unreadable. I stand by my criticisms.

Pickin' up

TO THE EDITORS:

I appreciated Ruth Franklin's kind comments in her review of my book, *Temperament: The Idea That Solved Music's Greatest Riddle* ("Good Vibrations," December 10). If I may, however, I would like to raise one point of disagreement with her. Franklin notes, as I did, Galileo's description of the musical harmony of a fifth as "giving at the same moment the impression of a gentle kiss and of a bite." She then goes on to say that on the modern piano, "that is not what you will hear," implying we have lost something precious because the instrument is tuned in equal temperament. Yet one of the peculiarities of equal temperament is that the fifths are actually very close to pure. In fact, since most tuners "stretch" the octave to compensate for the natural inharmonicity (out-of-tuneness) of the piano's strings, the fifths end up being, for all intents and purposes, pure indeed. Hence, Galileo's characterization of that harmony is just as apt when the notes are played on a modern Steinway as they were on an instrument of his time. That Franklin believes otherwise shows how easily our musical perceptions are colored by philosophy and the opinion of "experts." And that was one of *Temperament*'s themes.


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THE
EMILY DICKINSON LIVES!
Helen Vendler, R. B. Kitaj
THEODORE ROOSEVELT LIVES!
Christine Stansell
THE COMING WAR AGAINST SADDAM
By Lawrence F. Kaplan

STUART ISACOFF
Closter, New Jersey

TO THE EDITORS:

Ruth Franklin's "Good Vibrations" struck quite a chord. The vibrations of musical strings have moved the best of minds. Brian Wilson wrote a rock symphony about those magic musical intervals. In his younger days Brother Brian would take his trusty tuning wrench to the piano of the day, tempering the strings—flattening some, sharpening others—until he was pleased more than repulsed. Franklin took me back to my early days as a roadie for the Beach Boys. At sound checks Brian would tinker and tweak and every so often he would howl like a wolf. Until Franklin's article, I never knew Brian was reacting to a murderous "wolf tone." I just thought he was stressed.

DAVE RAO
Via the Internet

TO THE EDITORS:

I very much enjoyed "Good Vibrations." However, I would note that Ruth Franklin takes almost entirely a pianist's or a listener's point of view—ignoring how other instruments regularly pull from untempered scales for different purposes. A string player will tune in perfect untempered fifths—not tempered ones—so that the instruments will fully vibrate, and a soloist (be it wind, string, or voice) will often pull the seventh note of the scale slightly higher or the flat third of the scale slightly lower to tighten tension within the melody. This happens both by design (in tuning) and by instinct (in melody) to maintain some of the beauty of the natural overtones or to better evoke where one is in the "terrain" of the scale. It's also true that these tendencies have to be reined in when playing with a piano, to avoid obvious conflict with the tempered tuning. Cellists even need to tune the lower two strings just slightly higher than they do for solo (or string quartet) playing to better "fit" with the piano's tuning. Overall, it is certainly true that the quality of the musician's playing will always be more important than the tuning; but for musicians who play instruments that offer more control over the intonation, the mix of tempered and untempered will regularly be used to service of the music, and therefore I've never considered it to be an either/or type of choice.

KATHERINE TYRKA
Paris, France

Counterplan

TO THE EDITORS:

Noam Scheiber's article "Wretched Excess" reminds us of Joseph Schumpeter's theory that periodic technological breakthroughs lead not only to productivity increases but to overoptimism and overinvestment, necessarily bringing capital losses for investors and unemployment for workers in those industries (December 3). Scheiber points out that monetary policy cannot by itself overcome these effects of misinvestment. But he goes on to argue that "with the sort of capacity glut we're now facing, just about every policy response—tax cuts, spending increases,

continued on page 45

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TRB

FROM CAPE TOWN

Social Disease

TO AMERICAN EYES, Thabo Mbeki is a contradiction. Throughout his political career, he's been known as a pro-Western moderate. He favored diplomatic rather than military efforts to end apartheid; he enjoys long-standing friendships with the captains of South African industry; his economic policies have been an IMF dream. And yet on AIDS, he spews Afrocentric nonsense—denying that Western science can help his people, claiming that racists are exaggerating the scope of the disease, and flirting with homegrown quack cures. A recent *New York Times* editorial remarked, "It is hard to understand how Mr. Mbeki, a reformer in many other ways, can be so irresponsible about AIDS."

Actually, from a South African perspective, it's not hard to understand at all. In the United States we take it for granted that "left-wing" economic policy and "left-wing" race policy go hand in hand: If you believe in redistributing wealth, you probably also believe in affirmative action. But in South Africa it's often the reverse: The left has generally been associated not with racialism, but with multiracialism. And capitalism and Afrocentrism often go hand in hand.

A major reason is that throughout the twentieth century, the easiest way for whites to enter the anti-apartheid struggle was through communism. (This was particularly true for Jews, who brought a tradition of labor radicalism with them from Eastern Europe.) By arguing that South Africa's fundamental conflict was not racial but economic, white leftists legitimized their role in the liberation movement. The still-influential South African Communist Party has long discouraged an excessive focus on race; in American parlance, it has always opposed identity politics.

But precisely because it has, South Africa's black racialists have generally viewed communism with suspicion. They have dubbed it a "European" import, a pretext for whites (and Indians) to control the anti-apartheid movement. And their anti-communism has often made South Africa's Afrocentrists sympathetic to the free market. In 1959, racialists formed the Pan-African Congress, which suggested that Nelson Mandela's African National Congress (ANC) was being controlled by whites and Communists. In the 1980s, Zulu leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi wooed American conservatives by arguing that his tribalism was more conducive to free-market economics than was the ANC's multiracial leftism.

This is the line of attack that Mbeki has now adopted as well. Within the ANC, he has long been considered a soft-liner. As Adrian Hadland and Jovial Rantao point out in their book *The Life and Times of Thabo Mbeki*, he played no role in the ANC's military campaign against the white government and, indeed, opposed the movement's 1985 decision to begin targeting civilians. In the late '80s, he led the ANC's efforts to woo influential white South African businessmen—becoming so chummy with some of them that colleagues in the ANC whispered that he was a government spy. To become Mandela's successor, he beat out two more militant rivals—ANC military chief Chris Hani, who was felled by an assassin's bullet in 1993, and Cyril Ramaphosa, the street-wise former head of the National Union of Mineworkers. As Anton Harber, former editor of the South African newspaper *The Mail and Guardian*, has put it, Mbeki "was known to the business community, having been the ANC's front-man dealing with them for some years.... But he did not have a popular base."

If his populist credentials weren't already suspect enough, since taking office Mbeki has pursued an economic policy that both admirers and critics call "Thatcherite." He has cut the budget deficit, reduced inflation to its lowest rate in 30 years, and slashed tariffs faster than the World Trade Organization requires. And he has been rewarded internationally, as Moody's and Standard & Poor's have upgraded South Africa's credit rating to investment-grade.

At home, however, Mbeki's free-market orthodoxy has brought howls of protest from South Africa's labor federation and Communist Party—both major players in black politics. To Mbeki's chagrin, South Africa's unions launched a major strike against his privatization policies just days before last summer's high-profile UN anti-racism conference in Durban. And there is reason to believe that the unions and the Communists accurately reflect public sentiment. In late 2000, *The Economist* quoted a survey showing that almost 50 percent of South Africans believed the government owed them a free house, and the same percentage believed that banks should be forced to lend to poor people, even if they can't pay back the loans.

Set against this backdrop, Mbeki's AIDS quackery is politically comprehensible. He is doing what black South African politicians have always done when attacked from the left: He is playing the race card. As *The Mail and Guardian* put it recently, "a kind of racial insecurity" characterizes Mbeki's statements about AIDS. His advisers have accused international pharmaceutical companies of exaggerating the epidemic's severity in order to sell drugs. Last October he said that international AIDS activists saw Africans as "germ carriers and human beings of a lower order." His first health minister notoriously claimed that South African researchers had found a homegrown cure for the virus, and his current health minister recently distributed a document saying that whites introduced AIDS as a plot to kill blacks.

Mbeki's rivals in the Communist Party and the labor federation have taken the bait. In keeping with their anti-Afrocentric tradition, they have criticized his refusal to give antiretroviral drugs to pregnant women, and called on him to accept the Western scientific consensus that HIV causes AIDS. At first blush, Mbeki's strategy has worked—he can finally lay claim to racial authenticity. One of his key lieutenants has even called for purging the ANC of Communists in order to make it a more genuinely black party.

The problem, of course, is that Mbeki is pursuing his political gambit on the back of the worst plague in modern history. Shrewd racial politics or not, millions of South Africans are still dying of AIDS. And there is reason to believe that South Africa's president has guessed wrong—that most black South Africans care much more about saving lives than they do about blaming whites. Last year Mbeki's approval rating dropped from 70 percent to 50 percent, and Chris Landsberg, a political scientist at Johannesburg's University of the Witwatersrand, told *The New York Times*, "The AIDS policy and the communication of that policy was simply an unmitigated public relations disaster." The good news, then, is that South Africa's president may be learning a lesson about the limits of racial demagoguery—an especially timely lesson given the horrifying events in neighboring Zimbabwe. The bad news is that while he has been learning it, millions of his countrymen have needlessly died.

PETER BEINART

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Home Economics

WHEN PRESIDENT BUSH tapped Paul O'Neill to be secretary of the Treasury roughly one year ago, it looked like an intriguing choice. O'Neill was a successful industrialist and—surprisingly for a Bush appointee—a good government wonk who favored campaign finance reform and doubted the economic wisdom of the administration's $1.6 trillion tax cut. O'Neill seemed to have only one major weakness: a lack of experience in international finance. But sympathetic observers—this magazine included—hoped he could overcome it by soliciting expert advice.

He has not. Instead, O'Neill has tried to make a virtue of his ignorance by advocating a kind of economic isolationism. And that ignorance has contributed to the Bush administration's disastrous international economic policy.

O'Neill's predecessors, Robert Rubin and Lawrence Summers, assumed that the global economy was an integrated whole in which a crisis in one part of the world could easily spread to another. Operating from that assumption, they intervened in trouble spots all over the world—Mexico in 1994, Asia in 1997, Russia in 1998. And these interventions prevented, or at least stemmed, economic catastrophes.

O'Neill does not share his predecessors' view. He has mocked Rubin as "the chief of the fire department" and called the theory of interconnected markets a "fashion" that needed to be retired "like the hula hoop." And now in Argentina, the costs of O'Neill's view are becoming grimly apparent. This past summer Argentina—facing unemployment climbing toward 20 percent and unable to repay the money it had borrowed to back up its currency, which in 1991 the country's currency board pegged to the dollar—asked the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for debt relief. O'Neill was unsympathetic. "They've been off and on in trouble for 70 years or more," he told *The Economist* (in an interview the investment bank UBS Warburg later called "amazing, astonishing, appalling"). "Nobody forced them to be what they are." O'Neill's comments weren't merely callous; they actually made Argentina's condition worse: By suggesting that the United States would not approve an IMF loan, he helped cause interest rates on private loans to Argentina to rise even more.

In August, O'Neill relented and approved an $8 billion IMF loan to Argentina. But instead of making the demise of the currency board a condition, he ludicrously suggested that Argentina persuade some of its creditors to "voluntarily" write off its debts. And he insisted that Argentina's government create a "zero deficit" by drastically slashing its public spending. That was a Hooveresque recipe for civic unrest, not economic revival. But O'Neill called the agreement "an important step," and in October declared that the Argentinean budget cuts "sound good to me."

By December, Argentina's unemployment rate was growing even higher, and when the government in Buenos Aires balked at further cuts, the IMF, with O'Neill's support, withheld further money until it agreed to more reductions in public spending. To please O'Neill and the IMF, Argentina moved to cut pensions and eliminate over 20,000 more jobs. The result has been riots, the collapse of the government, and now the country's fifth president in one month. Meanwhile Argentina has defaulted on its loans—the largest default in history—and devalued the peso.

The Bush administration insists that Argentina's problems are "isolated to Argentina." But that may be wishful thinking. Argentina is Latin America's third largest economy, and the devaluation of its currency could set off a trade and currency war with other Latin American nations that would deprive the United States of vital export markets. (Latin America is one of the few regions with which the United States maintains a trade surplus.) There are also political costs. In addition to Argentina, at least nine other Latin American countries suffer Depression-era levels of unemployment and poverty. And in many of them, populist, authoritarian, protectionist, and anti-American forces are on the rise. America's apparent indifference to Argentina's suffering has only strengthened their hand.

September 11 undermined the Bush administration's conviction that the United States had little to gain from an active diplomatic and military role in the world. But the administration's national security internationalism now stands in stark contrast to its continuing economic isolationism—a blithe and unwarranted confidence that the globalization-related turmoil in poorer precincts of the globe cannot damage the American economy and does not deserve sustained attention from top U.S. officials. This ignorance-is-bliss doctrine will not change unless the Bush administration finds a Treasury secretary with the skill and desire to help the United States intelligently manage the global economy once again. And Paul O'Neill, it is now painfully clear, will never be that man. ■

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NOTEBOOK

PAT ROBERTSON V. AMERICA, ROUND II: The last time we heard from Pat Robertson, it was shortly after September 11, and he was furiously distancing himself from his good friend Jerry Falwell. Falwell, appearing on Robertson's show, "The 700 Club," had said the terrorist attacks were "probably what we deserve" given "all the pagans, and the abortionists, and the feminists, and the gays and the lesbians" living in the United States. And although Robertson had concurred with Falwell's comments when he originally uttered them ("Jerry, that's my feeling," were his exact words), a few days later—following a huge public outcry—Robertson deemed the comments "inappropriate." Except that now, on "The 700 Club," Robertson has done his friend Falwell one better. "America will survive what is coming," he declared ominously, "but it won't survive in its present form. The proud will be humbled and then the time will come that they will turn to the Lord.... And, there's one last thing that the Lord led me to in Isaiah.... 'Destruction is certain for those who say evil is good and good is evil, that dark is light and light is dark, that bitter is sweet and sweet is bitter.' Those who say evil is good and good is evil, and that's what's happening in this country. Certain perversions, sexual perversions for an example, are being touted as a privileged activity, and those who oppose it are being called evil." And just to make sure no one missed the significance of his vision of "destruction" for those who tout "sexual perversions," Robertson added, "I do believe that San Francisco is going to be a target of these people"—i.e., the terrorists. And to think we'd foolishly imagined that the only people looking forward to the destruction of American cities were in Al Qaeda.

TORCH SONG: Ever since prosecutor Mary Jo White declined to indict him last week, New Jersey Senator Robert Torricelli has performed a rather ostentatious victory dance. Never mind that it looks like he escaped prosecution thanks largely to a recent Supreme Court decision making it harder to convict officials of illegal gratuities. And never mind that White has referred the case to the Senate Ethics Committee. To anyone who will listen, Torricelli is declaring vindication and complaining of his persecution at the hands of *The New York Times*. He's even begun calling himself "the New Jersey Wen Ho Lee." But on last Tuesday's "Imus in the Morning," he went a step beyond his usual self-righteous self-pity, denying that he brought his campaign contributor David Chang into a 1999 meeting with South Korean officials. "I had no idea what this man was doing in the room," claimed Torricelli. "He showed up." Here, the Torch seems to have forgotten a few facts regarding "this man." For starters, Chang hosted multiple fund-raisers for the Torch, and gave him tens of thousands of dollars; he also chartered a jet that shuttled Torricelli around New Jersey. Then there's the senator's intervention with the State Department on Chang's behalf, including a 1995 letter that read, "I wholeheartedly recommend Nikko Enterprises and, in particular, their senior vice president, David Chang." Finally, there is the 1999 meeting in question, at which Chang pushed to buy an insurance company run by the South Korean government. According to the *Times*, both the then-Korean finance minister and then-American ambassador to South Korea say that Torricelli personally brought Chang to the meeting and spoke up on his behalf. "Nobody sneaks into a meeting with the Korean finance minister," said the ambassador, Stephen Bosworth. Let's hope the Ethics Committee is listening.


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RUMS-FELD
Pentagon
WE COULD ADD $10 BILLION UP HERE AND WATCH IT FLOW DOWN THROUGH THE LINES AND PUT SMILES IN ALL THE LITTLE BOXES.
Pentagon
TWENTY! MAKE IT TWENTY BILLION! I'M TIRED OF THESE HALFWAY MEASURES!
— YET ANOTHER FELLOW WHO'S SUCCUMBED TO MY GRUFF CHARM.
TOLES
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LOSING FAITH: "$5.6 trillion is the amount in question that's generally agreed to be the surplus amount over the next ten years: $2.6 trillion for Social Security, $1.6 trillion for this proposed reform of the tax system, and $1.4 trillion for contingencies and to give us room for possibly other things.... [W]e're well within the limits of how much money we're going to raise over the next ten years with the structure of the tax system we've proposed."—Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill, "Meet the Press," March 4, 2001

"I think those numbers [showing that two-thirds of the ten-year surplus have vanished] are just not credible. And I would say one other thing. I think people who believe as a religion in ten-year numbers haven't lived in the real economy."—O'Neill, "Meet the Press," January 6, 2002

SORRY PERFORMANCE: Transportation Secretary Norm Mineta would seem to have a lot of apologizing to do these days. After all, his department has utterly failed to abide by a recently enacted law designed to strengthen aviation security in the wake of the September 11 attacks. It will miss congressionally imposed deadlines for enacting some of the law's measures—such as screening luggage for explosives on all domestic flights—and ignore others altogether—such as the one requiring all airport security screeners to have a high school diploma. But Mineta hasn't been very contrite about these failures. "There aren't enough people," he complained on November 27. "There aren't enough bomb-sniffing dogs to be able to do the job." Rather, Mineta has saved his apologies for an instance when airport security was the opposite of lax. After *The Washington Post* alerted Mineta this week that security screeners at National Airport had taken Michigan Representative John Dingell aside and asked him to remove his pants for a more thorough search after his artificial hip set off metal detectors, Mineta called Dingell to grovel. "The secretary got ahold of Mr. Dingell and told him he is appalled," Mineta's communications director, Chet Lunner, told the *Post*. "'[H]e said, 'John, I feel your pain. I fly commercial all the time, and it seems like they sometimes pick out public officials to make an example of them and show how thorough they are.'" Or maybe they're just trying to do their jobs. Perhaps Mineta should start doing his.

A FICTION WRITER, A LIAR, AND A PLAGIARIST: "In an interview, Mr. Rove depicted how this White House had learned from the triumphs—and travails—of other presidents. He has summoned several leading historians to the White House to meet with staff members, and often the president.... [P]residential scholars who have visited the White House include Edmund Morris, the biographer of Theodore Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan... Joseph J. Ellis of Mount Holyoke; and Stephen E. Ambrose, who wrote biographies of Dwight Eisenhower and Richard Nixon."—*The New York Times*, January 9



THE SHELF GROWS: We are pleased to announce the publication of *Jane Addams and The Dream of American Democracy* by Jean Bethke Elshtain (Basic Books) and *The Jane Addams Reader* edited by Jean Bethke Elshtain (Basic Books), a veritable revival of the thought and the example of a great American figure; and *Race Experts: How Racial Etiquette, Sensitivity Training, and New Age Therapy Hijacked the Civil Rights Revolution* by Elisabeth Lasch-Quinn (Norton), and *Essays on Hitler's Europe* by István Deák (University of Nebraska Press), some of whose fruit first fell from the TNR tree. ■

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On the Hill

Paper Chase

By MICHAEL CROWLEY

HE PRONOUNCED Bill Clinton a "scumbag." He presided over endless hearings on every Clinton scandal, real or imagined. He fired a bullet into a "head-like object"—reportedly a melon—in his backyard to test the theory that former White House counsel Vincent Foster was murdered. And so, not surprisingly, Indiana Congressman Dan Burton was widely viewed by Democrats during the Clinton years as a partisan wacko. In May 1998 Massachusetts's Barney Frank spoke for many of his colleagues when he labeled the silver-haired scold "incompetent, abusive, out of control, the worst kind of McCarthyite."

But at a little-noticed committee hearing last month, Frank sang a very different tune: "Mr. Chairman, I want to begin by apologizing to you," he told Burton, in all apparent sincerity. "[I]n the past, I had a question about whether there was too much partisanship in some of your approaches. And by the intellectual integrity you were displaying today, I think you've made it clear that that was not a basis for what you were doing. And I admire you enormously."

The cause of this startling encomium from the normally acerbic Frank was Burton's latest battle—this one with the Bush White House. Furious that the administration has invoked "executive privilege" to prevent the release of various Justice Department documents, Burton last month called a hearing of the House Government Reform Committee, which he chairs, to investigate the case of an innocent man whom the Boston FBI allowed to spend 30 years in jail for murder. Demanding access to internal agency memos detailing the case, Burton sounded like the 1990s all over again: "[T]his is not a monarchy.... [I]f this president and if his legal staff continues to try to block us from getting access to records at the White House or at the Justice Department to which we're entitled, then they are going to be having to deal with this committee, day in and day out, for ... as long as I am chairman."

Frank's not the only liberal who's reevaluating Burton in light of his squabble with the Bush administration. A recent *New York Times* editorial denouncing the president's executive-privilege claim cited Burton approvingly. When Burton appeared on Fox's "Hannity & Colmes" in December, liberal host Alan Colmes gushed, "I know for years I've not always said the nicest things about your attacks on Bill Clinton, thinking that it was partisan ... but I certainly see that you are consistent in your views." And Burton is promoting this man-of-principle story line himself. At last month's hearing he declared that Democrats who had denounced his Clinton investigations "are going to find that it was because I really believe what we were trying to get to the bottom of."

But Democrats may want to think twice before accepting Burton's makeover at face value. For while it's true that he's angry about Bush's efforts to restrict public and congressional access to executive branch documents, the dispute is ultimately procedural. Unlike his battles during the Clinton years, the ultimate goal of Burton's current crusade is not to dig up documents that will embarrass the current White House. Indeed, Burton's latest fulminations may actually be a convenient way for him to continue pursuing his old obsession with Clinton and Janet Reno. Frank's praise notwithstanding, many Democrats are convinced that Burton's real concern is that if Bush persists in claiming executive privilege over law enforcement papers, Burton could lose access to Clinton administration memos capable of proving his wildest conspiracy theories. "He's afraid of what this means for Clinton [documents]," says a Democratic aide to the Government Reform Committee. "The Clintons are gone, but not from our committee."

FROM ITS BEGINNING the Bush administration has shown a disturbing penchant for secrecy. First there was the stonewalling of Democratic efforts to get details about Dick Cheney's energy task force—tactics that appalled even the former GOP activist who heads the General Accounting Office. Then, in November, Bush issued a constitutionally dubious executive order effectively restricting the release of papers from former presidential administrations, which are supposed to be easily available after twelve years (see "Cover Letter," by Josh Chafetz, August 27, 2001).

But Burton did not go into attack mode until last month, when the president invoked executive privilege in response to document requests from the Government Reform Committee. The most publicized of these was for decades-old memos related to the Boston FBI fiasco, in which a corrupt relationship between federal agents and brutal mobsters during the 1960s resulted in the framing of an innocent man, Joseph Salvati. Some bureau officials may have been aware of Salvati's innocence but said nothing in order to protect their mob contacts. (Salvati spent three decades locked up until he was exonerated by a judge last year.) Committee members, including Burton, were understandably taken aback at the White House's decision: It was the first time a president had denied Congress access to so-called "deliberative documents." In what sounded like a statement of new White House policy, administration lawyers argued that turning over such papers endangers legal confidentiality and could cause a specter of political recrimination to influence future Justice Department deliberations.

But the Salvati papers weren't all Burton was after. Less noted was his simultaneous request for Justice Department memos from the investigation—surprise!—of the 1996 Clinton-Gore fund-raising scandals. Specifically, Burton wants to see a memo to Reno, written by former Justice Department lawyer Robert Conrad, detailing the case for a special prosecutor to investigate Al Gore's fund-raising. The memo, which has never been made public, holds a Grail-like appeal for Clinton conspiracy enthusiasts. Burton is also after memos that might show why the Justice Department didn't indict other figures from the fund-raising imbroglio,

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including former Clinton White House aide Mark Middleton. While these questions may seem stale now, they'll freshen up quickly if Gore runs for president again in 2004. And as long as Hillary is in the Senate, Clinton scandals will make GOP hearts quicken.

Bush's secrecy edicts could ultimately lead to a tense showdown with Burton and other erstwhile allies in the congressional GOP. "There are a lot of people on the Hill who see this as part of a much larger effort to retrench on providing information to Congress and the public," says a House Republican aide. "A lot of people are willing to go to war on that broader effort." Connecticut Republican Chris Shays, a member of Burton's committee, agrees. "There has to be a battle. The House just can't sit back." Burton has scheduled four more hearings on the FBI issue, and aides say House legal staffers have begun discussing legislation to force the White House to hand over the Justice Department memos and relax its new proposal governing presidential records.

But the brewing fight over administration secrecy is notable for what it's not—namely an effort to uncover wrongdoing by the Bush White House. So don't hold your breath waiting for a return to the old days of marathon hearings on White House ethics. Because to date Burton's fight with the current administration has been primarily about his desire to keep investigating the former one. Indeed, Burton treats the question of whether he will examine the ethics of the Bush White House as borderline preposterous. When new admirer Colmes asked the congressman about a possible investigation into Enron's ties to the administration, for example, Burton snapped, "Alan, let's don't go way beyond the pale here." Sorry—for a minute we forgot whom we were dealing with. ■

White House Watch

Lay Men

By Ryan Lizza

President Bush's Wednesday afternoon was supposed to be free. At least that's what his official schedule said. Between his two o'clock return from a speech on education and his six o'clock fund-raiser for his brother Jeb, his schedule was empty. But in a last-minute revision, photographers were ushered into the Oval Office at 3:30 to snap pictures of the president signing the "Everglades Protection Agreement." Earlier in the day the White House also sent notice that Bush had just signed the African Elephant Conservation Reauthorization Act and the Rhinoceros and Tiger Conservation Reauthorization Act.

These environmental events serve as a canary for journalists watching the coal mine of the Bush administration. They seem to pop up whenever there's an increase in news about Bush's ties to big business and his efforts to roll back environmental regulations. (Remember the green-washing that occurred after the administration repealed arsenic standards and released its energy report last year?) And sure enough, as a complement to their election-year attack on Bush's handling of the budget and economy, Democrats are reviving their critique of Bush as a foe of the environment and a captive of special interests. This week's news that Bush will likely roll back air pollution standards for some coal-fired power plants and end an eight-year government program to help produce more fuel-efficient cars gave that assessment some traction (hence the Everglades signing). But the real vehicle for the Democrat's new assault will be the nascent Enron investigations in Congress.

Conspiracy buffs and anti-Bush liberals assume that because of the administration's ties to Enron, the investigation into the company's collapse will expose some corruption on the part of administration officials. But congressional Democrats are trying to tamp down such expectations. When it comes to officials formerly on the Enron payroll—like Bush economic adviser Larry Lindsey, U.S. Trade Representative Bob Zoellick, or Secretary of the Army Thomas White, for example—Hill Democrats show little interest. "Probably not a single one of them had the foggiest idea of what Enron was doing or how it was doing it," says an aide to Joe Lieberman, chairman of the Governmental Affairs Committee, which begins its Enron hearings on January 24. Democrats say they have learned a lesson from the GOP's investigations of Bill Clinton, when Republicans repeatedly claimed they would uncover "corruption" and then repeatedly failed to do so. (Remember Fred Thompson's dramatic allegation, at the outset of the 1997 campaign finance hearings, of a massive Chinese plot to influence the 1996 presidential campaign?) Those charges set the political bar too high, says an aide to Henry Waxman, who is conducting his own investigation of Enron as the ranking member of the House Government Reform Committee. "If you couldn't prove corruption, then your case fell apart."

Instead, Democrats want to use Enron as a vehicle for a broader indictment of the White House. They hope to link people's perceptions of the company—a secretive, arrogant, anti-worker institution that hid its cooked budget numbers with good p.r.—to their perceptions of the Bush administration. And in that way, Democrats hope to cast the White House as beholden to corporate fat cats once again—a perception they think was catching on before September 11.

If democratic investigators do find a Bush-Enron smoking gun, it will probably be that someone in or close to the administration was part of one of Enron's 33 secretive partnerships, which the company apparently used to hide billions of dollars in debt from its balance sheets. The partnerships, which Enron's CFO Andrew Fastow used to fleece the company of some $30 million, were essential to Enron's collapse and will be a primary focus of the hearings. Nobody knows how many people took part in the partnerships or how one got into them. Did a company that specialized in cultivating VIPs reward any politicians with one of these shady deals?

But such a revelation is unlikely. Democrats are more confident that the Enron scandal will put the GOP on the defensive on some key legislative issues—for instance,

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campaign finance reform, which has passed the Senate and is just a few signatures short of being brought to a vote in the House by way of a discharge petition. The Enron investigations, Democrats think, could shed light on the shady, if currently legal, means by which a company as aggressive as Enron can throw its money around in politics without disclosing it. Some Democrats hope the hearings will uncover nonpublic sources of support by Enron, like issue-advocacy groups that push the Bush agenda. "These groups don't file anything," says a Democratic aide. "They are all funded by special interests, but it's all laundered. And they are really hard things to pierce. Maybe one thing that Enron can do is shed some light on that." A full accounting of how Enron influenced Washington could push discussions of campaign finance reform beyond the stale debate over soft money—and beyond the current bill—that has dominated Congress for the last few years.

The upcoming hearings have also revived questions about the relationship between Enron and Vice President Cheney's energy task force. The General Accounting Office (GAO) must soon decide whether to sue the White House over Cheney's refusal to turn over documents and answer questions about the way the task force operated. The investigation once seemed dead, but now, even if the GAO doesn't go forward with its suit, Lieberman's committee will almost certainly explore Enron's influence on Bush's energy policy. The White House took a baby step last week toward cooperating with Waxman, who requested the GAO probe, and revealed that Enron officials met with Cheney staffers six times, including the previously revealed half-hour meeting between the vice president and Enron Chairman and CEO Kenneth Lay.

Democrats have big plans for Lay, whose ties to Bush are well documented. When W. was governor, Lay was his biggest financial supporter. And Bush, at Lay's request, talked up the company—pitching it to both an ambassador from Uzbekistan and to Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge. Lay attended Bush's economic summit in Texas last January, and dined with Bush and other executives at the White House last February. He was reportedly considered for energy secretary and advised Bush's transition team on energy policy. Lay even gave Bush's personnel adviser a list of individuals he endorsed to serve on the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, which oversees aspects of Enron's business, and Cheney's task force embraced several key Enron priorities. Several paragraphs of the task force report promoting the unregulated energy derivatives that were the core of Enron's business read like promotional literature from Lay.

While it is still unclear what Lay actually knew about Enron's partnerships and when he knew it, Democrats will surely try to make him every Republican's running mate this fall. (It is known that Lay sold millions of dollars worth of Enron stock in the months before the company's demise, even as Enron employees were prevented from moving their retirement savings out of the company.) "Here's this guy, Ken Lay, who is consulting with the administration and possibly influencing appointments," says a Senate Democratic aide working on the hearings. "If you did listen to him, what exactly is he responsible for? What did he tell you? What did you do for him?... And if the guy turns out to be charged criminally, well, then that's a story—a big story."

But even if he isn't, Democrats hope to publicly tether the GOP to K Street and corporate America, which always take a p.r. beating during recessions. And they think Republicans are walking into their trap. The new Republican Party chairman Mark Racicot, for instance, is an energy lobbyist who only recently dropped his now-radioactive Enron account. The GOP still seems intent on pushing new corporate tax cuts for all those left out last year. During the newsless interlude between Christmas and New Year's Eve, Bush quietly killed a regulation that would prevent chronic corporate lawbreakers from winning lucrative federal contracts. And the administration has signaled that a whole spate of other environmental, health, and safety standards may be next. The Enron hearings will amplify all of this. The Democrats probably won't find a smoking gun. But, at the very least, Bush will have to spend a lot of time talking about rhinoceros conservation and the Everglades. ■

There he goes again.

Recount

By JONATHAN CHAIT

IT'S HARD TO think of a fiscal argument that's been refuted as quickly and spectacularly as the one President Bush made on behalf of his tax cut last year. (Sure, in 1993 just about every Republican economist and politician argued that President Clinton's tax hike would destroy the economy, but that prediction took several years to be disproved, by which time almost everybody had forgotten about it.) Just six months ago Bush insisted we could pass a huge tax cut, save the entire Social Security surplus, increase military spending, and fund new domestic programs—and still leave aside plenty of money for unforeseen contingencies. Now, of course, not only is the government dipping into the Social Security surplus, it's due to run actual deficits for the next few years.

Yes, the vanishing surplus is due mostly to factors other than the tax cut; but that was exactly the critics' point: They said over and over that it was unrealistic to assume there would be no unanticipated claims on government largesse or substantial drops in economic growth. "[T]he president's tax cut leaves almost nothing for the next ten years for natural disasters or national defense emergencies," argued then-Minority Leader Tom Daschle last February. "[I]f our economy slows even a little, the surpluses people are predicting now could easily turn into deficits instead." But not even Daschle and his fellow liberal critics thought it would happen so fast. As it turned out, the skeptics weren't skeptical enough.

Given all this, you might think that Bush and his supporters would be somewhat chastened. But far from apologizing, Republicans have actually spent the last week on the

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offensive—gleefully accusing Democrats of plotting to raise taxes, a charge Democrats have been frantic to deny. House Minority Leader Dick Gephardt released a defensive statement pleading against a "partisan blame game." The phrase is telling: It's not supporters of the Bush tax cut who fear being blamed; it's their opponents. Something deeply perverse is going on here.

BUSH CAPTURED THE alternate-universe quality of the current debate in his "not over my dead body" speech last Saturday. "There is an amazing new kind of economic theory working its way through Washington, and it said that tax relief causes recessions," the president declared. "The worst thing you can do is raise taxes during a recession."

Consider the various dishonesties packed into these two short sentences. The first is that Democrats believe Bush's tax cut precipitated the recession, a canard that has since reverberated through the echo chamber of the conservative punditry. Bush is distorting a speech given two days before by Daschle, who argued not that the tax cut caused the recession, but that it failed to avert it (as Bush had promised it would) and may make it longer. How could the tax cut worsen the recession? By raising interest rates. It's simple supply and demand: Businesses compete to raise capital. Budget deficits force the government to soak up some of that pool of capital. When the supply of capital available to the private sector shrinks, the cost rises, which is reflected in higher interest rates. So, for instance, when Clinton pledged to reduce the deficit, long-term interest rates fell. Since passage of the Bush tax cut, the expectation of future deficits has pushed up long-term interest rates. This counteracts the short-term stimulus of tax cuts.

Then there's Bush's claim that Democrats want to raise taxes during a recession. Now, it's true that Daschle and Co. have been extremely slippery about their desire to undo the Bush tax cut, couching their plans in euphemisms like "restore fiscal responsibility." But when it comes to which elements of the plan they propose to undo—er, restore to fiscal responsibility—they explicitly say *only those that will take effect after this year*. After all, a huge portion of the Bush tax cut won't take effect until his second term, by which time the recession will almost certainly have ended. And rescinding future tax cuts now—such as the estate tax, which is scheduled for repeal in 2009—not only wouldn't slow down an economic recovery, it could actually help it along by lowering long-term interest rates.

But the silliest claim peddled by Bush and his allies is that Democrats want to "raise taxes" at all. The liberal position, remember, is to cancel out those portions of the Bush tax cut that have yet to take effect. Tax cut proponents insist that this constitutes a tax hike. Appearing on CNN last weekend, pro-tax-cut Democrat John Breaux was specifically asked about taxes "in the long run"—an important detail because it signifies that the question was not about repealing tax cuts that have already gone into effect. Breaux replied, "to go back on that program would, in effect, be a tax increase."

When you tell most people they're getting a tax increase, of course, they think their tax rate is going to go up. Canceling the unimplemented portions of the Bush tax cut would do no such thing. It would merely give people a smaller tax cut than they had been promised. You could argue that once the government has promised a future tax cut, any downward deviation from that promise counts as a tax increase—and indeed this seems to be the position that Republicans are taking. But it's a spectacularly dishonest one, for two reasons. First, to minimize its ten-year budgetary cost, the Bush tax cut is scheduled to phase out entirely after 2010, at which point (barring what tax-cutters hope will be a routine extension) taxes will revert to their pre-Bush level. So, according to the logic being used against Democrats, supporters of the Bush tax cut actually voted for the largest tax *increase* in American history.

The second problem is that, when it comes to spending, Republicans have consistently taken the exact opposite position. Remember the Republican Revolution's jihad over Medicare? Since the population of elderly people was growing, as was the cost of medical care, it cost the government more money each year to keep the program at a constant level of services. The GOP Congress wanted to give Medicare more money each year in absolute dollars, but less than what was required to maintain its level of services. Republicans insisted that this did not constitute a "cut" in Medicare, and successfully browbeat most of the media into banishing the word from its reporting.

Bush has adopted this same logic himself. He ridicules the notion that federal programs need to account for inflation and population growth as funny Beltway math. "We've had to learn new accounting," he likes to say. Or, as he guffawed last year, "in Washington, the definition of a cut is that you haven't increased the budget as much as anticipated." But in Bush's White House, the definition of a tax increase is that you haven't cut taxes as much as anticipated. When Bush said he had to learn new accounting, maybe he wasn't kidding. ■

The EPA's terrorism handbooks.

Easy Reading

By MICHAEL FUMENTO

"CHEMICAL PLANTS ARE FEARED AS TARGETS." That was the headline of a frightening front-page article in the Sunday, December 16, *Washington Post* about the potential vulnerability of American chemical storage and production facilities to terrorists. "At least 123 plants each keep amounts of toxic chemicals that, if

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released, could form deadly vapor clouds that would put more than one million people in danger, according to an Environmental Protection Agency analysis," the newspaper reported. One example: "The Atofina Chemicals Inc. plant outside Detroit projects that a rupture of one of its 90-ton rail cars of chlorine could endanger three million people."

How did the *Post* obtain these details about potential mass homicide via toxic or flammable chemicals? Shoe-leather reporting? Sources at the FBI? Actually, no. A *Post* reporter, Guy Gugliotta, got the information by walking into an EPA "reading room"—one of about 50 scattered across the country and open to the public—flashing a photo ID, and signing a piece of paper. You could do the same thing. And so could any terrorist interested in prospecting for potential targets among the nation's 15,000 chemical facilities.

IF THAT THOUGHT spooks you, you're in good company. In May 1999 Robert M. Burnham, then chief of the FBI's Domestic Terrorism Section, told a congressional committee that public access to such extensive information about chemical waste would provide "a blueprint for a potential terrorist attack." The CIA, ATF, Justice Department, Secret Service, Fraternal Order of Police, and International Association of Fire Chiefs have offered similar warnings. But incredibly, even in the wake of September 11, neither Congress nor the EPA has taken the threat seriously enough to prevent public disclosure of the information. Following the attacks in New York and Washington, the EPA did remove general information about chemical facilities from its website. (Many other federal and state agencies pulled related material from their websites as well.) But the far more detailed information in the reading rooms is still available to anyone with a driver's license.

The ease with which this information can be accessed worries counterterrorism experts for two reasons in particular. First, as with the fuel-laden jetliners of September 11, the weapon is already there: No lethal chemicals need be smuggled into the country, carefully hidden, or expertly spread. Second, again like the suicide hijackings—which followed a series of similar, but unsuccessful plots—it wouldn't be the first time terrorists targeted chemical facilities. In 1997 the FBI broke up a plot by four white supremacists to blow up a hydrogen-sulfide tank near Dallas. Two years later the agency arrested a militia leader and an alleged bomb maker for planning to blow up a propane storage facility outside Sacramento. And perhaps most disturbing was an explosion that ripped apart a petrochemical facility in Toulouse, France, just ten days after the World Trade Center collapsed. Three hundred tons of ammonium nitrate blew up, killing 29 people and devastating a chunk of the city. While the French government quickly declared it an accident, last October the minister of the environment claimed on television that "information [has] reached us which shows that there might have been a terrorist origin." (To date, the cause of the blast remains unexplained.)

In short, we know that chemical facilities in the United States have been targeted by terrorists in the past and that law enforcement agencies consider them vulnerable to attack today. We know that an attack undertaken with detailed knowledge of chemical toxicity, potential release rates, probable spread under particular wind conditions, etc., could have adverse health impacts on many thousands, perhaps millions, of Americans. And we know this information is publicly available in reading rooms across the country. "To put that out in a public venue is unconscionable," says John Eversole, formerly in charge of hazardous materials and terrorism for the Chicago Fire Department. "It cannot be rationalized by any sane person."

FEDERAL "RIGHT-TO-KNOW" legislation dates back to the Emergency Planning And Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) of 1986, which designated more than 600 toxic chemicals and required industries to reveal the amounts they released, both on- and off-site. The information was, and is, available on the EPA's Toxic Release Inventory website.

But environmentalists complained that the information wasn't specific enough. And so, in its 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act, Congress required facilities that produce or store relatively large amounts of toxic or flammable materials to provide the EPA with "Risk Management Plans," or RMPs. Among other information, each RMP is required to provide an "off-site consequence analysis" (OCA) consisting of a "worst-case scenario" and a less drastic "alternative release scenario." (The term OCA is generally used to describe both sections, because they refer to potential harm to surrounding populations as opposed to that of employees.) For each chemical, the OCA provides information on potential release rates, total quantities that might be released, how the chemical would spread at certain wind speeds, and the maximum possible exposure the surrounding population might suffer—extraordinarily valuable information for a potential terrorist. As with the 1986 EPCRA legislation, Congress declared that the information should be available to the public, but left specific implementation of this mandate to the EPA.

As the deadline for companies to submit their RMPs approached, the EPA decided that the best way to make them public was to post them to its website, as it had done with the EPCRA material. The FBI sounded the alarm. Along with other law enforcement agencies, it stirred up such a fuss that the EPA was forced to back down. Jim Makris, director of the EPA's Chemical Emergency Preparedness and Prevention Office, announced that the more sensitive OCA sections would not be Web-posted but would be made public in some other fashion. But the proposed solution—making the data available in electronic form through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)—didn't seem much better, as nothing would prevent individuals or groups who obtained the material from posting it on their own websites.

So shortly before the EPA was scheduled to begin releasing OCAs via FOIA requests, Congress heeded law enforcement protests and stepped in. In 1999 it passed legislation that prevented obtaining OCAs by FOIA or in any electronic format. Members of Congress then patted themselves on the back for having saved the Republic and went home. But the mandate to make the OCAs publicly avail-

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able remained, and so one year later the EPA, having gone through the proper rule-making process, put them in the reading rooms.

At the time some observers realized that the problem hadn't been solved. In his testimony, the FBI's Burnham worried that "certain groups and individuals will acquire the information through lawful means [i.e., paper copies handed directly to recipients] and post it in its entirety on private Internet sites." Indeed, several advocacy groups had announced their intention to do just that—and at least one has made good on its promise. The Greenpeace USA website now has OCA data, gleaned from the Washington, D.C., reading room, for more than 50 chemical facilities, mostly in southern Louisiana. Greenpeace even provides handy maps that give the location of schools and hospitals in relation to the toxic plume. (My calls to the group's head office went unanswered.)

So what is being done to prevent this information from falling into the wrong hands? Makris believes proper safeguards are in place. "Do you know the restrictions?" he asks emphatically. "You can only look at ten [OCAs] per month [outside of your own geographical region]. You can take notes but can't walk away with paper copies."

Yes, I knew the restrictions. The week before I had gone to one of the reading rooms and obtained access to the documents using my Virginia driver's license. (It bears noting that at least seven of the September 11 terrorists also had Virginia driver's licenses, though none lived in Virginia.) My ID was checked against my face, but not against any list.

It's true that visitors can view only ten documents from outside their own area per calendar month—but this is hardly onerous either. According to the reading room manager, some people come in on the last day of the month and the first day of the next month, thus gaining access to 20 documents in two days. More importantly, a would-be saboteur doesn't need 10 or 20 or more OCAs; he only needs one. And finding the right one wouldn't be hard: The EPA allows visitors to the reading rooms to conduct electronic searches by various criteria—including the types of chemicals produced or stored at the facilities in question. (The RMPs are printed out and given to the visitor.)

It's also true that upon leaving the reading room you must return the downloads, at which point each page is meticulously counted and later shredded. But given that visitors are allowed to take notes as copious as they please, this restriction doesn't mean much. I looked at a document that, at 85 pages, was apparently one of the longest in the system, and was able to copy down all the pertinent information in one hour. Someone with a palm-sized camera or camcorder could (illegally) record documents as fast as he could flip the pages. Nobody watches over you.

Makris emphasizes that, whatever its limitations, the reading room system provides "a record of who shows up." But he concedes that this applies only to people who use legitimate IDs. He says that using information from the reading rooms for a terrorist attack "would certainly require a lot of intelligence and a lot of luck.... You'd have to hope the weather conditions would be ideal. You'd have to have detailed technical information. You'd have to know atmospheric stability." But isn't that exactly the point? The OCAs, after all, offer detailed technical information.

In fact, Makris's low estimation of the potential danger of making this information publicly accessible appears to contradict a joint risk assessment by the Department of Justice and the EPA itself, published in the Federal Register in April 2000. The assessment says that "traditional means of creating or obtaining [weapons of mass destruction] are generally difficult to execute," while "[i]n contrast, breaching a containment vessel of an industrial facility with an explosive, or otherwise causing a chemical release, may appear less difficult to a terrorist and may also appear attractive in light of the pervasiveness of industrial facilities possessing toxic or flammable chemicals and their proximity to high-population areas." While noting that "some of the OCA information that is cause for concern is already publicly available"—for example, that which is sent out by companies trying to reassure local populations—the joint assessment notes the particular risk associated with the material in the reading rooms: "Easy access to OCA information would be helpful to someone seeking to cause [industrial chemical releases] because it would provide 'one-stop shopping' for refined targeting information, allowing terrorists to select potential targets from among the 15,000 facilities that have submitted OCA information."

Defenders of the current system argue that allowing public access to information about chemical plants also serves public safety—by informing people about the consequences of accidental release of hazardous material. As Representative Henry Waxman put it during the 1999 hearings, "we cannot keep this information out of the hands of terrorists without endangering people."

Waxman is right that there is danger on both sides of the equation. And it's understandable that an accidental release seemed the greater threat in 1990, when the amendments to the Clean Air Act mandated public disclosure of the OCAs. Back then, the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the Oklahoma City attack, and September 11 had not yet occurred; the tragedy on people's minds was still the chemical release at a Union Carbide plant in Bhopal, India, that had killed 3,000 people six years earlier. (Ironically, a 1988 report conducted by the consulting firm Arthur D. Little backed up Union Carbide's assertion that Bhopal itself was not an accident, but rather the result of inside sabotage.) But the intervening eleven years have surely shown that it is now terrorism that represents the greater concern. And yet the requirement for public access to vast amounts of detailed information about lethal chemicals remains law.

A better way to implement Congress's public access mandate would be to restrict OCA access to persons living or working in the area. "The concept of right-to-know is that it's for people affected, not for obtaining information about facilities thousands of miles away," says American Chemistry Council communications director Susan Roth. Others have suggested allowing those with the most to lose—the

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chemical facilities themselves—to maintain the OCAs and allow public access under more stringent restrictions. Best of all would be for Congress to revisit the 1990 legislation requiring public disclosure of RMPs altogether. (The information would, of course, still be made available to employees at the facilities themselves and to emergency response services.)

But closing the reading rooms—even temporarily—isn't on anyone's agenda on Capitol Hill. "As I understand it," says one staffer on the House Energy and Commerce Committee, which has oversight of chemical facilities, "you have to have photo ID, you can't Xerox anything, and you're only allowed to go in for a certain time [not true] and get ten documents. That's a lot to go through." No, it's a cakewalk. But don't be too hard on her. After all, we used to think that presenting a photo ID, answering two questions about baggage, and walking through a metal detector was enough to prevent terrorists from attacking our airliners, too. ■

The case for funding curiosity.

Fighting Chance

By SIDDHARTHA MUKHERJEE

IN THE SUMMER of 1987, nearly 15 years before words like "anthrax" and "bioterror" saturated our vocabulary, an unassuming biology professor named John Collier went to hear a graduate student give a talk on *Bacillus anthracis*. Collier was interested in anthrax because of a peculiar property of the bacteria. Anthrax, like a few other microbes, extrudes a deadly toxin that is capable of wreaking havoc on human cells. In fact, anthrax's most frightful symptoms—the coal-colored dimples that erupt into pustules and the volcanic hemorrhages that pour out of the organs—are actually just manifestations of this toxin's actions. And yet, despite decades of intensive military research on anthrax, little was known about how the toxin worked or how humans could be protected from its effects.

Collier was actually something of an aficionado of bacterial toxins. In the mid-1960s and 1970s, he and a group of colleagues had deciphered the mechanism for the toxin made by diphtheria. In his laboratory at Harvard, Collier had another set of graduate students tinkering with a toxin produced by a bacterium called *Pseudomonas aeruginosa*. So while listening to that talk in 1987, Collier decided that anthrax would be his next target. "It wasn't even a conscious choice," he recalls. "As a biologist, you just *had* to be intrigued."

In the wake of September 11, Collier's reasoning is worth remembering. Since the World Trade Center fell, there have been numerous exhortations to the nation's scientists to turn their attention to the terrorist threat. The Pentagon and the Department of Health and Human Services have issued calls to researchers for proposals that pertain to the War on Terrorism. Nearly $2 billion in funding is now available for anti-terror research. Georgia Senator Max Cleland has even called for a new anti-terror Manhattan Project to be led by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), declaring: "This is a race for the best minds, the best talent, and the best technology we can find in the realm of biological, chemical, and radiological warfare."

But Collier didn't embark on a 15-year investigation into anthrax because he was worried about bioterrorism or germ warfare. In fact, his early scientific papers and grant applications don't even mention the words. Collier spent thousands of hours picking the toxin apart, piece by piece, simply because he was curious about the basic biology and chemistry of the proteins. And in retrospect, there was probably something inherent in that curiosity—in Collier's becoming "intrigued" with anthrax toxin as a quandary of basic biology—that ultimately accounted for his success.

All of which suggests a paradox. In the post-September 11 world, it's tempting to think of curiosity-driven science as an anachronistic luxury. Wars inevitably make nations pragmatic about spending. And so there is already public pressure to funnel billions of dollars into applied research, into research that directly intersects with the dramatic changes in the political sphere. But Collier's story suggests the pitfalls of such an approach: Ironically, Collier may have cracked the mystery of anthrax toxin precisely because he *wasn't* out to curb the threat of bioterrorism. In other words, even in these pressured times, we may be better off leaving such scientists alone—to follow their curiosities wherever they lead.

This dichotomy—between science driven by curiosity and science driven by applications—began long before the War on Terrorism. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, Franklin Roosevelt found himself embroiled in a similar national debate. Back then, the case against funding curiosity-driven research seemed obvious. For much of the American public, the Manhattan Project—conducted by scientific SWAT teams in military laboratories—had shown that applied science was far more efficient than the arcane musings of academic namby-pambies tucked away in university labs. On August 7, 1945—the morning after the Hiroshima bombing—*The New York Times* declared, "University pro-

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fessors who are opposed to organizing, planning and directing research after the manner of industrial laboratories ... have something to think about now. A most important piece of research was conducted on behalf of the Army in precisely the means adopted in industrial laboratories. End result: an invention was given to the world in three years, which it would have taken perhaps half-a-century to develop if we had to rely on prima-donna research scientists who work alone.... A problem was stated, it was solved by teamwork, by planning, by competent direction, and not by the mere desire to satisfy curiosity."

If the trends augured by that editorial had persisted, Collier would have never even *started* work on anthrax toxin. Anthrax—like the Bomb—was, after all, a military problem. In fact, by the mid-'60s, anthrax research was already in full swing in the U.S. Army laboratories at Fort Detrick, Maryland. Scroll back through the early scientific literature on anthrax, and you'll find scores of scientists from Fort Detrick plugging away on various aspects of the microbe. They produced microscopic studies on how the organism forms spores, and careful disquisitions on the structure of its outer coat. In 1967 a journal called *Federation Proceedings* ran a whole seminar series on anthrax, most of which emerged from labs at Fort Detrick.

Superficially, these studies were flawless. But it's impossible to compare them to the rigorous brilliance of Collier's research—to the carefully dissected experiments, or the complete immersion in the biology of the toxin that characterized Collier's early years at Harvard. Even Collier, who has a reputation for reticence, agrees. "The military researchers contributed greatly to anthrax research," he says, "but the mechanism of the toxin wouldn't have been so quickly solved had university labs not gotten involved as well."

Indeed, in Collier's hands, the search for an anthrax antidote took a completely different turn. For ten years, beginning in 1987, Collier and his team delved deeper and deeper into the basic biology of anthrax toxin. For Collier, anthrax toxin became a sort of intricate wind-up toy, whose inner clockwork could be solved only by taking the whole unit apart. The toxin itself, it turned out, was actually a conglomerate of three distinct proteins: Lethal Factor, Edema Factor, and Protective Antigen. Each member of this trio seemed to play a critical role in the toxin's action. Protective Antigen led the charge: A fragment of the protein bound itself to the surface of cells and formed aggregates on the cell surface. Lethal Factor and Edema Factor then bound to these aggregates, entered human cells through a "pore" created by the Protective Antigen fragments, and proceeded to poison the cell.

By the late 1990s Collier's work on these details began to yield astonishing payoffs. Once Protective Antigen's critical role had become clear, Collier realized that he might be able to thwart the toxin by blocking Protective Antigen directly. And last year Collier's team published two landmark papers describing not just one but two such anti-toxins directed against Protective Antigen. Preliminary studies with the new drugs far exceeded Collier's modest expectations. Laboratory animals medicated with either of the molecules became totally immune to lethal doses of anthrax toxin. If the same sort of drugs worked in humans, Collier argued, they could potentially combat even the "late stage" of anthrax, the frightful crescendo of the illness, when the disease can no longer be curbed by conventional antibiotics or vaccines.

In short, anthrax turned the logic of the Manhattan Project on its head. In the brief span of 50 years, the paradigm of research had dramatically changed, with academic scientists—the tweedy "curiosity-driven" professors once mocked by the *Times*—playing a critical role in understanding the toxin and the military researchers lagging behind.

WHAT HAPPENED? THE answer lies in the complete overhaul of science funding that began during Roosevelt's presidency. In 1944 FDR asked the head of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, an MIT-trained engineer named Vannevar Bush, to devise a science plan for postwar America. And, bucking prevailing sentiment, Bush produced a manifesto, entitled *Science: The Endless Frontier*, that would transform the compact between science and society. Bush's plan rested on one key assumption: that, in the short term, people would never grasp the true value of basic science. If basic and applied science were allowed to mix and compete freely, the latter would inevitably drive out the former. The only way basic science could survive—something Bush wanted to ensure—would be to completely insulate it from that competition, leaving basic scientists to pursue their work in peace.

The institutions charged with protecting basic science were the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the National Science Foundation (NSF)—near-autonomous scientific foundations that grew out of the Bush plan in the 1950s. By that decade's end, both institutions had become independent science-funding bodies, run for and by scientists. Shielded from political accountability, curiosity-driven scientists were given plush Ivy-league sandboxes and growing public largesse to spend. They could dismantle the structures of recondite proteins if they so pleased, or sequence the genomes of fruit flies—as long as other scientists deemed their goals scientifically worthwhile.

Princeton political scientist Donald Stokes, who spent his academic career studying Bush's compact, compared it to a "deal" between society and scientists. Society would invest unflinchingly in the basic sciences without insisting on premature technological rewards. Politicians and bureaucrats wouldn't go up to someone like Collier and say, "Now wait a second, haven't we funded research on anthrax toxin for five years? Where's the antidote?" In return, scientists would pursue basic research in good faith—being broadly receptive to the technological innovations that might emerge. It was this deal that allowed Collier to sit for 15 years at Harvard, plumly funded by NIH grants, calmly chipping away at the structure of a bacterial toxin, before finally producing a new drug that would block it.

But how do we know that "programmatic" research—research that aims to find cures for applied problems within specified periods of time—wouldn't benefit society more? In a provocative article in *Nature Medicine* in 1997, the physician and scientist Richard Wurtman argued that it

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almost certainly does. His case study was AIDS. AIDS, remember, was identified as a clinical entity among gay men in San Francisco and New York just 17 years ago. In 1993, at the heyday of the epidemic, scientists were uniformly pessimistic about whether HIV would ever be a curable infection. And yet, a mere eight years later, triple therapy with antiretroviral medicines—for those who can afford it—has made HIV into a largely treatable disease. That turnaround time of 17 years—between the discovery of AIDS and the discovery of a therapy—is a truly astonishing accomplishment in the history of medicine.

Wurtman contends that this rapid pace of drug discovery was the result of a paradigm shift in HIV research. In the early '90s, AIDS activists began campaigning ferociously for federal dollars to combat the disease. But instead of picketing the NIH for "more research," they demanded "effective treatments"—i.e., they didn't demand greater inquiry; they demanded better results. As Wurtman tells the story, scientists responded to these demands by revising their own ideas about research. Instead of digging in their heels against "mission-oriented," or programmatic, research, they began actively scouting for antiviral therapies—even before much of the basic biology of the virus was fully understood. Prodded along by impatient activists, HIV researchers somehow picked up on what Wurtman calls an "implicit call for accountability." And that combination of public accountability and programmatic focus, Wurtman believes, brought about the effective anti-AIDS drugs in record time.

But programmatic research has problems that Wurtman's parable doesn't acknowledge. The first is counterintuitive: It may be more expensive. In 1999 the NIH ran a complex accounting project in which it attempted to correlate the amount of money spent on a particular disease with some measure of the actual years of life that the disease had claimed from Americans (the so-called "disease burden"). The goal was to determine whether federal science money was being spent in a disease-proportional manner.

The results were astounding. For most diseases—even money guzzlers like cancer and cardiovascular research—federal spending was more or less proportional to the disease burden. The big exception was AIDS. In 1996 the NIH spent proportionally more public money on AIDS than on any other disease. Crudely put, programmatic research had indeed produced remarkable anti-AIDS drugs, but at an enormous price. And it's not hard to understand why the cost was so high. Once you declare "war" on a disease, Collier argues, "you would get plainly bad science—a lot of junk aimed at getting some of that pork-barrel money." After all, you have taken the ultimate funding decisions away from scientists and given them to politicians.

BUT THE PROBLEM with programmatic research isn't only that it may be more expensive; it's that it leaves little room for a critical feature of the discovery process: serendipity. Indeed, the history of HIV research itself offers eloquent testimony to the role of serendipity in science. Anti-HIV therapy was revolutionized in the mid-'90s with the discovery of a novel class of antiretroviral chemicals: protease inhibitors. These inhibitors block a critical step in the viral life cycle, the point when the virus is just about to launch itself out of an infected cell into another. That process, it turns out, is mediated by a critical enzyme called HIV protease.

HIV protease closely resembles another such protease found in the human kidney—renin—which is involved in regulating blood pressure. In fact, researchers had been scouring for an inhibitor for renin long before HIV arrived on the scene. These kidney scientists and blood-vessel biologists—some in pharmaceutical companies and some in academic laboratories—had nothing to do with the much-publicized "War on AIDS." But when the search for protease inhibitors intensified in 1990, it was this prior work that HIV virologists used to suddenly make the critical connection between the two completely unrelated fields—jump-starting the search for these revolutionary new drugs.

EXAMPLES OF SUCH serendipitous breakthroughs abound in the folklore of science. Sylvia Wrobel, writing in the scientific magazine *FASEB Journal*, relates the story of a mysterious and lethal infection that broke out in New Mexico, Arizona, Colorado, and Utah in 1993. Within days of the outbreak, the CDC deployed a team of top-notch scientists to ferret out the cause of the infection. Epidemiologists, virologists, and molecular biologists swarmed the desert looking for clues to its source. But the observation that clinched the discovery came from an extraordinarily unlikely source. Ecologists at the University of New Mexico had been tracking the population of deer mice to collect data for a completely unrelated project. And looking back at the ecologists' data, the CDC scientists noticed that the human infections seemed to occur just when the population of mice in the area swelled. With that clue in place, it took just a few weeks to discover a novel virus—called hantavirus—from the mice. The hantavirus discovery has long been considered a landmark CDC achievement. And yet, had the CDC declared a "War on Southwestern Fever," it's hard to imagine it would have funded a project on deer-mouse population ecology as part of that effort.

The point is that scientific discoveries often happen when they are least expected. Disparate nodes in knowledge are inexplicably connected through secret passages. And the danger is that a post-September 11 focus on programmatic research might demolish this *Looking-Glass* universe. One of the everlasting quirks of curiosity-driven science is that it allows kidney biologists to find themselves at the forefront of HIV research or mouse ecologists to become hantavirus hunters. And perversely, the more narrowly you define a scientific goal—hoping to focus and streamline discovery—the more you potentially logjam the discovery process itself, setting technology back as a result.

But for John Collier, there's a final argument for curiosity-driven research, and it has little to do with science money or scientific serendipity. In fact, it lies outside the reach of science itself—in the foggy realm of personality. And Collier could only explain it by walking me through a critical fork in his own life.

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In 1959 Collier, like any other ambitious college graduate curious about science, had to choose between going to medical school and becoming a basic biologist. He spent an entire year mulling the choice. At the end of his final summer in college, he chose to spend an extra year working in a laboratory. It would be "just for a year," he told himself—and then he would consider medical school again.

Collier's year in that laboratory wasn't particularly memorable. There wasn't any single moment of scientific epiphany. But something ineffable happened to him—a transformation he struggles to describe. When application season came around again, he said, medical school was no longer an option. Maybe it was "merely inertia," but he had become, as he put it, "somehow drawn in."

Collier told me all this in his office, a sparse, sunny room on the fourth floor of the "Quad" of buildings that houses Harvard Medical School. The office is stockpiled with scientific journals. And just across from his desk, Collier has hung an enormous poster of the structure of diphtheria toxin, magnified more than a million times, the way a child might put up a poster of a basketball star. There is an empty space beside it, he explains, where a similar blowup of *Bacillus anthracis* toxin will one day hang.

People like Collier—people who frame bacterial toxins in mega-size posters on their walls—may never be "drawn in" by programmatic research. They can't be recruited for an applied research project—a "War on Anthrax," for instance. For Collier, and hundreds of eccentrics like him strewn across academic campuses throughout the United States, curiosity-driven research isn't just the best way to do research; *it's the only way*.

In retrospect, America's fateful decision to provide massive funding for basic science is deeply ironic. Vannevar Bush's model was adopted—and continues to be accepted—with scarcely any empirical evidence to support it. Expert committees weren't appointed to approve it; critics weren't called in to drum up statistics to illustrate its shortcomings. The everlasting paradox of American science is that it is based on rules that wouldn't survive even the most rudimentary scientific scrutiny.



But nonetheless, the history of anthrax research suggests that the technology transfer Bush dreamed of has, indeed, come to pass. This summer, when Collier and his co-workers found a way to block anthrax toxin with a novel drug, a group of scientists got together to seed a new pharmaceutical company based on their discovery. That company will presumably run clinical trials on the anthrax antidote—perhaps in coordination with medical researchers—in the hope that the FDA will eventually approve it for human use.

Collier is relieved about this transfer of responsibilities. Drug development isn't his passion; he wants to return to the laboratory bench, to further explore the basic structure of anthrax. He has to renew his grant from the NIH. He has graduate students and postdoctoral researchers to mentor. But as far as finding a potential antidote to anthrax goes, a scientific cycle may be coming to a close. And John Collier—who never imagined himself a poster child for curiosity-driven science—seems deeply satisfied with that. ■

PHIL FOSTER

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THE NEW REPUBLIC

Stanley Kauffmann on Films

Reasons For Being

EVER SINCE ADOLESCENCE, I have detested boxing. I fail to see the fun in a sport whose object is to find out which of two men can knock the other unconscious. I have heard about the science of boxing and the noble art of self-defense and the fact that a fight can be won on points, but this is all excusatory baloney. Boxing is the only sport whose object is to injure someone else. I have enjoyed only one prizefight, Joe Louis's knockout of Max Schmeling in 1938, and that was not for pugilistic reasons. Yes, some imposing figures have liked boxing. (Bernard Shaw did some amateur boxing as a young man, then wrote a novel about a boxer and subsequently dramatized it—in blank verse!) But vis-à-vis this non-sport, I remain an unregenerate sissy.

Despite all the above, I found things to admire in **Ali** (Columbia). What impresses from the start is Michael Mann's directing. He has used two stylistic strands that run concurrently through much of this one-hundred-fifty-five-minute film. The first is the conventional presentation of actors as they move through story elements—but even some of these scenes are shot with a hand-held camera that gives the conventional material a fillip of intrusive energy. The second strand is a series of shots that are three seconds long at the most. These shots create a mosaic counterpoint to the fight scenes especially, but they occur elsewhere, too, glimpses of spectators and handlers and hangers-on that are as carefully composed, with actors who are as carefully chosen, as if they were going to be substantial scenes.

Mann's previous work, such as the television series *Miami Vice* and the feature *The Last of the Mohicans*, promised no comparable visual styling. His cinematographer here, Emmanuel Lubezki, and most particularly his editors, William Goldenberg, Stephen Rivkin, and Lynzee Klingman, must have contributed to this extraordinary quasi-stroboscopic accompaniment of the central story. Not many viewers go to films for their visual qualities, but those who see *Ali* will at least have those rewards.

The rest of the picture, the principal part, is not up to the visual level. As admitted earlier, the boxing itself dismayed me. For those more interested in boxing, the picture contains sizable chunks of the major fights in Muhammad Ali's career, but except for occasional flashes of Ali's antics, they are just more of the same well-rehearsed movie repetitions of past fights whose outcomes are known. For me, what was disappointing from the start was Will Smith's body. Smith plays Ali, who was physically magnificent and had the physique of a leopard that promised feral power. The only boxer I remember who had a comparable body was Max Baer. (You can see him in *The Prizefighter and the Lady* with Myrna Loy, which appeared in 1933.) Smith has built up his body somewhat, but it is still Smith.

With foreknowledge that Smith could not be Ali physically and with my aversion to boxing, I nonetheless went to *Ali* in the possibly naïve hope of learning more about Ali, not factually—the facts are elsewhere available—but in terms of his pride and exultation, the qualities besides his fighting ability that marked him uniquely. Why was he different? The screenwriters, three of them plus Mann, certainly scoffed at my naïveté. The screenplay skims along over the well-known Ali attributes, and Smith's performance goodheartedly tries to unify them into a justified portrait, but it doesn't happen. The screenplay visits the more serious matters in his life—such as his relations with Malcolm X and Elijah Muhammad and the government's spying on them—but merely in token fashion. The film just ripples along touching a lot of bases, and although it is lengthy, it is also shallow.

All its shortcomings might have been excused if we could feel that the makers of the picture understood why they were making it—not the commercial reason but an intrinsic reason. Many a film seems to have been started with a flash of inspiration about a person or an event, a rush of conviction that so-and-so would be a good subject. Less thought then goes to the matter of the film's purpose, what it will accomplish besides exploiting as many highlights of the topic as it can cram into reasonable running time. *Ali* is a sad example. What is the point of the picture? It doesn't give us a satisfactory character portrait (what *were* the wellsprings of his exuberance?), it doesn't explore his African Americanism adequately or his refusal of induction for the Vietnam War or his alliance with Islam. It doesn't even finish with the harsh conclusion that nature supplied, his affliction with Parkinson's. None of the film-makers seems to have worried at the outset about a point to the enterprise. The film has no architecture: it is only a sightseeing tour through Ali's life. It might have been on the Biography television series, except that it is a fictional re-creation and too long.

Black Hawk Down (Columbia) suffers from the same lack of clear purpose. Why was this film made? Apparently only because no one had yet made a film about the American military expedition to Somalia in 1993. Ridley Scott, who directed, has had a very varied career with some gratifying results—*Blade Runner*, one of the best futuristic visions; *Thelma and Louise*, a milestone in film feminism; *The Browning Version*, a compact drama of English niceties. But *Black Hawk Down* (another long film, though this one runs only one hundred forty-four minutes) does little more than burrow through battle scenes in the streets of Mogadishu. These scenes are factual, I assume; but, grim though they are, they are very familiar by now, cinematically speaking.

The reasons for the American presence in Somalia are hastily sketched before the action starts. A few facts are tacked on at the end. Most of the film is simply shooting and bombing and emergency medical aid. (All of the fighting, of course, is with the Somalian militia of the warlord whom the Americans are trying to capture, so the U.S. troops include one black soldier to soften any suspicion of racism.) The picture ends up as nothing more than a trite collection of combat sequences suspended in limbo, scenes that, with a few minor changes in dialogue, could be used in other combat pictures set in foreign places.

Which leads to the fact that, though military pictures have never been in short supply, we are going to have a martial plenty. Bruce Willis is coming in one, and Mel Gibson in another. This surge cannot be a response to September 11; films take more time to make. But war pictures have always been as plentiful as war itself. We used to like to delude ourselves that there were eras of peace, but in any global

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view that belief was shaky and it is now hideously laughable.

Still, many of those war films have had some point other than the visceral excitements of slaughter. What's particularly depressing about *Black Hawk Down*, other than the whole subject of Somalia, is that it doesn't even sense the need for a point. Just slosh a lot of realistic carnage on the screen, it seems to say, and people will come. Roll on, Roman games. ■

Pope Pius XII, the Catholic Church, and the Holocaust.

What Would Jesus Have Done?

By DANIEL JONAH GOLDHAGEN

I.

IN THE LONG and sorry history of hatred that has shamed and demeaned the peoples of the Western world during the last two thousand years, more people have been prejudiced against the Jews than against any other group. Antisemitism, the most hardy and poisonous of weeds, has flourished in all environments, outliving historical eras, transcending national boundaries, political systems, and modes of production, sinking its roots and undermining moral and social ecologies where there have been Jews and where there have been no Jews, where Jews have been wealthy and where they have been poor, where they have been socially and outwardly distinct and where they have been socially assimilated and visibly indistinguishable.

Antisemitism's extreme durability is matched by its intensity and its power. It has been, arguably, the European prejudice with the most fearsome content. Europeans in the medieval era commonly believed that Jews were servants of the Devil (Antichrists), and in the modern era that they were immensely powerful, genetically programmed subhumans bent upon destroying humanity (antihumans). For centuries, and most cataclysmically in the twentieth century, antisemitism was a binding force, the common hatred of European culture that even adversary peoples and groups shared.

Antisemitism has also outdone all other European prejudices in engendering eliminationist violence, in the form of forced segregation, expulsions, and mass murders. All over Europe, Gentiles have expelled Jews, sometimes for hundreds of years: Crimea in 1016, Paris in 1182, England in 1290, France in 1306, Switzerland in 1348, Hungary in 1349, Provence in 1394, Austria in 1421, Kraków in 1494, Lithuania in 1495, Portugal in 1497, and most of Germany during the fourteenth through sixteenth centuries. From the fifteenth century until 1722, Russia forbade Jews to enter its soil. Most infamously, Spain expelled its Jews in 1492.

When these and other regions of Europe permitted Jews within their confines, they often sequestered them in ghettos in order to restrict their movements, their activities, and their intercourse with Gentiles. Cologne, for example, established a ghetto as early as 1150. During the next seven hundred years, ghettos were constructed in cities in, among other places, today's Austria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Portugal, and Spain, including such major centers and capitals as Frankfurt (1460), Madrid (1480), Prague (1473), Rome (1556), Venice (1517), and Vienna (1570). From 1835 until the Bolshevik Revolution, Russia confined Jews to its western portion, known as the Pale of Settlement.

The mass-murdering of Jews began in 414, when the people of newly Christianized Roman Alexandria annihilated the city's Jewish community. The mass slaughter of Jews reached an especially momentous frenzy during the First Crusade in 1096. The Crusaders killed the Jews of one community after another in northern France and Germany, totaling thousands and thousands of victims. Such killings resumed in subsequent crusades, as well as periodically around Europe in the following centuries. The larger instances can seem like precursors of the Holocaust: between 1348 and 1350, during the black plague, ordinary Germans slaughtered the Jews of roughly three hundred fifty communities, virtually every city and town, rendering Germany almost *judenrein*. In 1391, ordinary Spaniards slew Jews all over Spain, and during the last phases of the Spanish Inquisition many Jews were killed, often burned at the stake. The Chmielnicki massacres of 1648–1656 saw ordinary Ukrainians (then often called Cossacks) slaughter more than one hundred thousand Jews in cities and towns across Poland. The Russian pogroms from 1871 to 1906, though they claimed a fraction of the victims of earlier atrocities, shocked the Western world.

Viewed historically, then, the Holocaust, perpetrated by antisemitic Germans who were aided by antisemitic Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Poles, French, and others, deserves to be regarded as but the largest and most comprehensive in a long history of annihilative onslaughts. But it was not the final disaster. Immediately after the end of the Holocaust, Jewish survivors were often greeted with hostility by their neighbors in Catholic Eastern Europe, who sometimes massacred them. The best-known such pogrom took place in Kielce, where in July, 1946 rampaging Poles slaughtered forty Jews and injured others. The catalyst for this coda to the Holocaust was a Christian charge of ritual murder against the Jews, the great medieval canard. It is estimated that in the two years after the war ended Poles killed fifteen hundred Jews.

For considerably more than a millennium, antisemitism was an animating force in the social, political, and cultural lives of the peoples of Western countries, in whose mental and emotional maps of the world Jews had a salient and malevolent place. The politics, the economic development, and the social and cultural histories of Europe cannot be understood without according antisemitism, its causes and consequences, a prominent role. Why, then, is antisemitism often accorded but a marginal place in Western

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history? When subjects to which it is centrally relevant are under discussion, it can be treated obliquely, minimized, or cordoned off—in the twentieth century, for example, as the property of some pathological small sect called the Nazis. (This is true even for many academics writing about the Holocaust.) And antisemitism's marginalized place in the canonical accounts of Western history may be owed to a simple fact: that the main responsibility for producing this all-time leading Western hatred lies with Christianity. More specifically, with the Catholic Church.

II.

For centuries, the Catholic Church, this pan-European institution of world-hegemonic aspirations, the central spiritual, moral, and instructional institution of European civilization, harbored antisemitism at its core, as an integral part of its doctrine, its theology, and its liturgy. It did so with the divine justification of the Christian Bible that Jews were "Christ-killers," minions of the Devil. It spread antisemitism where its priests preached, ensuring that it would be not an ephemeral and territorially limited hatred, but within Christendom a powerful and enduring religious imperative. In medieval Europe, antisemitism was near-universal.

After the Reformation, in the sixteenth century, antisemitism continued in roughly parallel forms in the Catholic and Protestant churches. It was something that even these bitter foes could share. Martin Luther propounded that the Jews "are for us a heavy burden, the calamity of our being; they are a pest in the midst of our lands." This was but one small part of what James Carroll describes as Luther's "homiletic massacre" of 1543, *On the Jews and Their Lies*, a violently antisemitic treatise that, echoing the Catholic Church's campaign against the Jews of Spain just fifty years earlier, called for the degradation and the suppression and even the elimination of the Jews, including the destruction of their books and the burning of their homes and synagogues, so that "we may be free of this insufferable devilish burden—the Jews."

Luther's vicious antisemitism notwithstanding, it is not surprising that Catholics came to see Jews as instigators of the Reformation, which broke the Church's European near-monopoly on Christianity. The Catholic demonology about the Jews made it second nature for many Catholics, at all levels of society, to blame the Jews for any natural or human calamity. Philip II, king of Spain, the driving force behind the Spanish Inquisition and the close ally of the papacy, declared in 1556 that "all the heresies which have occurred in Germany and France have been sown by descendants of Jews, as we have seen and still see daily in Spain."

Antisemitism led to the Holocaust. Antisemitism has been integral to the Catholic Church. Surely the question of what the relationship is between the Church's antisemitism and the Holocaust should be at the center of any general treatment of either of these subjects. Near the beginning of *Constantine's Sword*, his extraordinary investigation of this relationship, Carroll observes that "an inquiry into the origins of the Holocaust in the tortured past of Western civilization is necessarily an inquiry into the history of Catholicism." Yet such an inquiry is for many people threatening and unwanted. As a result, there is a widespread and long-standing practice of deflecting attention from the central issues.

This practice of evasion and denial began as early as 1939, when Pope Pius XII suppressed *Humani Generis Unitas*, the not-yet-promulgated encyclical against racism of his recently deceased predecessor Pope Pius XI. The encyclical explicitly condemned the Nazis' antisemitism and called for the cessation of the Germans' persecution of Jews: "It becomes clear that the struggle of racial purity ends by being uniquely the struggle against the Jews. Save for its systematic cruelty, this struggle is no different in true motives and methods from persecutions everywhere carried out against the Jews since antiquity." That a pope drew this direct connection, in motive and in method, between past persecutions (and by strong implication, the Church's persecutions) of the Jews and the Germans' contemporary assault on the Jews should give pause to anyone who wishes to dissociate the Church from any responsibility for the persecution and the slaughter of the 1930s and 1940s. That a second pope buried this remarkable document, now known as the Hidden Encyclical, in the "silence of the archives," and that the Vatican for more than fifty years after the war tried to hide Pius XII's act of suppression and the encyclical itself (it came into public view because of the dogged work of Georges Passelecq, a Belgian monk, and Bernard Suchecky, a Jewish historian, who managed to publish it in France in 1995) tells us a great deal about the dissimulations that have surrounded that pope's and the Church's relationship to the Holocaust.

Public controversy over Pope Pius XII's conduct regarding the Holocaust first erupted in 1963 with Rolf Hochhuth's play *The Deputy*, which shocked many people around the world by condemning the pope's silence. Even earlier, much had been published on the pope, the Church, and Christian theology before, during, and after the Holocaust; but there was little public criticism of the pope's conduct. With the appearance of Hochhuth's damning play, a flood of publications ensued, including the Church's own eleven-volume edition of wartime diplomatic documents with commentary, *Actes et documents du Saint Siège relatifs à la Seconde Guerre mondiale*, a collection carefully selected to respond to Hochhuth's charge. An enormous specialized literature has since been produced on the story of Pius XII and the Holocaust, most of which has naturally escaped the broader public's attention.

But with the appearance recently of many new books on the subject, and with the Church in the late 1990s having begun the process of Pius XII's beatification, renewed public attention has been focused on his conduct regarding the Jews. Both sides in this fierce and important debate have had their say. Condemnatory cases and laudatory cases have been made for Pius XII. The basic issues seem straight-

Pius XII and the Second World War: According to the Archives of the Vatican
by Pierre Blet
translated by
Lawrence J. Johnson
(Paulist Press, 304 pp., $29.95)

Constantine's Sword: The Church and the Jews
by James Carroll
(Houghton Mifflin, 756 pp., $28)

Hitler's Pope: The Secret History of Pius XII
by John Cornwell
(Penguin, 464 pp., $15 paper)

The Popes Against the Jews: The Vatican's Role in the Rise of Modern Anti-Semitism
by David I. Kertzer
(Alfred A. Knopf, 355 pp., $27.95)

The Hidden Encyclical of Pius XI
by Georges Passelecq
and Bernard Suchecky
translated by
Steven Rendall
(Harcourt Brace, 330 pp., $14 paper)

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forward. What did the pope know of the Germans' ongoing slaughter of the Jews? What could he have done about it? What did he do, and what did he not do, and why? How honest has the Church been about all of this?

The critics have made the case that Pius XII was "Hitler's Pope" (John Cornwell), that he let the Germans deport Jews to Auschwitz from "under his very windows" (Susan Zuccotti), and that the postwar whitewashing of his papal sin is nothing less than a "structure of deceit" (Garry Wills). Various explanations are offered for his motives: his own antisemitism, his pursuit of papal power, the need to preserve the Church in threatening times, a personal timidity, a de facto alliance with Nazism against modernity, a strong preference for Nazism over Communism, a fear of alienating German Catholics. The defenders of Pius XII portray him as an enemy of Hitler and a friend of the Jews who worked hard to save as many people as possible. In their view, his failures, whatever they were, were those of a pious man with human shortcomings who had to act in tragic circumstances. In the view of the defenders, the Church's postwar reckoning with the pope's record and with its own history has been relatively forthright, though not perfect.

These contradictory portraits emerge because the authors bring different values, perspectives, and agendas to their investigations, and also because some of the evidence can be read in multiple ways. Zuccotti, in her narrow but important investigation, exposes a central exculpating myth, in her view consciously fabricated or encouraged by the pope and others, and sustained by Jews who themselves were misled or wanted to placate the powerful Church: that the pope gave orders for Italian Church officials to hide Jews in churches and monasteries. The priests and others who took initiatives to save the lives of many Jews were certainly heroic, but there is no evidence of the pope's guiding hand. Based on extensive careful research into one locale after another, Zuccotti methodically debunks claims that Pius XII was active on behalf of the Jews. Her findings have devastated Pius XII's reputation.

In contrast, others, including Ronald Rychlak, the pope's most dogged recent defender, in *Hitler, the War, and the Pope*, give great weight to the quiet interventions of the pope's representatives on behalf of some Jews, even when the lucky Jews were not Jews at all but Christians who had converted from Judaism, or when the interventions were tepid and came only after the Germans and their local helpers had been killing Jews in a given country for months or years. The pope's defenders accept the assertions of Jews and Catholics that the pope was behind rescue efforts in Italy (though Zuccotti shows this is hearsay that is contradicted by credible evidence). The pope's defenders also eagerly interpret public statements by Pius XII that were critical of violence or racism in general—no matter how glancing, tepid, or tardy—as powerful and unequivocal defenses of the Jews, even though any mention of Jews is conspicuously absent.

Pius XII's Christmas message of 1942 is, for them, Exhibit A. At the end of a forty-five-minute speech dealing with other themes, the pontiff called for a just society: "We owe it to the innumerable dead, to the suffering groups of mothers, widows, and orphans, to the innumerable exiles, to the hundreds of thousands who, without personal guilt, are doomed to death or to a progressive deterioration of their condition, sometimes for no other reason than their nationality or descent, to the many thousands of non-combatants whom the air war has [harmed]." Laudable as this statement might seem, its platitudinous vagueness is striking. By Christmas, 1942, the Germans and their helpers had been mass-murdering Jews for almost one and a half years, but Pius XII made no mention of Jews as victims or of Germans or Nazis as perpetrators, no condemnation of racism or antisemitism, no attempt to provide usable information to the European peoples about the extent of the mass murder, no call to them to resist further slaughters. During the years when the Germans were mass-murdering Jews, Pius XII chose again and again not to mention the Jews publicly. Yet his defenders insist that, the repeated and purposeful omissions notwithstanding, he was speaking about them all along.

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND THE HOLOCAUST, 1930–1965
by Michael Phayer
(Indiana University Press, 328 pp., $14.95 paper)

THE HOLOCAUST AND THE CHRISTIAN WORLD: REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE
edited by Carol Ann Rittner, Stephen D. Smith, and Irena Steinfeldt
(Continuum, 278 pp., $24.95 paper)

HITLER, THE WAR, AND THE POPE
by Ronald J. Rychlak
(Genesis Press, 468 pp., $26.95)

PAPAL SIN: STRUCTURES OF DECEIT
by Garry Wills
(Doubleday, 336 pp., $14.95 paper)

UNDER HIS VERY WINDOWS: THE VATICAN AND THE HOLOCAUST IN ITALY
by Susan Zuccotti
(Yale University Press, 408 pp., $29.95)

THE ESSENTIAL FACTS of the pope's conduct are clear, even if what we make of some of them may be open to disagreement. Eugenio Pacelli, born in 1876 near Rome, served as the papal nuncio, the Vatican's emissary, to Germany from 1918 to 1930, then as Vatican secretary of state starting in February, 1930, and finally as Pope Pius XII beginning in March, 1939. (I refer to him as Pacelli for the years before he became pope and as Pius XII for the years of his papacy.) As the Vatican's secretary of state—which, after pope, is the most powerful position in the Catholic Church—Pacelli hastened to negotiate for the Church a treaty of cooperation, the Concordat, with Hitler's Germany. Completed in July, 1933 and ratified that September, it was Nazi Germany's first international treaty. It included the Church's liquidation of the democratic political party, the Catholic Center Party (the forerunner of postwar Germany's governing Christian Democratic Party), effectively legitimating Hitler's seizure of power and his destruction of democracy, which Pacelli welcomed. He communicated his approval of the developments in Germany in March by conveying to Hitler, in the words of Pacelli's envoy, his "indirect endorsement of the action of the Reich chancellor and the government against Communism." The treaty also helped to legitimate the Nazi regime in the eyes of the world. Neither as secretary of state nor later as pope did he instruct Church officials to stop preaching the Church's antisemitism, which they continued to spread in their sermons and in the Church's own newspapers and other publications, some of which were under his regular supervision.

Pacelli was no admirer of Hitler, against whom he, as Pius XII, conspired in 1940 with some German generals and the British in a plot that went nowhere. Yet he distinguished throughout between Hitler the man and Germany the country. He was devoted to the country, and he wanted it to remain powerful. He identified with

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it during its war of extermination against the Soviet Union, because he considered Bolshevism to be the Church's mortal enemy. A German victory against the Soviets, who were then allied with Great Britain and the United States in the fight to destroy Nazism, was his strong wish.

That this meant that the Germans would virtually annihilate European Jewry did not seem to dampen Pius XII's ardor for German conquest in the east. As late as 1941, he confessed a "special love" for Germans and regularly held audiences with German soldiers, which he knew would be interpreted as an act of solidarity with them. In 1944, sick of hearing about the Jews, he got angry with the Polish ambassador for raising the subject. The Polish ambassador, like many other of the Allies' diplomats, kept returning to the subject because the pope refused to speak out publicly against the mass murder or to discuss it with the German ambassador to the Vatican, Ernst von Weizsäcker, even though Pius XII met with Weizsäcker regularly. From Pius XII's postwar stances, moreover, it is evident that this love of Germany continued and even deepened, the Germans' crimes notwithstanding.

As to the Holocaust itself, Pius XII was briefed regularly about the details of the unfolding mass annihilation of the Jews, which he knew about almost immediately. During the war he never made a public statement condemning the Germans' persecution and extermination of the Jews. He never even informed the European peoples that the mass murder was taking place, which would have given every person the knowledge with which to make a moral and political choice. Indeed, when people made inquiries about the fate of the Jews, the Vatican, by withholding the facts, led people to believe that circumstances were less dire than they were.

Pius XII never privately instructed all European cardinals, bishops, priests, and nuns to do whatever they could to save Jews. He did not protest or instruct others to hide Jews when the Germans deported Jews from Italy or any other country, including from his own city, Rome. Pius XII's diplomatic corps did sometimes intervene behind the scenes to help Jews of different countries, but they tended to do so late in the course of the mass murder and without persistence or vigor. (An exception was the timely and forceful intervention of his representative in Romania, Archbishop Andrea Cassulo.)

Pius XII himself once protested to Miklós Horthy, the dictator of Hungary, about the deportation of Hungarian Jews in 1944. But he did so only after the Germans and their Hungarian helpers had already deported almost four hundred thirty-seven thousand Jews (most of whom the Germans gassed at Auschwitz), when the Germans had clearly lost the war and only after the Allied countries put him under great pressure to intervene. Occasionally, he privately expressed sympathy for the victimized Jews, at least for the ears of the Allies' diplomats. After the war, he and other Church officials asserted that he did things to help Jews that he did not do.

COURTESY PENGUIN BOOKS

Eugenio Pacelli as papal nuncio in Germany in the 1920s

III.

IT CANNOT BE plausibly maintained that Pius XII did everything he could to help the Jews. And yet many cling desperately, even aggressively, to this fiction, and continue to spread it. It needs to be dispelled step by step. The pope's defenders engage in a series of exculpatory strategies that divert attention from a considered view of the more significant issues. Not surprisingly, these same strategies are the stock-in-trade of those who try to exculpate ordinary Germans of their responsibility for, and participation in, the Holocaust.

The first strategy is direct exculpation. The pope's knowledge of the ongoing extermination and its various features is underplayed, delayed in time, or denied. The Church's cardinals, bishops, parish priests, and parishioners formed the most extensive information network in Europe. The Allies and Jewish organizations regularly conveyed their often considerable knowledge about the unfolding mass murders to Pius XII. Yet his defenders fail to report all of this. If they would acknowledge that the pope had access to timely—sometimes immediate—and reliable information, often from multiple sources, about the killings, the camps, the intended fate of the deportees, then the question of why he did not act more quickly, forcefully, and consistently on behalf of the endangered Jews would become more pressing.

Pius XII's defenders' second strategy is to omit, or casuistically to conceal, or flatly to deny, that he was an antisemite and, by extension, that this animus influenced his reactions to the various phases (deprivation of rights, segregation, expulsion, ghettoization, and mass murder) of the Germans' eliminationist onslaught against the Jews. This is exceedingly odd, because the evidence of Pius XII's antisemitism comes from an unimpeachable source: Pius XII himself. Cornwell quotes a letter that he wrote describing a scene of "absolute hell" from the Communist insurrection in Munich of April, 1919, in the royal palace:

> ... in the midst of all this, a gang of young women, of dubious appearance, Jews like all the rest of them, hanging around in all the offices with lecherous demeanor and suggestive smiles. The boss of this female rabble was Levien's mistress, a young Russian woman, a Jew and a divorcée, who was in charge. And it was to her that the nunciature was obliged to pay homage in order to proceed.
>
> This Levien is a young man, of about thirty or thirty-five, also Russian and a Jew. Pale, dirty, with drugged eyes, hoarse voice, vulgar, repulsive, with a face that is both intelligent and sly.

This passage, not intended for publication, is Pius XII's only relatively extensive utterance about Jews that has come to light. Recorded in a confidential letter about a scene that he had not even witnessed, it bears the stamp of authenticity,

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an expression of the then-future pope's true views of Jews. It is reasonable to believe that it was not a fleeting opinion, a whimsical lapse into rank antisemitism, but an abiding sentiment that may be reflected in other similar statements, oral or written, the evidence of which would have expired with his interlocutors or would be secured in the locked archives of the Vatican.

Here Pacelli was echoing the demonological views of Jews then current in Germany, in Europe, and in the Catholic Church itself. The vicious antisemitic stereotypes in his letter were of the kind that Julius Streicher would soon offer the German public in every issue of his notorious Nazi newspaper *Der Stürmer*. Implicit in Pacelli's letter is the notion of Judeo-Bolshevism—the virtually axiomatic conviction among Nazis, modern antisemites in general, and within the Church itself that Jews were the principal bearers and even the authors of Bolshevism.

The Communist revolutionaries, Pacelli averred, were "all" Jews. During the Weimar and Nazi period, anti-Communist diatribes and caricatures conflated Jews and Bolsheviks, pictorially depicting Communists, with distorted Jewish visages, as repulsive, licentious, and bloodlusting. Pacelli's description of the Bavarian Communist insurrectionists reads like a verbal rendition of one of the innumerable Nazi cartoons printed in Germany during Hitler's crusade against Bolshevism. There was nothing that Pius XII dreaded more than Bolshevism. Would it be unreasonable to believe that his stance toward the Germans' persecution of the Jews was colored in some measure by his apparent identification of Communism with Jews?

Two decades after penning his antisemitic letter, Pacelli, then Vatican secretary of state, either wrote or supervised the writing of a papal encyclical, *Mit brennender Sorge* (*With Burning Concern*). It is often presented erroneously as evidence of the Church's, Pacelli's, or Pius XI's antipathy to Nazism, or as a sweeping condemnation of Nazism. The encyclical did object in clear and ringing language to violations of the Concordat, particularly the treatment of religion in Germany. In six sentences of its forty-three paragraphs does it refer to race. It never mentions Jews. Its objection to the doctrine of race is not that it is false or inherently pernicious, but that some would have race take precedence over the teachings of Christianity. Race, no different from "time, space, [and] country," is too restrictive a basis for morality, which only God's universally valid commandments can provide.

The encyclical was not a general condemnation of Nazism itself. It never once mentioned Nazism by name. It pointedly made clear that its objection revolved around the narrow though important "systematic antagonism raised between national education and religious duty."

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The papal nuncio in Berlin leaving St. Hedwig's Cathedral in 1933, after a service of thanksgiving for the Concordat

But it also urged the young in Germany, in the canonical idiom of the Nazi regime itself, to embrace the new Germany: "No one would think of preventing the youth of Germany from establishing a true ethnic community (*Volksgemeinschaft*) in a noble love of freedom and unshakable fidelity to the Fatherland." Pacelli knew that, to German ears, the *Volksgemeinschaft* would by definition exclude Jews, because according to common belief and usage among Germans, and according to the well-known Nazi Party Program issued in 1920, "no Jew may be a member of the *Volk*."

The encyclical did seek to educate the German people about Nazism's religious transgressions and about its elevation of race above the universal commands of religion. In such an encyclical, a friend of the Jews, or at least an enemy of the antisemites, would have condemned Germany's intensive persecution of its Jews; but Pacelli did no such thing. He defended the Old Testament against the Nazis' charge that it was a Jewish book, but he couched his explanation in explicitly antisemitic terms, presenting it as an anti-Jewish book that reveals "the story of the chosen people, bearers of the Revelation and the Promise, repeatedly straying from God and turning to the world." Its value lies in "the luminous splendor of the divine light revealing the saving plan which finally triumphs over every fault and sin."

Pacelli's gratuitous affirmation of the sinfulness of the "straying from God" Jews could only strengthen the prevailing antisemitism among the many Germans who held that Jews should in some way be eliminated, at least from German society. As if to drive home his point, he reminded Germans of "a people that was to crucify" Jesus, referring to them as Jesus's "torturer." To ensure the maximum exposure and effect of the encyclical (which also shows how little afraid Pacelli was of criticizing the regime's practices publicly), it was read from every German pulpit on Palm Sunday in 1937.

Pierre Blet, in *Pius XII and the Second World War*, a summary of the Church's sanitized official publication of documents relating to World War II by one of the documents' editors, and Ronald Rychlak, in *Hitler, the War, and the Pope*, discuss the encyclical of 1937 exclusively as an anti-Nazi document without mentioning Pacelli's or Pius XI's antisemitism. More surprising, the International Catholic-Jewish Historical Commission, in "The Vatican and the Holocaust: A Preliminary Report," of October, 2000, also wrongly presents it as a "forceful condemnation of National Socialism," instead of as a document that narrowly, if forcefully, condemns its religious policies.

These expressions of Pius XII's antisemitic sentiments, and his failure during the time of maximum danger for the Jews to countermand the deep-rooted antisemitism of the Church, leave no doubt that he was an antisemite. Why should this be astonishing? He had been brought up and lived his entire adult life in the profoundly antisemitic establishment of the Church, an institutional culture centrally animated by the notion that all Jews were Christ-killers and responsible for many of

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the perceived evils of modernity.

Do Pius XII's remarks mean that the character of his antisemitism was the same as Hitler's? Of course not. There is enormous variation among different kinds of antisemitism—their foundations, their ideas, and their intensities. Does Pius XII's antisemitism mean that he necessarily approved of every aspect of the Germans' persecution of the Jews? Of course not. But does it mean that his prejudices against Jews must be investigated in depth, and that their influence on his actions must be central to any evaluation of his conduct regarding the eliminationist persecution of the Jews? Of course it does. Such an inquiry would include not just why he chose to act or to remain inactive regarding each new German initiative against the Jews, but also why, in light of the obviously injurious, even murderous consequences of antisemitism, he did not decree an end to antisemitic expression and practice from the Church or among Catholics (particularly among German Catholics, whose antisemitism in its demonology was scarcely different from the Nazis') and prevent its further dissemination by Church officials.

The nature of the relationship between antisemitic belief and anti-Jewish action is complex. Its explanation is open to disagreement. But two things are beyond disagreement: that those who sidestep this central issue are de facto engaging in an exculpatory enterprise; and that, until the Vatican opens all its archives to all researchers—which it steadfastly refuses to do, attacking those who wish to learn the truth—much that might shed further light on the character of Pius XII's antisemitism and on how it affected his actions (this is also true of the Church and its clergy more broadly) will remain hidden.

IV.

PIUS XII'S DEFENDERS' attempts to exonerate him of antisemitism and to represent him as a friend of the Jews, a friend who did everything that he believed possible to help them, are riddled with weaknesses. Why, as a moral or practical matter, did Pius XII intervene in Germany on behalf of Catholics who had converted from Judaism, but not on behalf of Jews? His defenders have no good answer. Why, as a moral or practical matter, did he cause *Mit brennender Sorge* to be read from pulpits across the country, but did not similarly denounce the persecution of the Jews, either then or when the mass murder began? Again, no good answer. Why, as a moral or practical matter, did he protest the Germans' invasion of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg with separate telegrams to the sovereigns of each of those countries (and in large type on the front page of the Vatican's official daily newspaper, *L'Osservatore Romano*), but not the Germans' slaughter of the Jews? No good answer. Why, as a moral and practical matter, did he speak out publicly on behalf of the suffering of Poles, but not of Jews? No good answer. (On the instructions of Pius XII, Vatican Radio broadcast the following in January, 1940: "Conditions of religious, political, and economic life have thrown the Polish people, especially in those areas occupied by Germany, into a state of terror, of degradation, and, we dare say, of barbarism. The Germans employ the same methods, perhaps even worse, as those used by the Soviets.") Why, as a moral or practical matter, did Pius XII not direct all ecclesiastic personnel to defend and help to save the Jews? No good answer. Why, as a moral or practical matter, did he not lift a finger to forfend the deportations of the Jews of Rome and other regions in Italy, neither denouncing them publicly nor instructing his priests and nuns to give the hunted Jewish men, women, and children sanctuary? No good answer. Why, as a moral or practical matter, did he excommunicate all Communists in the world in 1949, including millions who never shed blood, but did not excommunicate a single German or non-German who served Hitler—or even Hitler himself—as the millionfold willing executioners of the Jewish people? No good answer.

TO THE EXTENT that any of these questions are addressed (generally they are ignored), the answers proffered by Pius XII's defenders form a third strategy to complement the first two strategies of directly exculpating him and of denying his antisemitism: inventing constraints upon his behavior. They claim without convincing evidence that he chose not to do more on behalf of the Jews because he had to maintain the Vatican's neutrality so as not to endanger the Church. His demonstratively public condemnation of the Germans' invasion of Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands reveals this to be false. His defenders also assert, perversely, that had he made concerted efforts to save Jews—as the critics maintain that he should have done—he would have ended up only hastening more Jewish deaths. In 1963, no less a personage than the close wartime confidant of Pius XII, Cardinal Giovanni Battista Montini, shortly before his election as Pope Paul VI, made this argument: "An attitude of protest and condemnation [of the persecutions of the Jews] would have been not only futile but harmful." But the cardinal's claim was not an argument at all. It was an imperious assertion dismissing the need for further inquiry: "that is," the future pope declared, "the long and the short of the matter."

On its face, this contention—that Pius XII would only have harmed Jews by trying to help them—is nonsense. Those who advance this argument, such as Rychlak, cannot point to a single instance in which the intervention of Christian churches led to the deaths of more Jews, and there are many well-known instances in which such interventions saved the lives of many Jews. The best that Rychlak can do is adduce the Netherlands, where the Dutch Catholic Church's protest of the deportation of the Jews in July, 1942 led the Germans to deport Catholics who had converted from Judaism. But his presentation is misleading in several ways. The Germans' murder of these people may be relevant to a discussion of the Church's solicitude for Catholics, which no one doubts, but it is disingenuous to present this as an instance of a Church attempt to help Jews that led the Germans to kill Jews whom they would otherwise have not killed. Quite simply, in the eyes of the Church, these people were not Jews but Catholics. And even so, the Church quickly learned that these Catholics were doomed regardless of its protest. The Germans soon thereafter deported Dutch Protestants who had converted from Judaism, even though the Protestant churches had not publicly protested.

Rychlak, as is characteristic of Pius XII's defenders' selective and misleading use of evidence, fails to mention the deportation of the Dutch Protestants, which gives the false impression that the Catholic Church rightly believed that its silence would have saved the Catholics whom he falsely presents as Jews. Rychlak also fails to point out how the contemporaneous French bishops' protest of the deportation of Jews from France undermines any argument that the Church could have genuinely believed that silence in this context was golden. There is no reason to believe that the French bishops' protests led to more Jews dying or suffering. This was clear at the time. What it did obviously do was spur Catholics, clergy and lay, to save Jews.

RYCHLAK AND THE pope's other defenders fail to discuss the famous and most relevant case for assessing the efficacy of acting on behalf of Jews: the case of Denmark. The Danish Lutheran State Church, in the person of Bishop Hans Fuglsang-Damgaard of Copenhagen, supported by all its bishops, sent a letter of protest to the German authorities before the deportations began,

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which their pastors read from every pulpit in Denmark on October 3, 1943, thereby helping to mobilize national sentiment and to move ordinary Danes to act on the Jews' behalf:

> Whenever persecutions are undertaken for racial or religious reasons against the Jews, it is the duty of the Christian Church to raise a protest against it for the following reasons:
>
> Because the persecution of the Jews is irreconcilable with the humanitarian concept of love of neighbors which follows from the message which the Church of Jesus Christ is commissioned to proclaim. With Christ there is no respect of persons, and he has taught us that every man is precious in the eyes of God . . . race and religion can never be in themselves a reason for depriving a man of his rights, freedom, or property. . . . [W]e shall therefore struggle to ensure the continued guarantee to our Jewish brothers and sisters [of] the same freedom which we ourselves treasure more than life.
>
> . . . [W]e are obliged by our conscience to maintain the law and to protest against any violation of human rights. Therefore we desire to declare unambiguously our allegiance to the word, *we must obey God rather than man.*

What did the Germans do to the Danish Church, with its ringing call for "struggle" against the Germans on behalf of the Jews? Nothing. What did the Danes suffer for their collective thwarting of the Germans' exterminationist onslaught? Nothing. Did Pius XII know about the Danish Church's protest? Of course he did. It happened two weeks before the Germans began deporting the Jews of Rome, and months before the Germans deported Jews from other parts of Italy, such as Trieste (December 7, 1943 to February 24, 1945), and from other parts of Europe, including Hungary (starting in May, 1944). Here was a model of successful action against the annihilation of the Jews that Pius XII chose to reject and that his defenders choose not to mention—all the more striking in light of the fact that the entirety of the rescued Jewish community of Denmark survived the war. This cannot be said of the nineteen hundred Jews whom the Germans deported from Rome to Auschwitz in October, 1943 and the ensuing months. If Catholics in Italy who took the initiative to help Jews, sometimes to the Vatican's displeasure, had followed the pope's lead and done nothing, then the Germans would have killed thousands more.

As Zuccotti points out, from the point of view of assessing the conduct of Pius XII, the fate of the close to five hundred Danish Jews whom the Germans did manage to deport is also important. In part because the Danish officials passionately demonstrated their concern for their country's Jews, the Germans sent the Danish Jews not to Auschwitz but to Theresienstadt, where Danish officials and Red Cross officials were permitted to visit them and to monitor their well-being. Ninety percent of Denmark's deported Jews survived the war. The pope and his representatives, by contrast, made no genuine effort to look after the Jews deported from Rome, or from other parts of Italy, or from other countries. Occasionally they did make perfunctory inquiries.

THE FACT IS that in those dark years there were still others besides the Danes—including the French Catholic bishops, the Orthodox Bulgarian synod of bishops, and the Greek Orthodox archbishop of Athens—who publicly denounced the Germans' eliminationist onslaught against the Jews. There is every reason to believe that these ecclesiastical protests helped to save Jews' lives, and no reason to believe that they caused more Jews' deaths. All the Jews living within the borders of prewar Bulgaria, numbering fifty thousand, survived the war. These protests all occurred before the Germans began the deportation of Italy's Jews.

The Norwegian Protestant churches, upon the impending deportation of the Jews of Norway, also protested pointedly in a letter to Vidkun Quisling, the German-collaborating leader of Norway. The letter was read from the pulpit twice in late 1942 all over Norway, and ministers led their congregations in saying prayers for the Jews. The letter was also published as the New Year's message for 1943, and broadcast to Norway and Sweden:

> For ninety-one years Jews have had a legal right to reside and to earn a livelihood in our country. Now they are being deprived of their property without warning. . . . Jews have not been charged with transgression of the country's laws much less convicted of such transgressions by judicial procedure. Nevertheless, they are being punished as severely as the worst criminals are punished. They are being punished because of their racial background, wholly and solely because they are Jews. . . . [A]ccording to God's Word, all people have, in the first instance, the same human worth and thereby the same human rights. Our state authorities are by law obliged to respect this basic view.

After speaking forthrightly in a manner that belies the pope's defenders' claim that he never could or should have

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

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spoken out, the Norwegian bishops resumed: "To remain silent about this legalized injustice against the Jews would render ourselves co-guilty in this injustice." With the leadership provided by the Norwegian Protestant Church leaders, Norwegians managed to help more than fifty percent of the country's Jews escape to safety in Sweden. And how did the Catholic Church of Norway contribute to the rescue? It did not, pointedly deciding not to participate in the protest. Its concern was restricted to five Christian families that included converts from Judaism.

The Germans took no retribution against the Norwegian, French, Bulgarian, or Greek churches for championing the Jews, just as they had refrained from acting against the Danes. That the pope would bring danger upon himself and the Church by speaking out was then, and is now, a convenient fiction. Moreover, the pope himself proved definitively that such considerations played no role whatsoever in his decisions to remain publicly silent while the Germans murdered Jews. After Rome was liberated by the Allies on June 4, 1944, the Germans were in the process of gradually deporting the Jews of Trieste, which they still occupied. The pope and the Vatican were now completely safe, and still he did absolutely nothing to help Trieste's Jews. Fifteen of the twenty-two trains that brought almost twelve hundred Jews mostly to Auschwitz departed Trieste when the pope was safely under Allied protection. Moreover, as Zuccotti shows, Pius XII personally could have quietly, behind the scenes, done many things to try to help the Jews, particularly the Jews of Italy, with no risk to himself or the Church. He chose to do none of them.

The notion that had the pope spoken out and tried to mobilize Catholics, ecclesiastic and lay, and non-Catholics to resist the Germans' slaughters, then more Jews would have died, is about as bizarre an argument as I have read by anyone writing about the Holocaust, except of course the fulminations of Holocaust deniers and their fellow travelers, who blame the Jews for their own destruction or, now, for speaking the truth about the Holocaust after the fact. No one has ever demonstrated—or even plausibly argued—that papal silence and the Church's inaction saved Jews anywhere, or even that there was a good reason at the time to believe that abandoning the Jews to their German-ordained fate was the way to save them.

V.

Let us step back for a moment from Pius XII and the stubbornly unflattering historical facts about him. Let us consider the moral dimension of the defenders' arguments. Since when do we argue that religious men should not speak moral truths? That being silent in the face of mass murder is the best way to help the victims? That mobilizing people of conscience to resist radical evil would have the opposite effect of abetting that evil? I know of no other genocide about which onlookers who genuinely opposed the mass murder adduced such arguments. Would the pope's defenders have been happier had the world been silent and done even less than it did while the Hutu were slaughtering the Tutsi in Rwanda, and while the Serbs slaughtered Croats, Bosnian Muslims, and Kosovars? It is curious that Pius XII—the man who had more moral authority in the 1940s than anyone else in Europe, who had the greatest capacity to get ordinary people to recognize their moral duty to resist the mass murder, who more than any other person could have spurred an enormous number of people across Europe either to stop aiding the mass murder or to resist it—only this man is deemed to have been wise to keep quiet.

Imagine that Pope Pius XII had instructed every bishop and priest across Europe, including in Germany, to declare in 1941 that the Jews were innocent human beings deserving, by divine right, every protection that their countrymen enjoyed, and that antisemitism was wrong, and that killing Jews was an unsurpassable transgression and a mortal sin, and that any Catholic contributing to the mass murder of the Jews would be excommunicated and would surely have to answer for his deeds in the next world. Imagine that Pius XII had broadcast the same declaration over Vatican Radio and the BBC throughout Europe, and that all Church publications across Europe had printed it on their front pages. Imagine that Pius XII and all European clergy, including German clergy, had then decreed it a moral duty for all Europeans to resist this evil. Does anyone really believe that many more Jews would not have been saved?

How many Catholics working in the institutions of killing, how many Catholics around Europe who were helping the killers by identifying Jews, would have been given pause? How many more people, in addition to the Church, with its vast networks and resources, would have been moved to help the hunted and forsaken Jews? Many people, antisemites included, needed desperately to be roused from their moral stupor to recognize the mass slaughter as evil. What almost all people needed additionally was leadership. Pius XII and his clergy could have provided both. Never mind the projections of how many people Pius XII would have saved: there is a good chance that the German government would not have tried to implement, or been able to implement, its murderous intentions in any manner resembling what happened. Was it not the moral and spiritual duty of a pope to declare that it is every person's responsibility to resist the this-worldly Satan and those who serve him?

Whatever the isolated instances of aid to Jews that Pius XII's defenders point to—and they are often much less than what they seem—they ignore or deny the potential efficacy of all the other measures that were available to him to help Jews, measures that he repeatedly and consciously chose not to take. Pius XII's defenders also heroize him by magnifying the significance of, or even inventing, praiseworthy deeds for him. The Church's own uncritical lionization of him is one such example. In "We Remember: A Reflection on the Shoah," issued in March, 1998, the Church's generally welcomed official statement about its historical part in the Holocaust, the sum total of the discussion of Pius XII is to present him as an anti-antisemite and to laud him for what he allegedly "did personally or through his representatives to save hundreds of thousands of Jewish lives." According to the pope's defenders, we are to believe that although Pius XII could not do much, he, being not an antisemite but a good friend of the Jews, did as much as it was possible for him to do.

They make this assertion even though Pius XII, at the height of the Germans' slaughter of European Jewry and shortly before the Germans began to deport Italian Jews, felt the need to declare to all Catholics, in graphic and gruesome terms, the falseness of Judaism, and to express his antisemitism publicly by reiterating the deicide charge. In *Mystici Corporis Christi*, the encyclical of June, 1943, he declared: "But on the gibbet of his death Jesus made void the Law with its decrees, [and] fastened the handwriting of the Old Testament to the Cross, establishing the New Testament in His blood . . . on the Cross then the Old Law died, soon to be buried and to be a bearer of death." What exactly Pius XII meant by his ominous pronouncement that the "Old Law," namely the Jews, was to be a bearer of death is unclear. But the making of such a false charge when the Jews were being slaughtered in Christian and Catholic Europe tells us a great deal about its author.

Why should we care so much whether Pius XII was a righteous man or a blameworthy man? After all, he was just a man, just

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one man, and as Garry Wills reminds us in the opening sentences of his book,

> Catholics have fallen out of the healthy old habit of reminding each other how sinful popes can be. Painters of Last Judgments ... used to include a figure wearing the papal crown in the fires of hell, presenting the pope as a terminal sinner damned forever. This was not only a topos (commonplace), but a preacher's topos—a lesson of faith, not an attack on it. Authoritative as a pope may be by his office, he is not impeccable as a man—he can sin, as can all humans.

It is important to recognize that, the passionate polemics engulfing the pope notwithstanding, Pius XII remains a sideshow, a diversionary subject, by which, according to Carroll, "the broader question of a massive Catholic failure is deflected." The sound and fury engulfing this one man signifies more by what it omits and conceals—the deeper, more disquieting facts of the conduct of many thousands of clergy and their millionfold flock—than by what it reveals about him.

Pius XII was not the Catholic Church. The Church was an enormously powerful trans-national institution, with a long relevant history; a political culture; national churches with their cardinals, bishops, priests, and nuns; and scores of millions of individual adherents, informed in their actions by their faith. Compared to all of this, one pope, as important as he was, must be but a small part of any historical or moral reckoning.

The fixation on Pius XII is common among those who would figuratively or literally sanctify him, though it is also characteristic of some of his detractors, such as Cornwell and Zuccotti. It is understandable that Pius XII's defenders focus on him, yet they proceed in the narrowest of terms, as if by refuting the accusations that the pope was an antisemite, that he helped the Nazis, or that he stood with a hardened heart watching as the Germans slaughtered Jews, they vindicate not only the pope but also the Catholic Church and other Catholics qua Catholics.

To frame the issue as whether or not Pius XII spoke out or acted forcefully enough to save the Jews is to obscure the broader and more important themes. Even if the conclusions that people draw about Pius XII are not the ones that his champions wish, as long as the light shines principally on him this defeat means little compared to the Church's defenders' strategic victory of whitewashing the Church's past. Symptomatic of this strategy was the Church's initial mandate to the International Catholic-Jewish Historical Commission, which it formed in 1999 and which is now defunct. The Church narrowly confined the commission's investigation to include only the highly restricted material that the Vatican itself had chosen to publish on its own diplomatic activity, thereby excluding its non-diplomatic activities and the conduct of its national churches, and confined the time frame to the war years, thereby preventing the commission from examining the first six years of the Germans' persecution of the Jews.

VI.

THE DEFENDERS OF the Church engage in many sleights of hand in order to forestall a systematic investigation of the Catholic Church's contribution to the German-led persecution and extermination of the Jews. I will focus on three such stratagems. The defenders shift their gaze from one part of the Church to another, depending on what is propitious for their arguments. They erect a *cordon sanitaire* around the antisemitism that moved the Germans to kill, arguing that it had nothing to do with the Church's own deprecating and hate-filled views of Jews, which they consistently deny or underplay. And they shift from analyzing the Church as a moral institution to discussing it as a political institution.

Like photographing a disfigured face only from its one good angle, shifting focus from some members or parts of the Church to other ones, as the issues change, systematically displays the Church at its best and conceals its uglier aspects. When the pope or a Church official did something laudable or at least defensible, such as intervening on behalf of Catholics who had converted from Judaism (which is typically presented falsely as an intervention on behalf of Jews), it is accorded great significance. When the pope failed to do something he obviously should have done, such as intervening for or speaking out publicly on behalf of Jews, it is ignored and attention is diverted to, say, the French bishops who did protest, as if they had spoken for the entire Catholic Church. (The pope and his representatives clearly failed to support these protests.) Italian clergy who helped Jews are rightly praised for their actions, but the utter failure of the German clergy's far more pressing need and greater duty to extend verbal and physical aid to Jews is passed over. The silence of other national churches' bishops, such as Belgium's, is ignored.

Such bias in choosing which topics to discuss is guaranteed not to yield a faithful historical portrait of the Church's role, or its many components' roles, in these persecutions and mass murders. It is all



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a prettifying procedure. This problem is exacerbated greatly by the convention—followed even by critics who bend over backwards for fear of being falsely charged with being anti-Catholic (or anti-German, or anti-Polish, etc.)—of presenting vivid anecdotes of righteous Catholics (or of righteous Germans, Poles, etc.) that offset summary statements of the Church's (or Germans', or Poles', etc.) enormously more widespread failures. This practice misleads readers by supplying concrete stories and memorable images of the relatively rare instances of resistance, while keeping abstract or vague the far more common cases of Catholics' (or Germans', or Poles', etc.) abandonment of Jews or of their complicity in the mass murder.

ANY SERIOUS INVESTIGATION of the role of the Catholic Church during the Holocaust would have to assess systematically not just the pope, not just the Vatican, but every national church. While across Europe there were individual clergy who helped Jews, such as Father Marie Benoît in Marseilles, who shepherded hundreds of Jews to safety, even a cursory inventory yields a deeply depressing picture.

The German Catholic Church, without hesitation, abandoned the Jews to their countrymen's ever-intensifying eliminationist persecution of them. Genealogical records, essential for determining who was a Jew according to Germany's new racist laws, so that the regime would know whom to persecute and, eventually, to kill, were stored in churches. Catholic (and Protestant) bishops and priests in all corners of Germany gave the government full access to these records, without protest and apparently without hesitation. It seems never to have occurred to them that there was any reason not to aid the regime's identification of those people whom, according to racist criteria, it would persecute as Jews. Quite the contrary; they saw it as promoting the welfare of Germans. In the authoritative *Klerusblatt*, the official organ of the Bavarian priests' association (Bavaria being the center of German Catholicism), a priest told its readers, already in 1934, that just as the Church had "always" aided the German people, it would also help in such measures fundamental to the persecution of the Jews, which he called "this service to the people." In January, 1936, shortly after the Nuremberg race laws were passed, the *Klerusblatt* gave its stamp of approval to them as being essential for the well-being of the German people.

How can any treatment of the Catholic Church during this period not put this racist-genealogical collaboration at the center of the discussion? Why, moreover, did Eugenio Pacelli, as Vatican secretary of state or as pope, not prevent the German Catholic clergy's willful collaboration with this explicitly racist, eliminationist persecution? Rychlak and others have no answer. They do not even mention the collaboration itself, the record of which is vast.

The German bishops consciously chose not to protest their government's extermination of Germany's Jews or Europe's Jews. They also never protested publicly (or even privately to their government's leaders) against any other major aspect of their country's persecution of the Jews, as the horrors unfolded before their eyes. (Some had private misgivings, and one in particular, Bishop Konrad Preysing, passionately and futilely urged both Pius XII and his German colleagues to try to save Jews.) Yet in a sermon in August, 1941, the German Bishop Clement August von Galen publicly condemned the German state's so-called euthanasia program, which killed the mentally and physically infirm: "If they start out by killing the insane, it can well be extended to the old, the infirm, sick, seriously crippled soldiers. What do you do to a machine which no longer runs, to an old horse which is incurably lame, a cow which does not give milk? They now want to treat humans the same way." Bishop Galen did not mince his words. He explicitly called it "murder." Why did the German bishops and the Vatican, silent about the Germans' systematic mass-murdering of the Jews, which had already begun, rally behind Bishop Galen when he spoke for the mentally ill and others who were not Jews?

Earlier, in the second half of 1940, Cardinal Michael Faulhaber protested to the minister of justice, and Cardinal Adolf Bertram protested to the head of the Reich Chancellery, against the so-called euthanasia program, with Cardinal Faulhaber declaring: "I have deemed it my duty of conscience to speak out in this ethico-legal, non-political question, for as a Catholic bishop I may not remain silent when the preservation of the moral foundations of all public order is at stake." For Bishop Galen, were the Jews not "humans"? For Cardinal Faulhaber, was the mass murder of the Jews not an assault on "the moral foundations of all public order"? Why did the bishops not believe that protesting on behalf of the mentally ill and other victims of this program of mass murder would only hasten their deaths, as the pope and the bishops are now alleged to have believed would have happened to Jews if they had defended them? Why did the German bishops' unqualified "duty of conscience to speak out" against mass murder not apply when the victims were Jews?

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Roman Catholic clergy giving the Nazi salute with German government officials

What did the Nazi leadership do to Bishop Galen, this man who had essentially denounced the Nazis as murderers? Nothing. The power of the Church was so great, as the Church itself knew, and the regime was so fearful of the Catholic Church's hold over Germans, that it did not dare to move against Bishop Galen. Joseph Goebbels, Germany's Mephistophelian propaganda minister, who was acutely attuned to public opinion, explained: "The population of Münster could be regarded as lost during the war if anything were done against the bishop ... [indeed] the whole of [the state] of Westphalia." The so-called euthanasia program was soon formally halted, though the regime continued to kill mentally ill people secretly in the camps.

The German Catholic Church protested

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publicly many other policies of the Nazi regime, including the removal of crucifixes from the schools of Bavaria, which led to sustained regional public protests by ordinary Germans. What did the German government do to the Church, to its bishops and its priests? Virtually nothing. What happened to the policies? The government restored the crucifixes to the schools. The German Church survived these and its many other conflicts with the German government unscathed, which is the best indication that it would have survived, as the Catholic Church as a whole would have survived, had it defended the Jews. But the German bishops made no such protest. One priest, Provost Bernhard Lichtenberg of Berlin, said a daily prayer for the Jews. It took the regime three years—until October, 1941—to arrest him. He died two years later on his way to Dachau. Father Lichtenberg and a few other lonely priests implicitly condemned the silent German Catholic leadership, which, like the pope, abandoned Lichtenberg to his fate. The German bishops and priests were determinedly not the Jews' keepers—but then they did not see the Jews as brothers and sisters.

WHAT ABOUT THE hundreds of German priests serving the German army and occupation forces in Eastern Europe, who were in the thick of killing operations, holding services for—and as part of Catholic practice, taking the confessions of—the killers, who, exceptions notwithstanding, did not see their mass slaughtering of Jews as wrong, let alone as a sin? Did the priests tell the many Catholics among the hundreds of thousands of Germans participating in the mass annihilation that they were sinning? The evidence strongly suggests that they did not. If they had, then we would in all likelihood know about such initiatives, because it has been the practice of the Church to put forward any evidence that would cast a favorable light upon itself. The testimony that does exist is not heartening. Of an estimated one thousand Catholic and Protestant clergy serving as military chaplains, fewer than ten cases (most are Catholic priests) have come to light—and some of them are dubious—in which the chaplains conveyed disapproval of, or urged resistance to, the mass murder. And some chaplains have recounted their clerical colleagues' approval of their countrymen's mass-murdering. One priest, for example, tells of the enthusiasm of Catholics for the slaughter of the Jews, and of another priest who justified the mass murder by invoking the Christian Bible, instructing that "there is a curse on this people ever since the crucifixion of Jesus when they cried: 'Let his blood be on our heads and on the heads of our children.'"

That Catholic priests in the thick of the mass murder greeted the annihilation of the Jews with silence or worse should come as no surprise, since the Catholic military bishop, Franz-Justus Rarkowski, the spiritual leader of the priests assigned to the Wehrmacht, was deeply Nazified. In his Christmas message in 1940, which all Catholic soldiers received, Bishop Rarkowski vilified the Jews as the progenitors of the war and of Germany's suffering:

> The German people has a good conscience and knows which people it is that before God and history bears the responsibility for this presently raging, gigantic struggle. The German people knows who lightheartedly unleashed the dogs of war. Our opponents believed in the power of their money bags and the repressive force of that shameful and un-Christian Treaty of Versailles.

More surprisingly, Doris Bergen has concluded that the great majority of German military chaplains, Catholics and Protestants, "weighed in on the side of the perpetrators, condoning and blessing their crimes through words, actions, and silence. One of the most obvious manifestations of this function was the provision of group absolution for soldiers." So how can we maintain anything other than that the German priests who gave succor to the genocidal executioners were at least collaborators with the Nazi regime, if not partners in this mass murdering onslaught? This virtually unknown and unmentioned chapter of the Catholic Church and its clergy's role in the Holocaust has barely been investigated.

IN SLOVAKIA, THE Catholic Church was not just extremely influential, its priests were political founders and leaders of the independent Slovakian state. The rabidly antisemitic Father Andre Hlinka established the Slovak People's Party in 1905; and after his death in 1939 another priest, Monsignor Jozef Tiso, his successor, became the first president of the German satellite state of Slovakia, and the devout Catholic Vojtech Tuka became prime minister. Their government instituted comprehensive antisemitic laws, modeled on Germany's racist statutes, and itself instigated the deportation of the country's Jews by requesting at the beginning of 1942 that the Germans deport twenty thousand Jews as a way for Slovakia speciously to fulfill its labor quota. Adolf Eichmann later commented that "Slovakian officials offered their Jews to us like someone throwing away sour beer."


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

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In August, 1942, during the first phase of the deportation of the country's Jews to their deaths, president-priest Tiso preached in a holiday mass, using Nazi antisemitic idioms and arguments, that expelling the Jews was a Christian act because Slovakia had to free itself of "its pests." He invoked the authority of his ecclesiastical predecessor Father Hlinka, who, sharing the views of many Catholics of the time, had proclaimed in violation of official Church policy the racist doctrine that "a Jew remains a Jew even if he is baptized by a hundred bishops."

Although individual Slovak bishops decried these policies, Livia Rothkirchen, the foremost authority on the annihilation of Slovak Jewry, has concluded that the majority of the Slovak Church leadership supported their country's eliminationist program. They themselves said as much. During the height of the deportations, in April, 1942, the Slovak bishops collectively issued a pastoral letter that essentially justified the deportation of the Christ-killers: "The greatest tragedy of the Jewish nation lies in the fact of not having recognized the Redeemer and of having prepared a terrible and ignominious death for Him on the cross." They complemented this with modern antisemitic charges: "The influence of the Jews [has] been pernicious. In a short time they have taken control of almost all the economic and financial life of the country to the detriment of our people. Not only economically, but also in the cultural and moral spheres, they have harmed our people. The Church cannot be opposed, therefore, if the state with legal regulations hinders the dangerous influence of the Jews." Earlier the Slovak bishops had protested to their government, effectively, on behalf of Christians who had converted from Judaism (who were subsequently not deported), but they said nothing on behalf of the Jews.

It should therefore come as no surprise that one priest in Slovakia actually counseled an important perpetrator. Vojtech Tuka, the mass-murdering Catholic prime minister of Slovakia, conveyed to a German diplomat that he had once told his father confessor that his conscience was clear regarding his deportations of Slovakia's Jews. As long as his deeds were, in Tuka's words, done "for the good of his people," the priest was "not opposed to his actions." Was this indicative of the pastoral response more generally, including among the German clergy?

The bishops waited until March, 1943—almost one year after deportations had begun, and when three-quarters of Slovak Jewry had already been transported to their deaths—to issue a pastoral letter against the deportations. But they were clearly going on the record only because the war was going badly for the Germans—and still many bishops opposed the letter. They chose to have it read in Latin, which few Slovaks understood, so that it would not rally many people to sympathize with the Jews. The letter was so opposed by the clergy that many priests either refused to read it or altered its content so that it no longer condemned the anti-Jewish onslaught.

The Vatican did privately protest several times to the Slovak government, though mainly on behalf of Catholics who had converted from Judaism. It was acutely worried that this avowedly Catholic regime would implicate the Church and the pope in mass murder because the Church's fingerprints in Slovakia were undeniably on the trigger. The German government had earlier commented with "undisguised satisfaction" that the Slovak government's antisemitic laws "had been enacted in a state headed by a member of the Catholic clergy." Pius XII's representative warned Tiso in October, 1944, when the Germans' defeat was around the corner, of the injury that further deportations would do to the Church: "the injustice wrought by his government is harmful to the prestige of his country and enemies will exploit it to discredit clergy and the Church the world over." This intervention, as the Church itself made clear, had much to do with the Church's selfish political interests and little to do with compassion for the soon-to-be-slaughtered Jews. As with the pope's late appeal to Horthy in Hungary, the Church was donning a fig leaf of quarter-hearted intervention to cover up its indefensible stances for an expected postwar world under Allied domination.

What did the Catholic Church do to president-priest Tiso, who, explicitly invoking the Church's authority as justification, contributed to the mass murder of Jews? What did it do to the Catholic clergy in parliament, not one of whom voted against the legislation legitimizing the deportation of the Jews to their deaths? No public condemnation. No excommunication. Nothing. By allowing Tiso and the other priests to remain Catholics—not merely lay Catholics but priests who administered the sacraments—and by refusing to publicly and emphatically dissociate itself from him and the other priests who blessed and contributed to mass murder, and by refusing to excommunicate this man and the others acting publicly in the name of the Church, Pius XII and his bishops showed that they believed that people complicit in the mass murder of Jews were worthy of representing the Catholic Church in its most sacred duties.



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Nuns marching with Nazi legionnaires in Croatia

THIS UNBELIEVABLE STATE of affairs was etched even more starkly in Croatia, where many priests themselves committed mass murder, including as commanders of approximately half of the twenty death camps set up by the Ustasha regime. Menachem Shelah has observed that "dozens, perhaps even hundreds of priests and monks shed their priestly apparel and donned Ustasha uniforms, in order to share in the 'sacred work' of murder, rape and robbery." The most notorious camp was Jasenovač, where the Croats killed two hundred thousand Jews, Serbs, and Gypsies. Forty thousand of them perished under the unusually cruel reign of "Brother Satan," the Franciscan friar Miroslav Filipovic-

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Majstorovic. Pius XII neither reproached nor punished him or the other Croatian priest-executioners during or after the war.

With regard to Jews, the leaders of the national Catholic churches of different countries (this is also true of Protestant churches) were deeply influenced by the culture and politics of their own societies, in which, after all, they had grown up and lived. This meant that the Catholic Church's overarching cultural and doctrinal patrimony of antisemitism was refracted through each national culture. In less antisemitic countries, such as France, Italy, and Denmark, the churches were, to varying degrees, also less antisemitic. Their clergy more frequently reacted with genuine horror to the Germans' antisemitic onslaught and extended more aid to the Jews. In the most deeply antisemitic societies, such as Croatia, Germany, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Ukraine, churchmen tended to reflect the intensity and the particular character of their local antisemitism. In August, 1941, when the Germans' and Lithuanians' slaughter of Lithuania's Jews was in full swing, the leaders of the Lithuanian Catholic Church, in the words of a contemporaneous German report, "forbade the priests to help Jews in any way whatsoever"; and they issued this prohibition after representatives of the Jewish community had approached the Church leadership begging for help. Although some individual priests helped Jews, the Lithuanian Church as a whole fully collaborated with the Germans until the war turned against Germany (when a greater number began to help Jews, especially Jewish children), with some priests taking part in, and lending their authority to, the German and Lithuanian killing institutions.

To understand the Catholic Church's various and many roles during the Holocaust, then, the Church needs to be examined as an agglomeration of related, though distinct, this-worldly social and political institutions, at least as much as a unified institution, seated in the Vatican, whose character derives from the interpretation of religious doctrines or from its self-conceived political needs. A major research project into the political, social, and cultural histories of each national Catholic church's attitudes and actions toward the Jews—before and during the Nazi period—remains an essential prerequisite for fully evaluating the role of the Catholic Church, and for the Church itself to fully to evaluate its role, during the Holocaust. It would have to produce a series of in-depth, uncompromising volumes on each country, which would include, of course, an account of the small minority of individual bishops and priests across Europe who objected to the persecution of Jews and sought to aid them, and how their clerical brethren and parishioners reacted to their stances. Such an investigation has never yet been done.

The current practice of shifting focus to whatever parts or members of the Church show the Church in a favorable light on a given issue is accompanied by a complementary concealment tactic of asking certain questions to the exclusion of other ones. The most flagrant example is using Pius XII as a lightning rod to deflect attention from the rest of the Church. Equally misleading is the oft-discussed question of why the Church did not do more to help Jews. This question is important, but it typically conceals the unexamined, underlying question of what the Church—its national churches, bishops, priests, and nuns, not to mention its lay members—thought about Jews and about the eliminationist persecution in all of its facets, not only its most extreme manifestation of mass annihilation.

The Catholic Church and its national churches greeted many aspects of the Germans' pan-European eliminationist assault on the Jews, and of the national assaults in individual countries, with approval, sometimes even with enthusiasm, and with little principled disapproval. The Germans' antisemitism and eliminationist impulses were understood, and found to be valid, and were supported, exceptions notwithstanding, by the German (and Austrian), Croatian, Lithuanian, Polish, Slovak, and other parts of the Catholic Church. Differences over the means of implementing these goals (whether genocide was an acceptable and just eliminationist response to the putative Jewish threat in which they commonly believed) is what separated portions of the Church from the many Germans and others who morally or physically supported mass murder.

VII.

Another tactic of exoneration has also been employed by the Church and its defenders: erecting an iron curtain between the Church's virulent antisemitism and the antisemitism that led the Germans and those who helped them to persecute and then to slaughter Jews. In one of the most glaring public falsehoods of recent times, the Holy See's Commission for Religious Relations with Jews declared in "We Remember: A Reflection on the Shoah" that the Nazis' "antisemitism had its roots outside of Christianity."

The Catholic Church and today's pope, who commissioned "We Remember" and wrote a letter of endorsement upon its publication, would have us believe that had the Church and its officials, high and low, never propagated the antisemitism that "We Remember" exculpatingly calls "anti-Judaism," and never imbued so many of its followers with this "anti-Judaism," then three things would still have happened: the Nazis would still have invented exactly their murderous brand of antisemitism out of thin air; and all those people in Europe who were not "neo-pagan" antisemites (as the Church calls modern German antisemitism) but were still supportive of the Germans' eliminationist persecution of the Jews—owing precisely to their religious antisemitism (this is true of many complicit Croats, Lithuanians, Poles, Slovaks, and others)—would still have lent the same moral and physical support to the Germans' assault; and the Germans would still have met with little clerical and popular resistance, and therefore would still have been able to inflict so much suffering on Jews, culminating in the murder of six million of them.

If people choose not to suspend their disbelief when considering such improbable notions, then the Church's iron curtain separating its antisemitism from the Germans' antisemitism must be lifted. This inevitably leads to a consideration of the degree of the Church's culpability not just for its reactions to the eliminationist onslaught, but also for the Holocaust itself. Several topics would have to be investigated, always keeping in mind that, according to a survey conducted in 1939, ninety-five percent of Germans at that time still belonged to a Christian Church and were hardly (as the Catholic Church would have us believe) "neo-pagans." Or is it the Church's position that the forty-three percent of Germans who were Catholics were really neo-pagans? As Carroll observes: "The German people, whatever else they did, maintained their ostensible Christian identity—which is why the question about, at the very least, acquiescence in genocidal crimes is a question about the content of that identity."

What was the Church's construction and treatment of the Jews historically? How did the Church's antisemitic precept and practice contribute to the modern eliminationist antisemitism that animated the Nazis, the vast majority of the German people, and, by and large, the willing executioners? How did the Church's antisemitism prepare the social soil, eventually tilled by others, for Nazism to flourish, and for the Nazis' assault on the Jews to find broad sympathy and many helpers in Germany and

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throughout Europe? (The same questions should be posed about the Protestant churches, particularly the German ones, the descendants of Luther.)

BEFORE INVESTIGATING THE complex of issues relevant to the Church's antisemitism and the Holocaust, it might be asked: Why is such an investigation lacking in most treatments of the Holocaust, not to mention in treatments of the Church during the Holocaust? How can it be that this overwhelming record of antisemitic hatred and its obvious integral relationship to the genesis of the Holocaust is often denied? Blet, Cornwell, Michael Phayer in *The Catholic Church and the Holocaust, 1930-1965*, Rychlak, and Zuccotti, defenders and critics of Pius XII, fail to discuss, in any but the most glancing ways, the Church's antisemitism. It may seem extraordinary that Zuccotti could write an important book exposing comforting and falsely heroizing fictions about Pius XII, the Church, and the Holocaust without an in-depth exploration of the Church's long history of deeply rooted antisemitism and persecution of the Jews, or of the extent and the character of antisemitism within the Church during the Nazi era. But when one knows that this unapologetically ahistorical approach to the study of the Holocaust has been a common (though not universal) practice among academic historians who have focused on the mass murder itself, this particular neglect becomes just an unremarkable part of a general neglect.

Those who speak plain truths about the antisemitism of the European past, including of Catholic officials, often meet ferocious opposition. Given that roughly two billion people in the world today, including most Americans and Europeans, are Christians (with more than one billion Catholics among them), and that the most visible, respected, and powerful religious leader in the world is the leader of the Catholic Church, speaking the truth about Christianity and antisemitism, and especially about Christianity and the Holocaust, is too rare. Nothing more enrages those who are deeply invested in defending the indefensible—whether they be Germans, Christians, or academics who have built careers in this way—than when someone dares to expose the falsehoods of their claims. These attacks are no less surreal than if those who stated the obvious truths that widespread racism undergirded Southern slavery and Jim Crow, and that the enslaving or segregating whites regarded blacks as inferior or dangerous, were branded anti-white.

Of all the books under review here, only Carroll's volume attempts to get at the root of the problem (David Kertzer's book does a fine job within in its circumscribed time period), digging into the historical development and nature of the Church's antisemitism, which is to excavate the intellectual seedbed from which grew the ideas that moved the perpetrators of the Holocaust. Carroll's account of the development of Christian antisemitism, and then after the Reformation of its continuation as Catholic antisemitism, is masterful. By structuring his analysis around several explicit and implicit themes that are either underappreciated in or absent from other treatments of the subject, Carroll develops a large and persuasive interpretation, even if its individual elements may be familiar to experts on the development of antisemitism.

THE SUPERSESSIONIST CREED of Christianity held that once Jesus fulfilled the messianic prophecy of Judaism, a new Christian era had begun that replaced the now suddenly anachronistic Judaic one. And just as Judaism had become Christianity, Jews were to become Christians. Since the refusal of the Jews to accept the Christian demands that they renounce their Judaism implicitly posed a fundamental challenge to the Christian claims, and since that challenge came from those once acknowledged as the people of God, the disparagement of the Jews became central to Christianity.

If the Jews rejected the divinity of Jesus and his Church, then either Jesus was not divine and the Church was wrong, or the people had strayed from God's path. So the Gospel of John has Jesus saying to the Jews: "Whoever belongs to God hears the words of God; for this reason you do not listen, because you do not belong to God." If not to God, then to whom? According to John, Jesus recognizes the true identity and nature of the Jews, saying: "You belong to your father the devil and you willingly carry out your father's desires. He was a murderer from the beginning and does not stand in truth, because there is no truth in him."

That the Jews were capable of any evil—including the service of the Devil—became the pan-European view of Jews in the Middle Ages. This alleged alliance with the Devil was supported by the foundational canard that the Jews had killed Jesus, and that all Jews, dubbed "Christ-killers," were forever responsible for the crime. Carroll writes that while Christianity, historically, has needed living Jews to be a negative Other against which the true Christian claims could be pressed, "replacement implied the elimination of the replaced. This strain would lead to conversionism and expulsions, and ultimately it would be reduced to its perverted essence by the attempted genocide."

Moreover, Christian antisemitism has been divorced from the nature of actual Jews. "The age-old 'Jewish Problem,' that is, was and remains a Christian problem, spawned by an ignorant Christian imagination," Carroll writes. The claim that prejudices—against Jews, blacks, gays, women, and so on—are provoked by those who are hated, in this case the Jews, is transparently false. (Such an assertion is itself an expression of the prejudice that it purports to explain.) The responsibility for antisemitism and other prejudices lies with the bigots, and with their societies and their cultures, which teach them their prejudices. Most antisemites throughout history have not known actual Jews (many regions of Europe expelled Jews, sometimes for hundreds of years, and continued to be thoroughly antisemitic) and were nonetheless animated by the vivid, often demonic images of Jews of their cultures' and religions' imagination. Real, living Jews had nothing to do with the origins of the antisemites' beliefs.

CARROLL ALSO UNDERSTANDS the direct yet complex relationship of beliefs to actions that has characterized antisemitism. The basic supersessionist tenet of Christianity, given an inexhaustible supply of emotional fuel by the charge of Christ-killing, was elaborated through the centuries in a variety of ways, producing a series of evolving and related demonological antisemitisms, and then, among Christians, depending on doctrines and circumstances, a variety of eliminationist strategies and attacks: expulsions, pogroms, forced conversions, ghettoization, and sustained murderous assaults.

Although there can be no doubt that antisemitic belief and antisemitic action do not correspond in a one-to-one relationship—because other social, cultural, and especially political factors shape the relationship—there can also be no doubt that, when activated and channeled by political leaders, beliefs about Jews suggest certain courses of action to the bearers of those beliefs. In the case of antisemitism, it has often been sufficient to motivate leaders and ordinary people alike to seek to extirpate Jews from their midst, often with deadly violence.

It should also be clear that antisemitism itself does not generate a program of systematic mass murder. Those who want to deny that the Church's antisemitism or the antisemitism of ordinary Germans had a significant role, or any causal role at all, in producing the Holocaust pretend that if either kind of antisemitism was critical to producing the Holocaust, then the Holo-

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caust, or something like it, should have happened long before it did. This line of argumentation is specious. It neglects the well-established fact that for a large program of mass murder to occur, two factors are necessary, but neither one alone is sufficient: a political leadership that initiates and organizes the mass murder, and people willing to implement the leaders' policies. One (a deeply antisemitic populace) without the other (a political leadership that, for whatever reason, refuses to engage in a politics of systematic extermination) does not lead to mass murder.

CARROLL'S ACCOUNT ALSO highlights the tendency among antisemites toward violence, even mass murder, against Jews. Carroll emphasizes the Church's catastrophic posture physically and socially for the Jews, and doctrinally and morally for itself. It counseled that the Jews were not to be attacked because of the Augustinian notion, codified by Pope Gregory I in 598 in the proclamation *Sicut Judaeis*, that the Jews should not be destroyed but should live in subjection as proof of what happens to those who reject the Church. Yet the same Church repeatedly found it hard to prevent the flood of rage against the Jews that it engendered among its followers from bursting the weak dams of its formal injunctions against violence. "For a thousand years," Carroll writes, "the compulsively repeated pattern of that ambivalence would show in bishops and popes protecting Jews—but from expressly Christian mobs that wanted to kill Jews because of what bishops and popes had taught them about Jews."

The bishops' and popes' weak restraining impulses were "bound to fail" whenever "Jews presumed, whether economically or culturally or both, to even think of thriving," or for that matter when, for any reason whatsoever, Christians projected responsibility for natural or social maladies upon the demonized Jews, such as during the Black Plague of the mid-fourteenth century, which was when Christians, mainly in Germany, annihilated the Jews of roughly three hundred fifty communities, including major centers such as Mainz, Trier, and Cologne. Carroll might have added that this murderous logic of popes' and bishops' needing to restrain Catholics from acting on what popes and bishops had inculcated into them was also operative in the 1930s and 1940s. The pope and most bishops watched the Germans and their local helpers—many of whom had imbibed Church-inspired antisemitism—deport and slaughter the Jews of one Catholic country after the next, and also of non-Catholic Christian countries. This time they did not even try to protect them.

IN CARROLL'S VIEW, all of this comes together in the most central and sacred symbol of Christianity: the cross. His account of the development of Christianity from a religion that celebrated Jesus's life into a religion fixated on his death with all its consequences (a wrong, contingent turn that he laments and would like the Church to reverse) is rich, nuanced, and persuasive. The most catastrophic of the consequences was a Christian fixation on the people who allegedly caused the Crucifixion, which led to the rise of the cross as a concomitant weapon against the "Christ-killers." The cause of this age-old "Jewish problem," born of Christian ignorance, Carroll remarks, "is so plain we can hardly see it as such, and it has been there all along. A miscarried cult of the cross is ubiquitous in this story, from the Milvian Bridge [where Constantine saw a cross in the sky and became a Christian] to Auschwitz." The Crusades were wars of the cross, intended to free Jerusalem from Muslim control, but in 1096 the First Crusade's first victims were—perfectly logically—Jews, the Jews of Mainz. A Jewish chronicler captured the annihilatory logic of the antisemitism:

> [The Crusaders] said to one another: "Behold we travel to a distant land to do battle with the kings of that land. 'We take our souls in our hands' in order to kill and subjugate all those kingdoms that do not believe in the Crucified. How much more so (should we kill and subjugate) the Jews, who killed and crucified him." They taunted us from every direction. They took counsel, ordering that either we turn to their abominable faith or they would destroy us "from infant to suckling." They—both princes and common folk—placed an evil sign upon their garments, a cross.

Carroll traces the development of the cross as an antisemitic symbol and weapon from Constantine's Christianized Roman Empire to the medieval Crusades to modern times, culminating in Catholics' recent attempts to de-Judaize Auschwitz by colonizing it with a convent and a huge cross. For the better part of two millennia, since the time of Constantine's adoption of Christianity for the Roman Empire in the fourth century, the cross has stood for the murder of Jesus and has invoked the Jews as his murderers. "In a dozen ways," Carroll writes, "the cross itself had been conscripted into this campaign ... and now every cross in Western Christendom would become an infallible



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promulgation of the same doctrine."

Given the many historical fabrications and calumnies about Jews contained in the Christian Bible, including the explicit and false blaming of the Jews of Jesus' time and all their descendants for his death, it is all too likely that many Christians will continue to blame Jews for Jesus's death. The Gospel of Matthew fabricates a Jewish crowd demanding Jesus's crucifixion, shouting "Let him be crucified!," gladly accepting their guilt, and pronouncing a curse of that guilt upon their own descendants: "And the whole people said in reply [to Pilate's declaration of his own innocence], 'His blood be on our heads and on our children's.'" (For those who haven't heard, Jews were not responsible for Jesus's death. It was the Romans who decided to kill him as a political subversive, and who themselves executed him by their trademark method of crucifixion.) Even though the Catholic Church has removed much of the explicit antisemitism from its doctrine, theology, and liturgy, the cross, Catholicism's central and most evocative symbol, bound up in the biblically derived antisemitic libel of "Christ-killers," is, as Carroll argues, likely to continue to provoke antipathy toward Jews.

THESE STRUCTURING ELEMENTS of Carroll's analysis of Catholicism's antisemitism do not substitute for the long story itself, which he tells with a fine narrative flow, genuine insight, and unyielding rectitude and directness. (For a devout Catholic, a priest who has left the priesthood, to confront his own tradition in this unsparing manner is remarkable. It should be an inspiration to people of all traditions and all countries, who more often than not flinch from looking at the ugly features of their own spiritual or national homes.) I will not retell the history here, as much as it bears retelling in Christian cultures. Suffice it to say that the pan-European antisemitism, which one scholar describes as "a hatred so vast and abysmal, so intense, that it leaves one gasping for comprehension" and which frequently led to eliminationist onslaughts, including protogenocidal violence, did not generally dissipate with the Enlightenment and modernity, though it did gradually decline in some countries and among certain groups. Instead, it continued to be spread systematically by the Church at the same time that a new, derivative form of antisemitism, racist in character, began to flourish by its side.

This occurred most centrally, though not exclusively, in Germany in the nineteenth century, where Christianity's fierce litany of anti-Jewish charges was reinforced by a new pseudo-scientific foundation of race and augmented with a new set of accusations appropriate to the age—accusations that were taken up by Christian antisemites and racist antisemites alike. Christian antisemitism, as Carroll illustrates, had always adapted itself to the idioms and the social conditions of the day, with new antisemitic charges cropping up in response to political, economic, social, and cultural developments. The modern world was the age of nations, so Jews were said to undermine the nation. It was the age of industrializing capitalism, so Jews were said to pull its levers, to prey on entire economies. It was the age of secularization, so Jews were said to be making an assault on Christianity and morality in general. It was the age of growing demands for political and economic inclusion and justice, including Marxist demands, so Jews were said to be the instigators of revolution.

The age-old Christian view of the Jews as authors of so much evil was naturally adopted by racist antisemites, most noticeably in Germany. Germanness was fused with Christianity as Jewishness was transformed into the nefarious Other, not just for Christendom but also for Germania. Christianity bequeathed to modern racist antisemites a powerful demonology, a powerful emotional antipathy toward Jews, and an image of the Jew as the sinister Other seeking to destroy goodness root and branch, in the case of Germany the root being the *Volk*.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the Catholic Church, whose publications and preachers continued to pour forth antisemitic indictments throughout the nineteenth century and the first part of the twentieth century, including the 1930s and 1940s, could find common cause with most of what racist antisemites were saying and urging, even if they did not usually share the racists' belief that the source of the Jews' putative perniciousness was biological, which meant that Jews could not be redeemed by baptism. To the ear of the common folk, not focused on every tonal variation of the antisemitic battle cry, the fearsome charges of one kind of antisemite (the religious, such as the Catholic Church) echoed and reinforced the fearsome charges of another kind of antisemite (the racist, such as the Nazis). That their litanies of hatred were not one hundred percent congruent, but only a figurative ninety percent, made little difference.

IT WAS IN the 1930s, when Hitler was weak and the Church was indisputably in no danger, that Pacelli, then Vatican secretary of state, engineered Catholicism's legitimation of Nazi dictatorship with a deal, the aforementioned Concordat, pledging the German Church's loyalty to Germany's Nazi leadership (Catholic bishops, on behest of the Church, swore an oath of allegiance to the Nazi state) and forbidding the Church to participate in politics. The Concordat effectively conceded to the regime the right to pursue, without Church criticism or opposition, its political goals, which included its openly militarist, imperialist, and racist program. Pacelli even agreed to a subsequent "secret annex" to the Concordat that effectively gave the Church's approval to German re-armament, still forbidden by the Versailles Treaty. Hitler's existentially central, loudly trumpeted, though still vague eliminationist enterprise against the Jews was well known to the Catholic Church. Before signing the Concordat, Hitler even boasted to two German Church leaders of his affinity with the Church in his hostility to the Jews, explicitly telling them that he would "drive the Jews out more and more."

The Catholic Church gained with the Concordat a recognized sphere of religious and cultural immunity for itself in Germany, where its newspapers and its organizations were under pressure from the regime. Pacelli's political bargain with Hitler might have appeared less reprehensible had the Church done it with a heavy heart weighed down by utter repulsion toward the eliminationist antisemitism that reigned in Germany, and with firm resolve to fight it, however possible. But the opposite prevailed. In a note that he submitted to the German government at the time of the Concordat's ratification, which reflected the views of the German Catholic Church leaders, Pacelli conveyed the Church's intention to let the Germans have a free hand with the Jews, except Catholics who had been born Jews, by stating that "the Holy See has no intention of interfering in Germany's internal political affairs," which, given prior discussions, was a clear reference to Jews.

Both in the Vatican and in Germany itself, the Catholic Church continued to spread antisemitism and, certain exceptions notwithstanding, to be greatly sympathetic to the Germans' eliminationist impulses—even if some clergy had private misgivings about the violence, such as *Kristallnacht*. This is evident by the failure of the Catholic Church and both its popes, Pius XI and Pius XII, and of its national bishops, to oppose the antisemitic legislation that Germany, Italy, and many other countries issued in the 1930s and 1940s. There is no evidence that clerical expressions of approval or clerical silence regarding these policies concealed an inward opposition to them born of the belief that the Jews were

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innocent. If the Church archives contained evidence of such opposition, especially on the part of the popes, how likely is it that the Church would insist on keeping it hidden from the public?

VIII.

ASIDE FROM THE indisputable fact that the Church's antisemitism was the trunk that never ceased nourishing the modern European antisemitism that had branched off from it, just a cursory glance at what the Church was preaching about Jews from the second half of the nineteenth century through the Nazi years renders untenable the claim of a difference in kind between the Church's "anti-Judaism" and its offshoot European "antisemitism." Those asserting such a difference as fact do not do the minimum necessary to prove it, such as discuss the nature of antisemitism and its varieties, and compare the two kinds of antisemitism in depth according to clear evaluative criteria in order to ascertain what their relationship is. Surely that relationship is not non-existent, as Pope John Paul II and other apologists would have us believe.

Even if they did seriously compare the different antisemitisms as they choose to portray them, it would not suffice, because this distinction between anti-Judaism and antisemitism is itself founded on a fiction, a sanitized account of the Church's so-called anti-Judaism. The antisemitism of the Church, certainly since the last part of the nineteenth century and throughout the Nazi period, was far more "modern" and far closer to the Nazis' antisemitism, in precept and in practice, than has been acknowledged. David I. Kertzer's important book, *The Popes Against the Jews: The Vatican's Role in the Rise of Modern Anti-Semitism*, presents a wealth of new archival research to demonstrate this. Kertzer even ascribes responsibility for engendering the modern antisemitism that came to predominate in Germany and elsewhere to the Catholic Church, which he calls "one of its important architects."

Kertzer's signal contribution is to refocus attention away from the difference between the religious foundation of the Church's antisemitism and the racist foundation of modern European antisemitism, toward a consideration of the great similarities between these kindred ideologies of prejudice. There was even a new tendency among Catholic writers to define Jews as a race. In 1880, the Jesuit fortnightly *La Civiltà Cattolica*, which was the official, authoritative, and most important Vatican publication, explained: "Oh how wrong and deluded are those who think that Judaism is just a religion, like Catholicism, Paganism, Protestantism, and not in fact a race, a people, a nation!" In 1897, *Civiltà Cattolica* was still more emphatic: "The Jew remains always in every place immutably a Jew. His nationality is not in the soil where he is born, nor in the language that he speaks, but in his seed."

Regardless of whether the churchmen were formally sticking to the religious explanation for the alleged evil of the Jews or propagating the new racist explanation, the content of the Church's antisemitic demonology was exceedingly modern. "As modern antisemitic movements took shape at the end of the nineteenth century," Kertzer observes, "the Church was a major player, constantly warning people of the rising Jewish peril." A classical statement of this kind was to be found in an article in *Civiltà Cattolica* from 1893, called "Jewish Morality," which Kertzer says is typical:

> [The Jewish nation] does not work, but traffics in the property and the work of others; it does not produce, but lives and grows fat with the products of the arts and industry of the nations that give it refuge. It is the giant octopus that with its oversized tentacles envelops everything. It has its stomach in the banks ... and its suction cups everywhere: in contracts and monopolies, in credit unions and banks, in postal services and telegraph companies, in shipping and in the railroads, in the town treasuries and in state finance. It represents the kingdom of capital ... the aristocracy of gold.... It reigns unopposed.

THE CHURCH'S ACCUSATIONS against Jews were often virtually indistinguishable, then, from those of the racist antisemites. Even Pius XI's suppressed anti-racism encyclical is animated by modern antisemitic charges that might be called soft Nazism. This should come as no surprise, because, as Kertzer demonstrates, Pius XI had long been a committed antisemite. In 1918, immediately after the end of World War I and less than four years before Achille Ratti was to be elevated to the papacy as Pius XI, Pope Benedict XV sent him to Poland as his representative with the assignment of working to improve the lot of the Jews, whom Catholic Poles were intensely persecuting, even with some pogroms. Kertzer concludes: "Ratti did nothing of the sort. On the contrary, he did everything he could to impede any Vatican action on behalf of the Jews and prevent any Vatican intervention that would discourage the violence.... [His] reports to the Vatican on the situation of the Jews in Poland ... rather than warning about the Jews' persecutors, were aimed at alerting the Vatican to the dangers posed by the Jews themselves."

Why did he disobey his pope's order? Because of his antisemitism. Not only did the Jews in Polish cities, according to Ratti, "only subsist through small commerce involving contraband, fraud, and usury," but he also declared in his report that "one of the most evil and strongest influences that is felt here, perhaps the strongest and most evil, is that of the Jews." Like his successor Pius XII, he subscribed to the modern antisemitic demonology that identified Bolshevism with Jews, maintaining in his report to the Vatican that "the Jews form the principal force [of Bolshevism] in Poland."

In 1932 he even confided his profound animosity toward Jews, which stayed with him at least through most of his papacy, to Mussolini. The persecution of the Church around the world, Pius XI volunteered, was partly a result of "Judaism's antipathy for Christianity." He said also that, with the exception of Italian Jews, the Jews of Central and Eastern Europe were a threat to Christian society. As his own experience in Warsaw had supposedly taught him, "I saw that the [Bolshevik] Commissioners ... were all Jews." With antisemitic views such as those of Pius XI and Pius XII—especially their common identification of Jews with Communism—leading the Church, it is no wonder that Mussolini and Hitler believed that they would have carte blanche from the Church in the matter of the Jews. (But it is a wonder that "We Remember" presents Pius XI, like Pius XII, only as an anti-antisemite.)

HOW FAR GONE this modern antisemitic Church was by the 1930s is suggested by Pius XI's attempt, late in his life, to atone for the terrible transgressions of his ongoing support for the Church's antisemitism (including the antisemitism of his and Pacelli's encyclical *Mit brennender Sorge*, and his suppression of a Catholic organization that sought to put an end to the deicide charge), and of his silence in the face of the Germans' racist antisemitic assault upon the Jews. He decided to commission a new encyclical, the so-called Hidden Encyclical, condemning that assault, as Passelecq and Suchecky recount; but he so distrusted the antisemitic Vatican establishment, presumably including Pacelli himself, from whom he concealed his initiative, that he went to an outsider, an American Jesuit named John LaFarge, who was the editor of the Jesuit journal *America* and had written a book against racism that attacked segregation in the

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American South. LaFarge informed his superior, the general of the Society of Jesus, Father Wladimir Ledóchowski, who had closely collaborated with the pope on earlier encyclicals but whose views about the Jews had led the pope to keep this new initiative secret from him. When LaFarge eventually turned his draft over to Ledóchowski, Ledóchowski strategically gave it for evaluation to Father Enrico Rosa, the former longtime editor and notorious antisemitic polemicist of *Civiltà Cattolica*.

In assessing the content of *Civiltà Cattolica*, which was supervised by the pope himself, Passelecq and Suchecky write that "the boundary seems very fluid" between the Church's "anti-Judaism" and the "average" antisemitism of the period. They then devote thirteen pages to reproducing just a sampling of the hate-filled, Nazi-like charges against the Jews that *Civiltà Cattolica* was printing in the 1920s and 1930s. In 1922, it declared that "the world is sick.... Everywhere peoples are in the grip of inexplicable convulsions." Who is responsible? "The Synagogue." "Jewish intruders" control the principal threat to world order, Russia and the Communist International. In 1936, after the Nuremberg Laws had been published and the Jews had been under sustained assault in Germany for a few years, the Vatican journal echoed standard Nazi antisemitic rhetoric in accusing the Jews of being "uniquely endowed with the qualities of parasites and destroyers," as pulling the levers of both capitalism and Communism in a pincer assault to control the entire world. In 1938, it warned of "the Jews' continual persecution of Christians, particularly the Catholic Church, and their alliance with Freemasons, socialists, and other anti-Christian groups."

A year earlier, *Civiltà Cattolica* disseminated as "an obvious fact that the Jews are a disruptive element because of their dominating spirit and their revolutionary tendency. Judaism is ... a foreign body that irritates and provokes the reactions of the organism it has contaminated." It went on to discuss solutions to the Jewish problem ambivalently, explicitly considering various forms of "elimination," such as extermination and expulsion, and also permanent segregation, as actual thinkable options. In the end it rejected them as un-Christian and urged its readers to show Christian charity toward the Jews in the hope that the Jews would reform themselves. But since *Civiltà Cattolica*—and the Church—had for decades insistently described the Jews as an incorrigible threat to the well-being of the world, why should anyone who believed this have taken these words of Christian charity as a serious prescription for a cure? The viciously antisemitic Nazi newspaper *Der Stürmer* and the Italian Fascist newspaper *Il Regime fascista* could applaud *Civiltà Cattolica* as an antisemitic model, with the latter opining in 1938 that all countries, including Italy and Germany, "still have much to learn from the Fathers of the Society of Jesus."

AGAINST WHAT OTHER group did prominent Catholic clergy, in an authoritative Vatican publication, consider mass extermination a possibility? The Church had many real enemies, including secularizers, rival Christian movements that disparaged and hated Catholicism, Nazism, and of course Communism. But its official voices did not consider exterminating these enemies *en masse*. How great must the antisemitism of the Church have been, how demonic a hallucination about the Jews must it have had, that a prominent member of the Church would explicitly discuss such an idea already in 1937? The Church's images of Jews made Jews worse than the worst criminals. The Church was not an opponent of the death penalty, which it officially endorsed. The logic of its enmity toward Jews suggested lethal measures against Jews, even if other (barely known) religious doctrines formally inhibited the Church from accepting this logic as a guide to action.

Father Rosa himself, just as he was receiving the draft encyclical, was publishing his own article on what to do with the Jews, two weeks after Italy's first antisemitic decree, in September, 1938, expelling foreign Jews. In it he endorsed a series of articles that *Civiltà Cattolica* had published in 1890, in which the Jewish exceptions to the Jewish norm are defended: "Not all Jews are thieves, agitators, deceivers, usurers, freemasons, crooks and corrupters of morals. Everywhere, there is a certain number of them who are not accomplices in the evil actions of the others." Father Rosa comments that experience shows that the writer in 1890 was correct when he wrote that granting the Jews civil equality "has had the effect of bringing Judaism and freemasonry together in persecuting the Catholic Church and elevating the Jewish race over Christians, as much in hidden power as in manifest opulence." Father Rosa's views were all but official Church pronouncements, and known throughout the Catholic world to be such, as his obituary in the Jesuit journal testified: "It is no exaggeration to say that Father Enrico Rosa remained for thirty years at the head of Italian Catholic journalism as interpreter and intrepid champion of the directives of the Holy See."

Even the anti-racism encyclical, this defense of the Jews, which Pius XII quashed, calls for an understanding of the "authentic basis for the social separation of the Jews from the rest of humanity," namely religion, which becomes an occasion for the author's advancement of vicious antisemitic notions. The encyclical conjures up the image of Christ-killers, "the Jewish people [who] put to death their Savior and King," and the resulting "Divine malediction, doom[ing them], as it were, to perpetually wander over the face of the earth" and "the wrath of God, because it [the Jewish people] has rejected the Gospel." It warns of "the spiritual dangers to which contact with Jews can expose souls," and, in the contemporary antisemitic idiom, that Jews "promote revolutionary movements that aim to destroy society and to obliterate from the minds of men the knowledge, reverence, and love of God."

THIS WAS WHAT Jews could hope for from their "friends" within the Church: a condemnation of violence and racist persecution immediately undermined by an expression of the seemingly irrepressible age-old need of Church leaders to make it clear that the Jews were indeed a great evil. And national churches (Polish, Slovakian, French, etc.) were no better, and some were worse, with Catholic publications around Europe, and especially in Germany before and during the Nazi period, including the years when Germans were slaughtering Jews, publishing antisemitic vitriol that was often indistinguishable from the Nazis' fare.

In Germany, they justified the elimination of the Jewish "alien bodies" from Germany often in racist terms. Antisemitic policies, according to the German Catholic publications, was "justifiable self-defense to prevent the harmful characteristics and influences of the Jewish race." Archbishop Conrad Gröber published an antisemitic pastoral letter in March, 1941, blaming the Jews for the death of Jesus and, quoting the Gospel of Matthew, implying that the Germans' eliminationist policies were justified: "The self-imposed curse of the Jews, 'His blood be on our heads and on our children's,' has come true terribly until the present time, until today." Why was this German bishop not censured by the other German bishops? Why was he not censured by Pius XII? If we consider that the antisemitic Pius XII himself felt the need, during the height of the mass murder, to reiterate the deicide charge in his encyclical *Mystici Corporis Christi* in June, 1943, perhaps the answer becomes clearer.

We might think about the effect of the Church's antisemitic doctrines upon

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ordinary Germans, Poles, and others to support the violent elimination of Jews. Take a person who believed in the demonology that the Jews were Christ-killers, that they threatened the German, Lithuanian, or Slovak people, that they were responsible for Bolshevism, that they caused economic crises such as the worldwide depression of the 1930s, that they corroded morals, and so on, and ask: what would such an individual do when political leaders said that we must eliminate these evil people who have caused him, his family, and his countrymen so much suffering? Would he resist an initiative to get rid of the people about whom he believed such things, merely because he might believe that the source of their great evil was their religion (something that the Church decidedly did not emphasize during these years), particularly when he knew that wholesale conversion was not even a remote possibility? Or would he recognize that while the Church may have helped, along with others, to alert him to the extreme threat of the diabolical Jews, it is the government, not the Church, that fashions and implements practical solutions to political problems, which is what the grave "Jewish Problem" was across Europe understood, ultimately, to be?

IX.

In the discussion of the role of the Catholic Church in the destruction of European Jewry, still another diversionary strategy is often encountered: to oscillate between presenting the Church as a moral institution and presenting it as a political institution, without taking note of the shifting ground. The Church is legitimized as a moral institution and then its failings are defended by appealing to the constraints, real or invented, that it faced as a political institution.

Moral institutions, when they take part in the material world, must be centrally concerned with the moral content of people's lives and guided in their actions by defensible moral principles. Political institutions, whatever moral notions may animate them, are concerned with public power—acquiring it, using it, sustaining it. If the Church is to be defended as a moral institution, then one set of criteria should be employed. If it is to be defended as a political institution, then a different set of criteria should be used.

Political institutions do make moral claims, even when they are manifestly disingenuous: to protect their people, to increase their people's welfare, to bring about their people's salvation, and so on. These claims typically are particularistic, self-interested, non-universal promises of what they will do for their people. For the Catholic Church to have a special status as a universal moral institution, which is its explicit claim for itself—"catholic," after all, means universal—it must predominantly tend to souls and moral lives, and be concerned for the welfare of all human beings. If we take the Church's self-presentation seriously and assess it as a moral institution and not as a political institution, and its leaders as moral and not political actors, then a series of troubling issues must be addressed.

What was wrong with this moral institution and its moral leadership that it did not recognize that Nazism was an unsurpassed evil? Already in 1933 Hitler presented, as a blueprint for world transformation, a lethal, racist view of humanity that was anathema to Jesus's ministry. Hitler preached a passionate hatred of Jews and called explicitly for their elimination in 1920—practically from the beginning of his political career. He glorified war. He urged foreign conquest. By 1939, and certainly by 1941, Hitler was undeniably practicing what he had proudly and insistently preached. Catholics should know that one does not make pacts with the Devil. But that is precisely what the Church did with its Concordat, which it "honored" through the war.

Why did this moral institution and its moral leaders not direct even an iota of the ire against Hitler and the Nazis that it hurled at the innocent and harmless Jews during these years? Why did this moral institution and its moral leaders speak relatively temperately about Nazism, its mass-murdering notwithstanding, yet assault the Soviet Union with the most vitriolic imprecations? Zuccotti rightly notes that, compared with the Church's kid-gloved criticism of Nazism itself (as opposed to its ringing condemnation of some religious practices in Germany) in *Mit brennender Sorge*, the encyclical of 1937, Pius XI's contemporaneous anti-Communist encyclical, *Divini Redemptoris*, is a thundering and thorough condemnation: Communism destroys Christianity and Christians "with a hatred and a savage barbarity one would not have believed possible in our age." It is a "satanic scourge," a "false messianic idea," a "pseudo-ideal," and a "plague." Why did Pius XI, when he was Vatican secretary of state in the 1930s, work hard to soften those statements critical of Nazism or Germany that did emanate from Church officials?

What principles governed when this moral institution compromised morality for expediency, namely, for its own power? During the 1930s, the Nazis conducted their violent assault upon the Jews, created concentration camps (to which they initially consigned the regime's and the Church's common Communist and socialist enemies), and institutionalized torture as a regime practice. Although the existence of the Church was not in any conceivable sense imperiled, the Church kept silent, and in some of these areas it even lent tacit or active support to the murderous regime.

Also lost in the discussion of the Church's eschewal of its moral duty to the victims is its duty to, yes, the perpetrators. After all, it is not bodies but souls that are the Church's self-appointed primary responsibility. So why did it fail utterly to tend the souls of the mass murderers? Why did it not warn them, not educate them, not make it clear to them that the mortal sins that they were committing would endanger their souls? During these years, this moral institution thought nothing of warning its flock against all manner of lesser danger and lesser sin, including the putative threat to Christian souls of fantasized Jewish infiltration. Why did this moral institution not raise a voice, let alone trumpet with all its power, the hellish danger in which the executioners plunged themselves, so that some of them might not transgress or might work to redeem themselves by refusing to kill (which the Nazi regime allowed them to do) and by aiding Jews however they could? Why did this moral institution not forcefully preach to Catholics: do not hate Jews, do not commit mass murder, resist murderers with all your might?

Any evaluation of the Catholic Church as a moral institution must centrally take into account that in effect the Church was serving—because not to choose is to choose—the closest human analogue to the Antichrist, I mean Hitler; and that it tacitly and sometimes materially aided him in mass murder. There were righteous individuals within the Church. Bishops, priests, nuns, and laity spoke out and helped to hide Jews. Many of them (even when they were also antisemites), such as members of Zegota, the Polish Catholic organization, were moved by their religious beliefs to save Jews. But they acted on their own, in sharp contrast to official Church policy.

It is hard to defend the Church of this era as a moral institution, at least with regard to Nazism and the Holocaust. Not surprisingly, its defenders hardly try to defend it on these grounds. Instead, they take refuge in defending the Church as a political institution. They say that it had diplomatic considerations; that it had to remain neutral in the war

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or it would itself be endangered; that it believed that it had to support the fight against Communism. How, then, does the Church look if we evaluate it using the standard appropriate to its political nature?

The reality is that, almost since its inception, the Church has been a political institution, vying for this-worldly power at least as much as it has tended to other-worldly affairs. In the nineteenth century, as Kertzer and Carroll show, the Church made a momentous political turn when it rejected liberalism, democracy, and capitalism—in other words, modernity itself. This the Church itself declared in one of the most important encyclicals in its history, Pope Pius IX's *Quanta Cura* in 1864. It explicitly rejected as an "error" the notion that "the Roman Pontiff can and ought to reconcile himself, and come to terms with progress, liberalism, and modern civilization."

And it was natural for it, a reflex, to use antisemitism to fight them. The Church identified the Jews as responsible for modernity, blaming them for the hated political, social, economic, and cultural changes that threatened the Church and its hold over its people. In the words of the encyclical, "It is from them [a conspiracy of secret sects] that the synagogue of Satan, which gathers its troops against the Church of Christ, takes its strength." Kertzer writes that this encyclical "would shape Catholic attitudes for decades to come," particularly its invocation of the "synagogue of Satan"—the name given in the Christian Bible to the Jews' place of worship—as the font of the modern evil.

Appealing to all people beholden to embattled institutions, practices, and traditions, the Church sought to mobilize the vast reservoir of European antisemitism in the Church's political battle against modernity. So it attacked Jews relentlessly. The political tactic, which was also true to the churchmen's genuine belief, was clear. If modernity could be identified with the Jews, then half the battle against it was won. The Church was availing itself of a common, time-honored trans-European political strategy, born of belief and expediency, of attacking institutions by identifying them with Jews. This, of course, was most successful in Germany, where racist antisemites were turning the Jews into the central symbol of everything that was awry with Germany and with modernity.

The defenders of the Church argue that with the outbreak of World War II it felt beleaguered on all sides, afraid for its existence. Even Zuccotti, who is hardly a defender of the Church, writes somewhat sympathetically in this vein:

> Never had the term "Fortress Church" seemed more apt. Under these circumstances, many Vatican officials became more suspicious, timid, and inflexible than ever. Their activities became equally narrow and defensive, directed exclusively toward their own constituency. There was little room for concern about the poverty, oppression, or violations of the human rights of non-Catholics, who were, by definition, enemies of the Church.

Perhaps the Church should have been more outward-looking and active, its defenders say, but its reaction is both understandable and, in the end, justifiable, given the real danger that it faced from Nazism, which was indeed profoundly anti-Christian, even if the Nazis concealed their hostility well enough so that most Germans, even ecclesiastical Germans, did not comprehend this.

WE ARE ASKED to show understanding for this embattled political institution, which was a state, with an absolute ruler and diplomatic relations with other states. But why should the Church's situation vis-à-vis the Germans be judged so different from that of all the other countries and peoples, and why should the difficult circumstances that everyone in Europe was facing (in many places far more direly than the Church) excuse or extenuate only this political institution and its political leaders' pattern of action and inaction?

Many leaders around Europe came to terms politically and ideologically with the Germans, abetting them in at least some of their important political goals, even as they claimed that they did so in order to safeguard their people and some semblance of independence for their country. Such leaders—Quisling in Norway, Pétain and Laval in Vichy—are often called collaborators and their regimes collaborationist. Using this standard of judgment, one might conclude that Pius XII, too, must be classified as a Nazi collaborator, even if one does not share Cornwell's overly harsh portrait of him as "Hitler's Pope."

Analytical rigor and moral honesty demand that this comparison be considered. That the words "collaborator" and "collaborationist" are not frequently uttered in connection with Pius XII and the Catholic Church (or its national churches, bishops, and so on) is a symptom of the failure of writers and commentators in our Christian societies to speak plainly about this most prominent Christian leader and Christian institution. This failure is even more glaring in light of certain facts about France, the country that gave us the concept of "collaborator": the declaration in November, 1941 by Monsignor Beaussart, the representative of Paris's Cardinal Suhard, who was the Church's Assembly of Cardinals and Archbishops' liaison with the Germans, that "collaboration is the only reasonable course for France and for the Church"; Charles de Gaulle's wish, after the war, to have at least twenty-seven bishops removed for collaborating with Vichy; the French legal codification of the crime of collaboration, the principles of which would certainly apply to the Catholic Church and many of its clergy within and outside of France.

After all, this political institution, the Catholic Church, signed an agreement with Hitler in order to maintain its worldly power. Presenting itself as a moral institution, it conferred de facto moral legitimacy upon his regime. It aided the Germans' persecution of their country's Jews by granting access to its genealogical records. It joined the regime in denouncing the Jews and then stood by, all but mute, as the Germans and their helpers committed genocide. It allowed its German clergy to give succor to the soldiers of Hitler's apocalyptic, mass-murdering war. In Slovakia, prominent clergy were genocidal allies of the Germans. In Croatia, a significant number of clergy committed mass murder themselves. As Vichy was putatively safeguarding France, the Church was safeguarding its material and spiritual domain, namely itself. Each betrayed an enormous number of people—including by furthering the Germans' persecution and mass murder of the Jews—in exchange for these few pieces of gold.

Whatever answer may be given, the question must be asked: was the Catholic Church more like Vichy France or more like Denmark; was Pius XII more like Pétain and Laval or more like Bishop Fuglsang-Damgaard of Copenhagen and King Christian II of Denmark? Any evaluation of the Church as a political institution must begin with the fact that while many of the world's political institutions were, with all their power, resisting the Hitlerian scourge, including by fighting an apocalyptic war for the future of civilization, the Church cut a selfish, Nazi-legitimizing deal, sparing itself inconvenience and conserving its own power. The Church was obviously content enough to watch more or less passively as the rest of Europe burned and the Germans pitilessly exterminated the Jews.

A PRINCIPAL DIFFICULTY with moral judgment is the existence of an array of available evaluative frameworks, and therefore the need to state clearly and then to justify the one chosen. This is rarely done by academics

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writing about the Holocaust, let alone by defenders of the Church, though they readily render convenient judgments. Comparison is often used to suggest moral judgments, but the examples chosen are rarely justified. Defenders of Pius XII make much of the alleged effects of the Dutch Catholic Church's protests in making him reluctant to help Jews, while being silent about the protests of other national churches, or failing to compare the Church to Denmark on the one hand or to Vichy or Quisling's Norway on the other.

So what moral standard should be used? The defenders fail to state the clear moral principles that the pope and the Church should have been employing in deciding whether to help the Jews, or the moral standard that we should adopt to evaluate their actions. Presumably Pius XII and his Church subscribed to the Catholic principle that murder is a sin, and to the doctrine derived from the Fifth Commandment to resist murder. Since no one can honestly maintain that the Church did everything it could, or even made some sincere and substantial effort to resist the murder of the Jews, its defenders must articulate the criteria by which the Church might rightly have violated this principle in the case of the Jews.

The defenders offer a conjecture, not a fact, that to resist the mass murder—even to do something as little as expressing public disapproval of it—would cripple the Church's power; a conjecture, not a fact, that German Catholics, because they were so antisemitic, would, in a conflict between the Church and Nazism, choose Nazism over Catholicism. If the Church's defenders think that conjectures of these kinds provide a sufficient standard for abandoning millions of people to their deaths, then they ought to say so openly. They should further state what the acceptable moral calculus would be: how many Jews' lives would it be fine for the Church to have sacrificed for its desire to preserve how much of its power or to keep how many of its German Catholics from leaving the fold? Until a defender of the pope's and the Church's conduct during the Holocaust answers such questions, he has not made a good-faith attempt to address the real issues.

Even if the Church's defenders were willing to sketch such a calculus, this would still not settle the matter. They would have to be capable also of arguing the following: that had the Nazis set out to exterminate systematically eleven million Catholics in Germany or Italy, or for that matter eleven million Protestants in Germany (the number of Jews whom the Nazis slated for extermination at the Wannsee conference) only and precisely because the victims were Catholic or Christian, and had the Germans been carrying out the mass annihilation, with all the perpetrators' systematic torturing of the victims, day after day for almost four years, until six million Christian martyrs had perished, then the Church would have employed the same moral calculus and done as little to help German or Italian Christian victims as it did to help the Jews; that Pius XII would never have spoken out publicly against the mass murder; that the bishops of, say, the German Catholic Church would have remained silent; and that the Church would have continued to legitimize the regime and aid it in the myriad ways that it did, including by "honoring" its Concordat.

I suppose that the Church's defenders and the pope's defenders would not be willing to argue this. After all, what Catholic (or non-Catholic) could believe, or find it justified, that the pope and the Church would, under his very windows, without protest, watch six or eleven million Catholics or Protestants be systematically tortured and annihilated because and only because of their faith? If the Church's defenders refuse to make such a claim, then they are conceding more generally that the Church was not using defensible moral principles in its response to the Holocaust, and, effectively, that antisemitism prejudicially influenced the Church's response to the calamity facing the Jews. Why should it be any less delegitimating of the Church that the actual victims were not Catholics but Jews?

Imagine something else: that the powerless Jews were really as powerful as the Nazis' and the Church's fantastical demonologies held them to be, and that Jews, not German Catholics and Protestants, were engaged in slaughtering six million of an intended eleven million Catholic victims. Would the Catholic Church have been silent and have been content to do as little to help the victims as it did during the Holocaust? Would the Church's defenders (if it had any defenders at all) argue in this hypothetical scenario that the pope should be prudentially silent as Jews were slaughtering Catholics because his protest would lead only to more dead Catholics?

If it is fair to judge any individual or any institution by the highest moral standard, surely that individual is the pope and that institution is the Catholic Church. Moreover, the obligation of the pope, the Church, and the national churches—specifically, the German bishops and priests—to protect Jews might reasonably be deemed greater than that of other individuals and other institutions, because the Church and the national churches were so culpable for spreading the beliefs that led many Germans, Poles, French, and others who did support an eliminationist assault upon the Jews to do so. But to expect the pope and the Church to have made a substantial effort to save Jews is actually not to expect more of them than of the others who did so; it is only to refuse to tolerate the excuses for why they did so much less good and so much more harm than others did.

So what moral standard should be used? The Church's own doctrines, which include Christianity's universalism? A Kantian universalism? A liberal utilitarianism? What results from the application of any or all of these standards is nothing other than a shattering condemnation of the pope's and the Church's silence and relative inaction. The issue is also clear if we employ the Church's own doctrine, derived from the Fifth Commandment: "The moral law prohibits exposing someone to mortal danger without grave reasons, as well as refusing assistance to a person in danger." Perhaps the most famous parable of the Christian Bible, that of the Good Samaritan—which proclaims the superiority of Christian morality over Jewish morality—makes vivid this Christian duty to help those in dire need.

X.

How has the postwar Church come to terms with its greatest failure? Not well, as Garry Wills's survey of the Church's disheartening record of reckoning with its past shows. He writes that a break with such antisemitism

> is not easily accomplished, not for any institution, and least of all for an institution that claims never to have been wrong, never to have persecuted, never to have inflicted injustice. Given so much to hide, the impulse to keep on hiding becomes imperative, automatic, almost inevitable. The structures of deceit are ever less escapable.... It is thought, no doubt, that to let the truth slip through ... would embarrass the Church. But to keep on evading the truth is a worse embarrassment, and a crime—an insult to those who have been wronged, and whose wrong will not be recognized.

Wills is rightly not satisfied with vague, uplifting words that get in the way of a full and honest confrontation with the Church's wrongdoings, and the wrongdoings of two popes and many bishops and priests, which would necessarily result in extensive, explicit, and unequivocal mea culpas.

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Essentially, the Catholic Church has continued to try to cover up rather than to confront the facts of its dishonorable past. (By the "Church" I mean the popes, the Vatican, and many national churches, though in some countries, such as France, bishops and others eventually acknowledged some essential aspects of the truth of the Church's past, and individual churchmen in many countries have also been more forthright.) If the Church and Pius XII, as their defenders insist, really had not been antisemitic and really had tried to do everything they could to help Jews, then why, after the defeat of Germany, did the pope and the Church fail to do some simple things?

Pius XII lived for thirteen years after the war, but he did not publicly condemn the extermination of the Jews explicitly or repudiate the Church's antisemitism. As Phayer chronicles, he refused again and again to make public statements condemning the antisemitism, even though he was repeatedly beseeched by some Church leaders, foreign diplomats, and Jewish leaders to do so. Why, when a putative threat to the Catholic Church's existence could no longer be invoked, could this pope, supposedly a friend of the Jews, not speak passionately and explicitly about the crime of the Holocaust and the evil of antisemitism? Did he not think that all the Catholics who aided in the slaughter, that all the Germans and Austrians who passionately supported Hitler and the eliminationist assault on the Jews and even the extermination itself, all the Catholics in Europe who were antisemites—did he not think that they might benefit from moral and practical instruction on the evils of their beliefs and their actions? Did he not think that Catholics coming of age after the war in continuing antisemitic environments across Europe (and beyond) should be warned about the evils of Jew-hatred?

Instead, Pius XII's Church continued to preach its age-old antisemitism, including what Carroll calls the first blood libel: that the Jews killed Jesus, and that all Jews are forever responsible for his death. Pius XII also sought to stop others in the Church from fighting antisemitism. Phayer writes about Gertrud Luckner, the leader of a small philosemitic German Catholic group that "had innocently sought the pope's support for her work, but discovered instead that the Holy See intended to investigate her. In June of 1948, the Holy Office issued a *monitum* (warning) to the German church charging that efforts of religious groups to attack antisemitism were encouraging religious indifferentism (the belief that one religion is as good as the next)." (Two years later, she was cleared of the charge.) In light of all this, how can anyone take seriously the whitewashing notion that the pope was moved during the war by a concern for the welfare of Jews?

Instead of renouncing antisemitism and condemning the mass murderers, the Church continued to side with those who had annihilated Jews. Not only did Pius XII not excommunicate a single German or non-German mass murderer of Jews, but the Vatican also helped many of them to escape justice by providing them with false documents and shepherding them to South America. Among the beneficiaries of the Church's goodwill were Adolf Eichmann, the man who coordinated the annihilation of millions of Jews; Franz Stangl, the commander successively of two extermination camps, Sobibor and Treblinka; Kurt Christmann, the commander of Sonderkommando 10a, which slaughtered Jews in the Soviet Union; Ante Pavelič, the head of the mass murdering Croatian Ustasha regime; and, most infamous of all, Dr. Josef Mengele. The roster of Vatican transgressions that Phayer presents includes seeking clemency for convicted war criminals, resisting the extradition of potential German war criminals, hiding fugitives on Vatican properties, and abetting the escape of mass murderers by appointing Nazi sympathizers inside the Church to critical positions.

WHY DID PIUS XII'S Church act in solidarity with the mass murderers of Jews instead of with those who sought to punish them? Why has there been no genuine mea culpa from the Church? Why have the Church and its defenders fabricated the idea that Pius XII engineered behind the scenes an extensive Church rescue effort of Jews? Why, on August 3, 1946, did Pius XII utter, in Wills's words, the "deliberate falsehood" that "we condemned on various occasions in the past the persecution that a fanatical antisemitism inflicted on the Hebrew people"? Even in this historical fabrication the pope could bring himself to speak only in the most perfunctory and oblique manner about the Holocaust. And why did Germany's Cardinal Bertram commit one of the most morally unfathomable and revealing deeds that symbolically sealed the Catholic Church's role in the Nazi period (and inaugurated the coming era of the Church's moral evasion over its past)? Upon learning of Hitler's death, Cardinal Bertram in the first days of May, 1945 ordered that in all the churches of his archdiocese there be held a special requiem, namely, "a solemn requiem mass ... in commemoration of the Führer" so that his Catholic flock could pray to the Almighty, in accord with the requiem's liturgy, that the Almighty's son, Adolf Hitler, be admitted to paradise.

What was wrong with this Church that, in the wake of the Holocaust, it did not immediately renounce the antisemitism that had been at its core? Why did this supposedly non-antisemitic Church cling, for almost twenty more years, to its hate-filled views of Jews before promulgating some necessary (though insufficient) reforms in 1965 in *Nostra Aetate*, "In Our Time," the Second Vatican Council's "Declaration on the Relation of the Church to Non-Christian Religions"? And even then, as Carroll and Wills discuss, there was much resistance within the Church to its halting forward steps. Why has the Church, even when it moves forward, been so timid in fighting this antisemitic evil?

Vatican II was convened by Pope John XXIII, a progressive and humble man who wanted to drag the Church politically and theologically into the modern world. He was a genuine friend of the Jews, having himself, as papal legate in Turkey, saved the lives of many Jews during the war by providing them with counterfeit baptismal documents. But the resistance within the Church to an official renunciation of the Church's antisemitism was great. Certain cardinals made several attempts to sabotage the pope's enterprise, which only the pope's intervention forfended. Although John XXIII's precipitous death guaranteed that, with Vatican II, the Church would at best go only a small part of the way toward acknowledging and redressing the problems with its doctrine, its theology, and its practices with regard to Jews, the momentum that he established was too great for Vatican II to be completely short-circuited.

Wills skillfully analyzes the Council's maneuverings and the various drafts of the statement on the Jews to show how resistant the assembled bishops were to rectifying the Church's antisemitic injustices, including its historical fabrications. The bishops rejected a draft proposal that explicitly and unequivocally declared that "the Chosen people cannot without injustice be termed a deicidal race." Wills comments that "the same Council fathers who did not want a reference to deicide also sought to exclude any mention of past persecutions by the church, or of Christian guilt for them. They won [against the liberal bishops] on all three issues." The deeply flawed and tepid statement on the Jews that the Council did promulgate contained the historical fabrication that the "authorities of the Jews and those who followed their lead pressed for the death of Christ." Not surprisingly, it fails to mention the most basic fact that would

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go a long way toward de-mythologizing Jesus's death and correcting the record for all misled Catholics, namely, that it was the Roman authorities themselves who freely chose to pass the death sentence on, and then crucified, Jesus. The Council's statement did lift "blame" from "the Jews of today" and from Jews alive then, though not from all of them. But the explicit clearing of the Jews of "deicide" is gone. Wills writes:

> In an item-by-item vote of the whole Council, the vote against the sentence that opposed blaming Jews for the death of Christ was one hundred eighty-eight, and that against opposition to calling the Jews cursed was two hundred forty-five. Admittedly, this is a small minority—the votes for the statements were 1,875 and 1,821 respectively. But it is astounding that even the weakened form of the statement, unaccompanied by any recognition of past persecution or any expression of sorrow and repentance, could still be rejected by hundreds of Catholic bishops.

XI.

WHY HAS THE Church shown so little empathy for the suffering of the Jews, for what it must have been like to have been a Jew listening to the Church's antisemitic pronouncements and fearing their consequences, until finally the consequences of European antisemitism included annihilation? The Church and its leaders know how to speak insistently and with feeling about suffering, yet genuine emotion is strikingly absent from its rare and formal statements regarding the suffering of Jews. Why has the Church not grieved for the Jews who have fallen by the hands of Church-inspired antisemites? Why has the Church not regularly mourned what the Church has wrought? Why is the Church's discussion of the anguish of the Jews, and of the Church's transgressions in causing that anguish, often perfunctory compared with its attempts at self-exculpation? Why, the exceptions of certain churchmen notwithstanding, is the Church's show of penitence not recognizably that of a genuine penitent? Anyone who mistakenly believes that the Church has done these things should read James Carroll's book to see what a devout Catholic's heartfelt confrontation with this past really looks like.

The half-heartedness and the historical fabrications of "We Remember" make it read, as Carroll has described Vatican II's statement about the Jews, "like a post-Shoah attempt to disassociate the Church from the diabolical effects of its own teaching without really addressing the problem of that teaching." The Catholic Church's failure to be truthful is that much more glaring in the light of the statement of 1994 by the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America:

> In the long history of Christianity there exists no more tragic development than the treatment accorded the Jewish people on the part of Christian believers. Very few Christian communities of faith were able to escape the contagion of anti-Judaism and its modern successor, anti-semitism. Lutherans ... feel a special burden in this regard because of certain elements in the legacy of the reformer Martin Luther and the catastrophes, including the Holocaust of the twentieth century, suffered by Jews in places where the Lutheran Churches were strongly represented....
>
> In the spirit of truth-telling, we who bear his name and heritage must with pain acknowledge also Luther's anti-Judaic diatribes and the violent recommendations of his later writings against the Jews. As did many of Luther's own companions in the sixteenth century, we reject this violent invective, and yet more do we express our deep and abiding sorrow over its tragic effects on subsequent generations....
>
> Grieving the complicity of our own tradition within this history of hatred, moreover, we express our urgent desire to live out our faith in Jesus Christ with love and respect for the Jewish people.

Let us be plain. Is it so hard to speak the truth? Is the Catholic Church so insecure in its self-understanding, and so frightened for its hold on its believers, that it must persist with its cover-up, including the transparent falsehood in "We Remember" that the Nazis' "antisemitism had its roots outside of Christianity"? The Evangelical Lutheran Church in America has neither ceased to exist nor lost its faithful because it uttered the truth about its tradition. What is wrong with the Catholic Church, an institution that claims to, and obviously in many ways does, serve God and goodness, that it treats its long sinful history of antisemitic invective and practice, institutionalized at its core, as incidental to itself, as "errors and failures of those sons and daughters of the Church" but never of the Church itself?

The Evangelical Lutheran Church in America and its membership were not involved in the eliminationist persecution of European Jewry, so it did not need to repent for any complicity in the Holocaust. But the Austrian Evangelical Church did. It has publicly confessed in a declaration in 1998 that "not only individual Christians but also our churches share in the guilt of the Holocaust/Shoah." Why does the Catholic Church insist on not owning up to the truth?

How can this Church, with its history, continue to teach contempt about Jews and their religion, namely, that Jews are in error when the truth is staring them in the face, that their religion has been superseded by Christianity? The fundamentally reworked *Catechism of the Catholic Church* of 1994—for all its noticeable attempts to be as respectful of Jews as is possible within the limits of unbending doctrine—remains a supersessionist and deeply flawed document. Echoing the Christian Bible, it asserts, among other things, that the Jews bear a terrible burden by willfully insisting on being an obstacle to the well-being of the rest of humanity: the Jews, because of their "unbelief" in Jesus, prevent the arrival of the Messiah and human salvation. Fifty years after the Holocaust, the Catholic Church still promulgates a doctrine that explicitly holds the Jews, in their desire to remain Jews, as the greatest obstacle to the well-being of Christians and humanity.

In 1996, the Central Committee of German Catholics, to its credit, explicitly criticized the *Catechism* for this, for its supersessionist presentation of the relationship of the Christian Bible to the Jewish Bible, and for its failure to address "the church's anti-Judaism at all," which the German Catholics concede "is hard to understand today." But John Paul II confirms this supersessionism in his book *Crossing the Threshold of Hope*: "The time when the people of the Old Covenant will be able to see themselves as part of the New is, naturally, a question to be left to the Holy Spirit." When will the misguided Jews "be able" to see that they must accept the divinity of Jesus? Even the terminology of "Old" and "New" testaments is, as Carroll writes, "inherently supersessionist."

WITH REGARD TO the Holocaust, there remains a deeper issue. Whatever the contemporary Church's disapproval of the Germans' persecution and extermination of the Jews—and who can believe that contemporary bishops and priests look upon the mass murder as anything other than one of the greatest crimes in human history?—the Church continues to practice its age-old undermining of Jews when dealing with the Holocaust. The Church's attempt at least in part to Christianize the Holocaust, to incorporate the Holocaust into its Christology, takes several forms: the invention of false Christian martyrs, false Christian heroes, and false Christian victims, and the appropriation of Jewish suffering falsely as its own.

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The Church canonized Edith Stein, a convert to Christianity. The Germans killed her not because she was Catholic or a nun, which they deemed irrelevant, but because she had been born a Jew. So the Church has sent her on the path to sainthood under the false pretext that she was a Holocaust martyr to her faith. The Church canonized Father Maximilian Kolbe, who in Auschwitz did nobly volunteer to give his life to save another inmate—but Kolbe was not in the camp because of his Christianity, and he did not die for his faith, a condition for his canonization as a martyr; and he was also the expressly antisemitic editor of an antisemitic Catholic journal. The Church fictitiously transforms Pius XII himself into a hero of the Holocaust, and its representatives, such as Father Peter Gumpel, transform him into a victim by saying that those who speak unpleasant truths about him are really libeling him.

"We Remember," the Church's public reckoning with its role in the Holocaust, alongside its much-awaited admission of some Catholic wrongdoing, turns the Church, with the Jews, into a co-victim of the Nazis. It speciously celebrates Catholics more as helpers than as persecutors of Jews. It calls for Jews to stop being "anti-Christian" just as Christians should stop being "anti-Judaic," as if the catastrophic antisemitism of the Church and anti-Jewish violence of Catholics has been but the flip side of an equivalent anti-Christian persecution by Jews.

Since these measures and these declarations are all deeply offensive to Jews, and since it is clear that several of these cases for sanctification are dubious even according to Catholic doctrine, why does the Church insist upon them? Its politics of turning itself into a victim of Nazism of the sort that it was not—the Nazis were ideologically anti-Catholic, but in much of Europe the Church was more a collaborator than a victim of Nazism and its allied states—and into a kind of co-equal of the Jews contributes to its attempt to whitewash its past, which necessitates not only the fallacious defense of Pius XII but also the transubstantiation of him from an offender into a saint.

Aubade

Scintillas of the anatomical
on the vines, buds opening:
make me a figure
for the woken.

On the vines, buds opening:
blue, little throats.
For the woken,
this different tin sky.

Blue, little throats:
speak to me in the right voice.
This different tin sky,
the playground thawing.

Speak to me in the right voice,
only clean, sweeter.
The playground thawing
into its primary colors.

Only clean, sweeter,
briary as honeysuckle,
into their primary colors
the words come: *bitter, astral.*

Briar: as honeysuckle,
as attic webs, constellated
into their primary colors.
White, or whiter.

The words come: *bitter, astral.*
Make me a figure,
blue little throats,
scintillas of the anatomical.

Rick Barot

Even though the Church is a self-proclaimed authoritarian institution, seeking ever more to clamp down on members to prevent them from straying from the Vatican's prescriptions, the sins of its past weigh heavily on the conscience of some, perhaps many, within the Church, more heavily than the strictures of the present. There are men and women within the Catholic hierarchy who wish to confront the wrongs of the Church's past and present, who speak directly and truthfully about the Church's antisemitism, who reject the teaching of anti-Jewish contempt that is inextricably part of the continuing supersessionist core of Catholicism.

Should anyone still doubt that a reckoning of the Church's and Pius XII's responsibility for the Holocaust must begin by confronting the Church's own antisemitism, or that it is simply those outside the Church who are making this call, the following statement should be taken to heart:

> ... it is a well-proven fact that for centuries, up until Vatican Council II, an anti-Jewish tradition stamped its mark in differing ways on Christian doctrine and teaching, in theology, apologetics, preaching and in the liturgy. It was on such ground that the venomous plant of hatred for the Jews was able to flourish. Hence, the heavy inheritance [the Church] still bear[s] in our century, with all its consequences which are so difficult to wipe out. Hence our still open wounds.
>
> To the extent that the pastors and those in authority in the Church let such a teaching of disdain develop for so long, along with an underlying basic religious culture among Christian communities which shaped and deformed people's attitudes, they bear a grave responsibility. Even if they condemned antisemitic theories as being pagan in origin, they did not enlighten people's minds as they ought because they failed to call into question these centuries-old ideas and attitudes. This had a soporific effect on people's consciences, reducing their capacity to resist when the full violence of National Socialist antisemitism rose up, the diabolical and ultimate expression of hatred of the Jews, based on the categories of race and blood, and which was explicitly directed to the physical annihilation of the Jewish people.

The authors should know of what they speak. They are the French bishops and this is their "Declaration of Repentance" in 1997. They forthrightly reject many of the current pope's and the Church's defenders' prevarications about the past. Their apology is obviously heartfelt in a way that still eludes the Vatican: "For this failing of the Church of France and of her responsibility toward the Jewish people are part of our history: We confess this sin. We beg God's pardon, and we call upon the Jewish people to hear our words of repentance."

Should a reader of what I have written here consider my arguments to be anti-Catholic, then such a reader must aim his attack also at the French bishops. For the bishops place blame squarely on the Church's teachings, on "the Church as such." They do not palm off the blame onto misguided "sons and daughters of the Church." They show us that this true Catholic Church and these true sons and daughters of the Church will confront Catholicism's past as a way to ponder the path needed for a truthful future.

The spate of recent books dwelling on the misconduct of Pius XII during the Holocaust has put the Church under pressure, as it wishes formally to begin the process that would likely lead to his canonization. That the Church would declare this man a saint should not surprise anyone who knows that in 2000 John Paul II beatified Pius IX, the nineteenth-century father of mod-

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ern Church antisemitism (he declared in 1871 that by rejecting Christianity Jews had become "dogs" and that "we have today in Rome unfortunately too many of these dogs, and we hear them barking in all the streets, and going around molesting people everywhere") and a passionate persecutor of Jews.

Trying to quell the criticism about Pius XII, the Vatican announced in October, 1999 its creation of a commission of six historians, three Catholics and three Jews, to investigate the pope's conduct during the Holocaust, with the initial mandate of reviewing the Church's own published wartime diplomatic documents, asking questions about it, and issuing a report. In October, 2000 the commission issued "The Vatican and the Holocaust: A Preliminary Report." It asked the Vatican for a broad range of necessary materials with which to complete its work, which indicated how much the Church was keeping buried, and it suggested, in its forty-seven questions, how damaging that unseen material might be.

When, after ten months of the Vatican's inaction, it became clear to the commission that the Vatican had no intention of providing the materials necessary for it to continue its investigation, the commission suspended its work. The Vatican responded with classical antisemitic invective, accusing the Jewish members of the commission, Michael Marrus, Bernard Suchecky, and Robert Wistrich, of conducting a "defamatory campaign" against the Church. (Amazing as it may sound, the commission skirted the issue of the pope's antisemitism entirely, not asking explicitly for any archival information that might shed light on it.) The commission's Catholic members, Eva Fleischner, Gerald Fogarty, and John Morley, did not contest their Jewish colleagues' disclosure that they had always expected that the Church would give them access to the documents necessary for their inquiry. Yet the Vatican did not attack the non-Jews on the commission. If, as the Church maintained, the Jews were lying, then so were the Catholics. Why, then, attack only the Jews, and why use antisemitic tropes?

That the Church was not going to allow the commission to undertake a serious probe of Pius XII might have been obvious from the beginning, because the priest whom the Vatican designated to be its representative to the commission, and the author of the Church's official public attack on the Jewish historians, the Jesuit Father Gumpel, is the Church's officially appointed advocate for furthering Pius XII's candidacy for canonization. Against all the evidence, Father Gumpel maintains that Pius XII was nothing but saintly regarding the Jews, "laboring ceaselessly" for them. Speaking in this regard officially for the Church, he brands Jews who criticize Pius XII as responsible for "calumnious attacks against this great and saintly man," and even as "massive accomplices in the destruction of the Catholic Church," just as—and here he resurrects a Nazi-like charge—"Jews were the managers of Communism." As if such antisemitic slurs were not enough, Father Gumpel made a special point of emphatically and unqualifiedly declaring on "CBS News" to millions of people: "Let us be frank and open about this. It is a fact that the Jews have killed Christ. This is an undeniable historical fact."

Pope John Paul II has not censured Father Gumpel, who has been denounced by Gerhard Bodendorfer, the chief of the coordinating body for Christian-Jewish dialogue in Austria, as a man "hawking" such "old, obviously undistilled prejudices," such as "conspiracy theories about world Judaism" that "come out of the lowest drawer of antisemitism." Indeed, Father Gumpel maintains a place of great honor and responsibility in the Church, which gave him the platform to defame Jews who merely seek the records that are necessary for the work that the Church had asked them to do. Perhaps the Church protects Father Gumpel in his post because only an antisemite and a historical falsifier can be counted upon to present Pius XII in the glowing manner required for canonization.

When all of the disputation for and against Pius XII's and the Catholic Church's conduct before and during the Holocaust is done, when all of the discussion of particular deeds, circumstances, and motives is cleared away, everything comes down to an unavoidable question. What would Jesus have done? Would Jesus, a man who spoke truth to power, have said that his Church should have shouted protest, have spoken moral truth to evil, instead of being virtually silent, as the Jews, his people, in his and the Catholic Church's continuing view God's people, were being hounded, tortured, and exterminated? Would Jesus himself, in the face of such evil, have publicly condemned the evildoers?

There are three possible responses. First, to say "no," with all the moral and doctrinal devastation that it implies for Christianity. Second, to say nothing, to avoid answering this morally unavoidable question, which would concede that for a defender of Pius XII or the Church these plainest and most pertinent questions have no morally palatable answer. Third, to say that Jesus would have told his Church that it must not be a silent witness, complicit in the evil of the slaughtering of his people or, for that matter, of any people, that Jesus himself, this forthright man of goodness, would of course have publicly and repeatedly decried the evil in explicit, unambiguous, powerful, and ringing language. By admitting this, a person would necessarily concede that Pope Pius XII, the Church, and its silent cardinals, bishops, and priests sinned against God, betrayed their faith and their flock, and bear a weighty moral responsibility in the death of the Jews.

And no matter what a person's response to the question of what Jesus would have done, each answer leads to another unavoidable question: what should be the future of this Church that has not fully faced its antisemitic history, that still has antisemitic elements embedded in its doctrine and theology, and that still claims to be the exclusive path to salvation? ■

CORRESPONDENCE

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you name it—would prove ineffectual." In saying this he ignores the "Keynesian revolution" to which he had just paid his respects, that "governments must spend money to prop up demand in a recession," as well as the Keynesian alternative that government can lower taxes to prop up demand. Both of these measures can head off the "secondary" unemployment that results from the "primary" unemployment, and help in reabsorbing the primary unemployed in productive activity. They would particularly benefit low-income people and those being thrown off welfare by time limits, and would save the economy the enormous waste of high unemployment.

As one who took an economics course with Schumpeter many years ago, I am pleased to see his ideas brought forward; but I am appalled that THE NEW REPUBLIC is peddling the anti-Keynesian nonsense that there are no effective countercyclical policies.

ALLEN H. BARTON
Chapel Hill, North Carolina

NOAM SCHEIBER REPLIES:
Allen H. Barton is correct to invoke Schumpeter's distinction between the primary and secondary impact of a recession. It's a distinction I made, albeit implicitly, in the piece. Hence the concession that "cutting interest rates will prevent [the recession] from being worse than necessary" and that "government spending might also help ease the blow."

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JERUSALEM DIARIST

Anchors Away

IN ISRAEL, "OPERATION NOAH'S Ark," the January 3 capture of a ship carrying weapons bound for Palestine, was an epiphany. For many erstwhile doves, it shattered the illusion—still alive despite more than a year of intifada—that they could negotiate a demilitarized Palestinian state next door.

THE REST OF THE WORLD TREATED the news with a yawn. Italy's *la Repubblica* restricted its discussion of the ship to a sidebar within a front-page article about Yasir Arafat's confinement to Ramallah, entitled "THE SAD DAYS OF ARAFAT—PRESIDENT IN PRISON." Germany's *Berliner Zeitung* mentioned the ship under a headline about the Palestinian Authority's (PA) arrest of six extremists. London's *Observer* buried the story altogether. In much of the international press, Arafat's denial of responsibility—his solemn word that he knew nothing about a 4,000-ton ship purchased by one of his operatives and manned by members of his navy—has been treated as a credible counterweight to Israeli claims. Not even the televised admission by the ship's captain that the weapons were loaded near the Iranian coast, overseen by a Hezbollah agent, and bound for the PA—a textbook example of President Bush's definition of what transforms a local conflict into global-reach terrorism—convinced foreign observers that Israel had uncovered a Palestinian-Iranian-Hezbollah triangle. Few governments considered it disturbing that Arafat was using his pledged crackdown on terrorism as a cover to acquire weapons of terror aimed at civilians—dozens of Katyushas that could be used in attacks on Israeli towns and more than 2,000 kilos of high-grade explosives, especially c-4, more powerful than any explosive used in the car bombs and suicide assaults so far. Even the State Department—desperate to preserve what was once a peace process and is now barely a cease-fire process—reacted to the Palestinian captain's confirmation of Israel's accusations with the bland assertion that it was awaiting more conclusive proof.

IN ISRAEL, BY CONTRAST, THE operation—conducted more than 300 miles off the Israeli coast—was treated as an epic. Israelis consumed every detail, from how the ship was tracked after its purchase last October, to its eight-minute bloodless takeover. In its first edition after the news broke, the newspaper *Maariv* devoted 17 news pages to the story; commentators recalled the Entebbe rescue and the bombing of the Iraqi reactor at Osirak. "JUST LIKE IN THE MOVIES," exulted the headline of Israel's largest daily, *Yediot Aharonot*. One left-wing columnist complained that the newspapers resembled "victory albums"—a relapse into post-Six Day War arrogance. Yet Israelis weren't gloating; we were relieved: Despite our flight from Lebanon and our stalemated war against terrorism, we were still smart and daring enough to protect ourselves.

AND THE OPERATION DIDN'T ONLY have a profound emotional impact on Israeli society; it had an enormous political impact as well. After the suicide bombings in Jerusalem and Haifa last month, Prime Minister Sharon increased his demands on Arafat not only to impose seven days of quiet, but also to uproot Hamas and Islamic Jihad's terrorist infrastructure, and collect the vast quantity of illegal Palestinian weapons that violate the Oslo accords. Recently, though, Shimon Peres had begun to erode those demands, implying that a reduction in violence alone was sufficient for resuming political talks. And a weary Israeli public seemed prepared to go along. Indeed, though the Israeli press has amply reported that Arafat loyalists—mostly Tanzim militiamen and members of Force 17, Arafat's personal guard—have initiated about half of the terrorist attacks of the last year, many Israelis continued to cling to a distinction between Arafat and Hamas.

NO MORE. "OPERATION NOAH'S ARK" has quickly returned Israel's focus to infrastructure. Defense Minister and newly elected Labor Party leader Benjamin Ben-Eliezer has warned that the relative lull in violence conceals a steady expansion of the terrorist infrastructure. Even the left-wing newspaper *Ha'aretz* has been forced to concede that "Arafat is preparing for a huge escalation, including the ability to equip hundreds of suicide attackers with explosives and to attack Israeli cities with rockets." And most Israelis now realize that to demand that Arafat dismantle Palestine's terrorist infrastructure is absurd: As this incident proved, the biggest terrorist infrastructure in the PA is the PA itself. And so the Oslo process has moved from ambitious negotiations over ending the conflict to pathetic negotiations over resuming negotiations to now, finally, the realization that there is no point in negotiating at all.

IN DELEGITIMIZING ARAFAT, SHARON has the crucial backing of the army's general staff. Once a key bastion of Oslo support, the general staff's attitude has gradually shifted from skepticism over Arafat's intentions to public contempt. Following the seizure, Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz overstepped his authority and declared that it was time for the government to reevaluate its relations with Arafat—implying that Israel should label him not merely irrelevant, but an outright enemy. "This smuggle attempt emphasizes and points directly at the Palestinian Authority intention to continue a strategy of terror and violence increasing and escalating over time," Mofaz said last week. Though he has rebuked Mofaz for political statements in the past, this time Ben-Eliezer refused to join the left-wing Knesset members who justifiably criticized the chief of staff for trying to publicly influence the government's agenda. And were it not for pressure within Labor, Ben-Eliezer would probably endorse Mofaz's position himself.

BUT THE NEW MOOD GOES DEEPER than mere loathing of Arafat. For the first time since Oslo, you don't have to be right-wing to question the wisdom of a Palestinian state segmented between the West Bank and Gaza, with Israel wedged in between. The arms seizure has negated the most basic assumption of the Oslo process: that a Palestinian state would be demilitarized and devoid of terrorist intent. Now demilitarization no longer seems feasible. And mainstream Israeli newspapers have published maps that could have been lifted from the settlers' anti-Oslo pamphlets of the mid-1990s, showing Israel's population centers within Katyusha range of Gaza and the West Bank—maps that show most of Israel as the equivalent of the Northern border town of Kiryat Shemona, the symbol of Israeli vulnerability to constant attack. In my conversations about the ship with friends across the political spectrum, one question recurs: If this is what the Palestinians attempt now, with Israel in control of the borders and the seas, how will we enforce demilitarization in a sovereign Palestine? Barely anyone anymore even tries to provide an answer.

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

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

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

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

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
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Education Policy and Information

E. D. Hirsch Jr. is a professor of education and humanities emeritus, University of Virginia; distinguished visiting fellow, Hoover Institution; and member, Hoover's Koret Task Force on K–12 Education.

Economists say that the unequal distribution of information compromises market efficiency. Advocates of free-market school reforms such as charter schools and voucher programs should heed this important truth, as should school boards and state legislators. Without a free flow of reliable information, parents and policymakers cannot make intelligent decisions. Unfortunately, **reliable information is a scarce resource in the education world.**

Educational data exist in oversupply, but there's a critical difference between data and information. Data do not speak for themselves; they must be interpreted by teasing out the separate factors that affect educational outcomes and assigning relative causality to them. Useful analyses, dependable generalizations, and accurate interpretations of educational data are in short supply.

To those who must make decisions, it is disconcerting that so much educational data have produced so little usable information. The November 7 issue of *Education Week* reports that data on the multimillion-dollar "whole school" reform effort are inconclusive. Similarly, the November issue of *Scientific American* reports that data on the effects of class-size reduction are also inconclusive. We cannot draw dependable policy implications from these studies because the data remain ungeneralized and, in a fundamental sense, uninterpreted.

The best recent attempt to generalize educational data was offered by the late Jeanne Chall in her slender last book, *The Academic Achievement Challenge*—the fruit of a lifetime of engagement with educational research. Yet Chall's book has had a negligible effect on charter schools or state policies because its information has not been disseminated. Some thoughtful philanthropist should send thousands of copies of Chall's book to those in a position to affect policy.

One of the greatest gains in our understanding of scientific method came with the insight that data take on new meanings with new interpretations and that the best interpretations take into account relevant knowledge from the widest possible range of domains. **We need to transform the ocean of educational data into usable information on the basis of the most wide-ranging and exacting analyses.** In a field beset with ideology and politics, it is not surprising that good science is in short supply. But regardless of one's faith in markets or, alternatively, in state regulation, we still need reliable information, which means that we need really good science, not the impostor that now calls itself "research" in the field of education. Without better information we are unlikely to achieve much improvement in the quality and equity of our schools.

— E. D. Hirsch Jr.

Paid for by the Hoover Institution, Stanford University.

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